[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <57a319bf-73da-c04b-cdff-1717f3699268@intel.com>
Date: Mon, 17 Jun 2019 11:55:58 -0700
From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>
To: Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@...il.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Alexander Graf <graf@...zon.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Marius Hillenbrand <mhillenb@...zon.de>,
kvm list <kvm@...r.kernel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>,
Linux-MM <linux-mm@...ck.org>, Alexander Graf <graf@...zon.de>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>,
the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@...nel.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC 00/10] Process-local memory allocations for hiding KVM
secrets
On 6/17/19 11:50 AM, Nadav Amit wrote:
>> The idea is that you have a per-cpu address space. Certain kernel
>> virtual addresses would map to different physical address based on where
>> you are running. Each of the physical addresses would be "owned" by a
>> single CPU and would, by convention, never use a PGD that mapped an
>> address unless that CPU that "owned" it.
>>
>> In that case, you never really invalidate those addresses.
> I understand, but as I see it, this is not related directly to PCIDs.
Yeah, the only link I was thinking of is that we can manage per-CPU PGDs
in the same way that we manage PCIDs. Basically we can reuse a chunk of
the software concept.
Powered by blists - more mailing lists