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Message-Id: <A495EEB4-F05F-4AB3-831A-0F15B912A7EC@amacapital.net>
Date: Fri, 7 Jun 2019 10:05:13 -0700
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
To: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>, x86@...nel.org,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org,
linux-arch@...r.kernel.org, linux-api@...r.kernel.org,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
Balbir Singh <bsingharora@...il.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...il.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@...hat.com>,
Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>,
"H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@...il.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@...cle.com>,
Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@...il.com>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>,
"Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@...el.com>,
Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@...el.com>,
Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@....com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 03/14] x86/cet/ibt: Add IBT legacy code bitmap setup function
> On Jun 7, 2019, at 9:45 AM, Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com> wrote:
>
> On Fri, 2019-06-07 at 09:35 -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>>> On Jun 7, 2019, at 9:23 AM, Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>>> On Fri, 2019-06-07 at 10:08 +0200, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
>>>>> On Thu, Jun 06, 2019 at 01:09:15PM -0700, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
>>>>> Indirect Branch Tracking (IBT) provides an optional legacy code bitmap
>>>>> that allows execution of legacy, non-IBT compatible library by an
>>>>> IBT-enabled application. When set, each bit in the bitmap indicates
>>>>> one page of legacy code.
>>>>>
>>>>> The bitmap is allocated and setup from the application.
>>>>> +int cet_setup_ibt_bitmap(unsigned long bitmap, unsigned long size)
>>>>> +{
>>>>> + u64 r;
>>>>> +
>>>>> + if (!current->thread.cet.ibt_enabled)
>>>>> + return -EINVAL;
>>>>> +
>>>>> + if (!PAGE_ALIGNED(bitmap) || (size > TASK_SIZE_MAX))
>>>>> + return -EINVAL;
>>>>> +
>>>>> + current->thread.cet.ibt_bitmap_addr = bitmap;
>>>>> + current->thread.cet.ibt_bitmap_size = size;
>>>>> +
>>>>> + /*
>>>>> + * Turn on IBT legacy bitmap.
>>>>> + */
>>>>> + modify_fpu_regs_begin();
>>>>> + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, r);
>>>>> + r |= (MSR_IA32_CET_LEG_IW_EN | bitmap);
>>>>> + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, r);
>>>>> + modify_fpu_regs_end();
>>>>> +
>>>>> + return 0;
>>>>> +}
>>>>
>>>> So you just program a random user supplied address into the hardware.
>>>> What happens if there's not actually anything at that address or the
>>>> user munmap()s the data after doing this?
>>>
>>> This function checks the bitmap's alignment and size, and anything else is
>>> the
>>> app's responsibility. What else do you think the kernel should check?
>>>
>>
>> One might reasonably wonder why this state is privileged in the first place
>> and, given that, why we’re allowing it to be written like this.
>>
>> Arguably we should have another prctl to lock these values (until exec) as a
>> gardening measure.
>
> We can prevent the bitmap from being set more than once. I will test it.
>
I think it would be better to make locking an explicit opt-in.
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