linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v7 03/14] x86/cet/ibt: Add IBT legacy code bitmap setup function

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Date:   Mon, 10 Jun 2019 13:27:07 -0700
From:   Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com>
To:     Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
Cc:     Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>, x86@...nel.org,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org,
        linux-arch@...r.kernel.org, linux-api@...r.kernel.org,
        Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
        Balbir Singh <bsingharora@...il.com>,
        Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...il.com>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@...hat.com>,
        Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>,
        "H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@...il.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
        Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@...cle.com>,
        Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@...il.com>,
        Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>,
        Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>,
        "Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@...el.com>,
        Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@...el.com>,
        Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@....com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 03/14] x86/cet/ibt: Add IBT legacy code bitmap setup
 function

On Mon, 2019-06-10 at 12:52 -0700, Dave Hansen wrote:
> On 6/10/19 12:38 PM, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
> > > > When an application starts, its highest stack address is determined.
> > > > It uses that as the maximum the bitmap needs to cover.
> > > 
> > > Huh, I didn't think we ran code from the stack. ;)
> > > 
> > > Especially given the way that we implemented the new 5-level-paging
> > > address space, I don't think that expecting code to be below the stack
> > > is a good universal expectation.
> > 
> > Yes, you make a good point.  However, allowing the application manage the
> > bitmap
> > is the most efficient and flexible.  If the loader finds a legacy lib is
> > beyond
> > the bitmap can cover, it can deal with the problem by moving the lib to a
> > lower
> > address; or re-allocate the bitmap.
> 
> How could the loader reallocate the bitmap and coordinate with other
> users of the bitmap?

Assuming the loader actually chooses to re-allocate, it can copy the old bitmap
over to the new before doing the switch.  But, I agree, the other choice is
easier; the loader can simply put the lib at lower address.  AFAIK, the loader
does not request high address in mmap().

> 
> > If the loader cannot allocate a big bitmap to cover all 5-level
> > address space (the bitmap will be large), it can put all legacy lib's
> > at lower address.  We cannot do these easily in the kernel.
> 
> This is actually an argument to do it in the kernel.  The kernel can
> always allocate the virtual space however it wants, no matter how large.
>  If we hide the bitmap behind a kernel API then we can put it at high
> 5-level user addresses because we also don't have to worry about the
> high bits confusing userspace.

We actually tried this.  The kernel needs to reserve the bitmap space in the
beginning for every CET-enabled app, regardless of actual needs.  On each memory
request, the kernel then must consider a percentage of allocated space in its
calculation, and on systems with less memory this quickly becomes a problem.