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Message-Id: <20190607153858.186248816@linuxfoundation.org>
Date: Fri, 7 Jun 2019 17:40:10 +0200
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
stable@...r.kernel.org, Nadav Amit <namit@...are.com>,
Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>,
"Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@...radead.org>,
akpm@...ux-foundation.org, ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org,
deneen.t.dock@...el.com, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com,
kristen@...ux.intel.com, linux_dti@...oud.com, will.deacon@....com,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Rik van Riel <riel@...riel.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>, Sasha Levin <sashal@...nel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 5.1 85/85] x86/kprobes: Set instruction page as executable
[ Upstream commit 7298e24f904224fa79eb8fd7e0fbd78950ccf2db ]
Set the page as executable after allocation. This patch is a
preparatory patch for a following patch that makes module allocated
pages non-executable.
While at it, do some small cleanup of what appears to be unnecessary
masking.
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@...are.com>
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@...radead.org>
Cc: <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc: <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>
Cc: <deneen.t.dock@...el.com>
Cc: <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>
Cc: <kristen@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: <linux_dti@...oud.com>
Cc: <will.deacon@....com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@...or.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@...riel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190426001143.4983-11-namit@vmware.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@...nel.org>
---
arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c
index fed46ddb1eef..06058c44ab57 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c
@@ -431,8 +431,20 @@ void *alloc_insn_page(void)
void *page;
page = module_alloc(PAGE_SIZE);
- if (page)
- set_memory_ro((unsigned long)page & PAGE_MASK, 1);
+ if (!page)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * First make the page read-only, and only then make it executable to
+ * prevent it from being W+X in between.
+ */
+ set_memory_ro((unsigned long)page, 1);
+
+ /*
+ * TODO: Once additional kernel code protection mechanisms are set, ensure
+ * that the page was not maliciously altered and it is still zeroed.
+ */
+ set_memory_x((unsigned long)page, 1);
return page;
}
@@ -440,8 +452,12 @@ void *alloc_insn_page(void)
/* Recover page to RW mode before releasing it */
void free_insn_page(void *page)
{
- set_memory_nx((unsigned long)page & PAGE_MASK, 1);
- set_memory_rw((unsigned long)page & PAGE_MASK, 1);
+ /*
+ * First make the page non-executable, and only then make it writable to
+ * prevent it from being W+X in between.
+ */
+ set_memory_nx((unsigned long)page, 1);
+ set_memory_rw((unsigned long)page, 1);
module_memfree(page);
}
--
2.20.1
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