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Message-ID: <20190614115520.GH3436@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net>
Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2019 13:55:20 +0200
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
To: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, x86@...nel.org,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
Kai Huang <kai.huang@...ux.intel.com>,
Jacob Pan <jacob.jun.pan@...ux.intel.com>,
Alison Schofield <alison.schofield@...el.com>,
linux-mm@...ck.org, kvm@...r.kernel.org, keyrings@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH, RFC 47/62] mm: Restrict MKTME memory encryption to
anonymous VMAs
On Wed, May 08, 2019 at 05:44:07PM +0300, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> From: Alison Schofield <alison.schofield@...el.com>
>
> Memory encryption is only supported for mappings that are ANONYMOUS.
> Test the VMA's in an encrypt_mprotect() request to make sure they all
> meet that requirement before encrypting any.
>
> The encrypt_mprotect syscall will return -EINVAL and will not encrypt
> any VMA's if this check fails.
>
> Signed-off-by: Alison Schofield <alison.schofield@...el.com>
> Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>
This should be folded back into the initial implemention, methinks.
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