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Message-ID: <ec6ac2ba-7b88-2bcf-aa95-f8981b258c5c@linux.intel.com>
Date: Wed, 12 Jun 2019 08:43:40 +0800
From: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@...ux.intel.com>
To: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@...cle.com>
Cc: baolu.lu@...ux.intel.com, David Woodhouse <dwmw2@...radead.org>,
Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>,
Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@...gle.com>,
Christoph Hellwig <hch@....de>, ashok.raj@...el.com,
jacob.jun.pan@...el.com, alan.cox@...el.com, kevin.tian@...el.com,
mika.westerberg@...ux.intel.com, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
pengfei.xu@...el.com, Marek Szyprowski <m.szyprowski@...sung.com>,
Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@....com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@...cle.com>,
Juergen Gross <jgross@...e.com>,
Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@...nel.org>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
iommu@...ts.linux-foundation.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 3/9] swiotlb: Zero out bounce buffer for untrusted
device
Hi Konrad,
Thanks a lot for your reviewing.
On 6/10/19 11:45 PM, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk wrote:
> On Mon, Jun 03, 2019 at 09:16:14AM +0800, Lu Baolu wrote:
>> This is necessary to avoid exposing valid kernel data to any
>> milicious device.
>
> malicious
Yes, thanks.
>
>>
>> Suggested-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@....de>
>> Signed-off-by: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@...ux.intel.com>
>> ---
>> kernel/dma/swiotlb.c | 6 ++++++
>> 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/kernel/dma/swiotlb.c b/kernel/dma/swiotlb.c
>> index f956f785645a..ed41eb7f6131 100644
>> --- a/kernel/dma/swiotlb.c
>> +++ b/kernel/dma/swiotlb.c
>> @@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
>> #include <linux/scatterlist.h>
>> #include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
>> #include <linux/set_memory.h>
>> +#include <linux/pci.h>
>> #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_FS
>> #include <linux/debugfs.h>
>> #endif
>> @@ -560,6 +561,11 @@ phys_addr_t swiotlb_tbl_map_single(struct device *hwdev,
>> */
>> for (i = 0; i < nslots; i++)
>> io_tlb_orig_addr[index+i] = orig_addr + (i << IO_TLB_SHIFT);
>> +
>> + /* Zero out the bounce buffer if the consumer is untrusted. */
>> + if (dev_is_untrusted(hwdev))
>> + memset(phys_to_virt(tlb_addr), 0, alloc_size);
>
> What if the alloc_size is less than a PAGE? Should this at least have ALIGN or such?
It's the consumer (iommu subsystem) who requires this to be page
aligned. For swiotlb, it just clears out all data in the allocated
bounce buffer.
Best regards,
Baolu
>
>> +
>> if (!(attrs & DMA_ATTR_SKIP_CPU_SYNC) &&
>> (dir == DMA_TO_DEVICE || dir == DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL))
>> swiotlb_bounce(orig_addr, tlb_addr, mapping_size, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
>> --
>> 2.17.1
>>
>
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