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Message-ID: <20190617161600.77f5f5eb@lwn.net>
Date: Mon, 17 Jun 2019 16:16:00 -0600
From: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com>,
Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@...il.com>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Ben Greear <greearb@...delatech.com>, stable@...r.kernel.org,
Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@...el.com>,
Jiri Kosina <jikos@...nel.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>,
Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@...el.com>,
Arjan van de Ven <arjan@...ux.intel.com>,
Jon Masters <jcm@...hat.com>,
Waiman Long <longman9394@...il.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Mark Gross <mgross@...ux.intel.com>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, x86@...nel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3] Documentation: Add section about CPU vulnerabilities
for Spectre
On Mon, 17 Jun 2019 22:21:51 +0200 (CEST)
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de> wrote:
> > +Spectre variant 1 attacks take advantage of speculative execution of
> > +conditional branches, while Spectre variant 2 attacks use speculative
> > +execution of indirect branches to leak privileged memory. See [1] [5]
> > +[7] [10] [11].
>
> It would be great to actually link these [N] to the actual http link at the
> bottom. No idea what's the best way to do that.
>
> Jonathan?
Append an underscore to the link text, so:
See [1_] [5_] ...
Then, when adding the links:
.. _1: https://.../
There are other ways; see
http://docutils.sourceforge.net/docs/user/rst/quickref.html#external-hyperlink-targets
for the list.
> The below renders horribly when converted to HTML
>
> You probably want to wrap these into a table
>
> > + nospectre_v2 [X86] Disable all mitigations for the Spectre variant 2
> > + (indirect branch prediction) vulnerability. System may
> > + allow data leaks with this option, which is equivalent
> > + to spectre_v2=off.
> > +
> > +
> > + spectre_v2= [X86] Control mitigation of Spectre variant 2
> > + (indirect branch speculation) vulnerability.
> > + The default operation protects the kernel from
> > + user space attacks.
>
> Maybe Jonathan has a better idea.
The easiest thing is probably a definition list:
nospectre_v2
[X86] Disable all mitigations for the Spectre variant 2
(indirect branch prediction) ...
spectrev2=
...
i.e. just move the descriptive text into an indented block below the term
of interest.
jon
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