[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <20190614093409.GX3436@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net>
Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2019 11:34:09 +0200
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
To: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, x86@...nel.org,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
Kai Huang <kai.huang@...ux.intel.com>,
Jacob Pan <jacob.jun.pan@...ux.intel.com>,
Alison Schofield <alison.schofield@...el.com>,
linux-mm@...ck.org, kvm@...r.kernel.org, keyrings@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH, RFC 13/62] x86/mm: Add hooks to allocate and free
encrypted pages
On Wed, May 08, 2019 at 05:43:33PM +0300, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> +/* Prepare page to be used for encryption. Called from page allocator. */
> +void __prep_encrypted_page(struct page *page, int order, int keyid, bool zero)
> +{
> + int i;
> +
> + /*
> + * The hardware/CPU does not enforce coherency between mappings
> + * of the same physical page with different KeyIDs or
> + * encryption keys. We are responsible for cache management.
> + */
On alloc we should flush the unencrypted (key=0) range, while on free
(below) we should flush the encrypted (key!=0) range.
But I seem to have missed where page_address() does the right thing
here.
> + clflush_cache_range(page_address(page), PAGE_SIZE * (1UL << order));
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < (1 << order); i++) {
> + /* All pages coming out of the allocator should have KeyID 0 */
> + WARN_ON_ONCE(lookup_page_ext(page)->keyid);
> + lookup_page_ext(page)->keyid = keyid;
> +
So presumably page_address() is affected by this keyid, and the below
clear_highpage() then accesses the 'right' location?
> + /* Clear the page after the KeyID is set. */
> + if (zero)
> + clear_highpage(page);
> +
> + page++;
> + }
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * Handles freeing of encrypted page.
> + * Called from page allocator on freeing encrypted page.
> + */
> +void free_encrypted_page(struct page *page, int order)
> +{
> + int i;
> +
> + /*
> + * The hardware/CPU does not enforce coherency between mappings
> + * of the same physical page with different KeyIDs or
> + * encryption keys. We are responsible for cache management.
> + */
I still don't like that comment much; yes the hardware doesn't do it,
and yes we have to do it, but it doesn't explain the actual scheme
employed to do so.
> + clflush_cache_range(page_address(page), PAGE_SIZE * (1UL << order));
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < (1 << order); i++) {
> + /* Check if the page has reasonable KeyID */
> + WARN_ON_ONCE(lookup_page_ext(page)->keyid > mktme_nr_keyids);
It should also check keyid > 0, so maybe:
(unsigned)(keyid - 1) > keyids-1
instead?
> + lookup_page_ext(page)->keyid = 0;
> + page++;
> + }
> +}
> --
> 2.20.1
>
Powered by blists - more mailing lists