linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v4 6/9] iommu/vt-d: Check whether device requires bounce buffer

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Message-ID: <20190610160802.GX28796@char.us.oracle.com>
Date:   Mon, 10 Jun 2019 12:08:03 -0400
From:   Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@...cle.com>
To:     Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@...ux.intel.com>
Cc:     David Woodhouse <dwmw2@...radead.org>,
        Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>,
        Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@...gle.com>,
        Christoph Hellwig <hch@....de>, ashok.raj@...el.com,
        jacob.jun.pan@...el.com, alan.cox@...el.com, kevin.tian@...el.com,
        mika.westerberg@...ux.intel.com, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
        Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        pengfei.xu@...el.com, Marek Szyprowski <m.szyprowski@...sung.com>,
        Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@....com>,
        Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
        Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@...cle.com>,
        Juergen Gross <jgross@...e.com>,
        Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@...nel.org>,
        Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
        iommu@...ts.linux-foundation.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        Jacob Pan <jacob.jun.pan@...ux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 6/9] iommu/vt-d: Check whether device requires bounce
 buffer

On Mon, Jun 03, 2019 at 09:16:17AM +0800, Lu Baolu wrote:
> This adds a helper to check whether a device needs to
> use bounce buffer. It also provides a boot time option
> to disable the bounce buffer. Users can use this to
> prevent the iommu driver from using the bounce buffer
> for performance gain.
> 
> Cc: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@...el.com>
> Cc: Jacob Pan <jacob.jun.pan@...ux.intel.com>
> Cc: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@...el.com>
> Signed-off-by: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@...ux.intel.com>
> Tested-by: Xu Pengfei <pengfei.xu@...el.com>
> Tested-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@...el.com>
> ---
>  Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 5 +++++
>  drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c                     | 6 ++++++
>  2 files changed, 11 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> index 138f6664b2e2..65685c6e53e4 100644
> --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> @@ -1728,6 +1728,11 @@
>  			Note that using this option lowers the security
>  			provided by tboot because it makes the system
>  			vulnerable to DMA attacks.
> +		nobounce [Default off]
> +			Do not use the bounce buffer for untrusted devices like
> +			the Thunderbolt devices. This will treat the untrusted

My brain has sometimes a hard time parsing 'Not' and 'un'. Could this be:

	Disable bounce buffer for unstrusted devices ..?


And perhaps call it 'noswiotlb' ? Not everyone knows that SWIOTLB = bounce buffer.

> +			devices as the trusted ones, hence might expose security
> +			risks of DMA attacks.
>  
>  	intel_idle.max_cstate=	[KNL,HW,ACPI,X86]
>  			0	disables intel_idle and fall back on acpi_idle.
> diff --git a/drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c b/drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c
> index 235837c50719..41439647f75d 100644
> --- a/drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c
> +++ b/drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c
> @@ -371,6 +371,7 @@ static int dmar_forcedac;
>  static int intel_iommu_strict;
>  static int intel_iommu_superpage = 1;
>  static int iommu_identity_mapping;
> +static int intel_no_bounce;

intel_swiotlb_on = 1 ?

>  
>  #define IDENTMAP_ALL		1
>  #define IDENTMAP_GFX		2
> @@ -384,6 +385,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(intel_iommu_gfx_mapped);
>  static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(device_domain_lock);
>  static LIST_HEAD(device_domain_list);
>  
> +#define device_needs_bounce(d) (!intel_no_bounce && dev_is_untrusted(d))
> +
>  /*
>   * Iterate over elements in device_domain_list and call the specified
>   * callback @fn against each element.
> @@ -466,6 +469,9 @@ static int __init intel_iommu_setup(char *str)
>  			printk(KERN_INFO
>  				"Intel-IOMMU: not forcing on after tboot. This could expose security risk for tboot\n");
>  			intel_iommu_tboot_noforce = 1;
> +		} else if (!strncmp(str, "nobounce", 8)) {
> +			pr_info("Intel-IOMMU: No bounce buffer. This could expose security risks of DMA attacks\n");

Again, Intel-IOMMU: No SWIOTLB. T.. blah blah'

Asking for this as doing 'dmesg | grep SWIOTLB' will expose nicely all
the SWIOTLB invocations..

> +			intel_no_bounce = 1;
>  		}
>  
>  		str += strcspn(str, ",");
> -- 
> 2.17.1
>