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Message-Id: <1560897679-228028-12-git-send-email-fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Date: Tue, 18 Jun 2019 15:41:13 -0700
From: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@...el.com>
To: "Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@...utronix.de>,
"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@...hat.com>, "Borislav Petkov" <bp@...en8.de>,
"H Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
"Peter Zijlstra" <peterz@...radead.org>,
"Andrew Morton" <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
"Dave Hansen" <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
"Radim Krcmar" <rkrcmar@...hat.com>,
"Christopherson Sean J" <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>,
"Ashok Raj" <ashok.raj@...el.com>,
"Tony Luck" <tony.luck@...el.com>,
"Dan Williams" <dan.j.williams@...el.com>,
"Xiaoyao Li " <xiaoyao.li@...el.com>,
"Sai Praneeth Prakhya" <sai.praneeth.prakhya@...el.com>,
"Ravi V Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@...el.com>
Cc: "linux-kernel" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"x86" <x86@...nel.org>, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@...ux.intel.com>,
Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@...el.com>
Subject: [PATCH v9 11/17] kvm/vmx: Emulate MSR TEST_CTL
From: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@...ux.intel.com>
A control bit (bit 29) in TEST_CTL MSR 0x33 will be introduced in
future x86 processors. When bit 29 is set, the processor causes #AC
exception for split locked accesses at all CPL.
Please check the latest Intel 64 and IA-32 Architectures Software
Developer's Manual for more detailed information on the MSR and
the split lock bit.
This patch emulates MSR_TEST_CTL with vmx->msr_test_ctl and does the
following:
1. As MSR TEST_CTL of guest is emulated, enable the related bit
in CORE_CAPABILITY to correctly report this feature to guest.
2. If host has split lock detection enabled, forcing it enabled in
guest to avoid guest's slowdown attack by using split lock.
If host has it disabled, it can give control to guest that guest can
enable it on its own purpose.
Note: Guest can read and write bit 29 of MSR_TEST_CTL if hardware has
feature split lock detection. But when guest running, the real value in
hardware MSR will be different from the value read in guest when guest
has it disabled and host has it enabled. It can be regarded as host's
value overrides guest's value.
To avoid costly RDMSR of TEST_CTL when switching between host and guest
during vmentry, read per CPU variable msr_test_ctl_cached which caches
the MSR value.
Besides, only inject #AC exception back when guest can handle it.
Otherwise, it must be a split lock caused #AC. In this case, print a hint.
Signed-off-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@...ux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@...el.com>
---
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 92 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h | 2 +
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 19 ++++++++-
3 files changed, 109 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index b93e36ddee5e..d096cee48a40 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -1640,6 +1640,16 @@ static inline bool vmx_feature_control_msr_valid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
return !(val & ~valid_bits);
}
+static u64 vmx_get_msr_test_ctl_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ u64 mask = 0;
+
+ if (vcpu->arch.core_capability & MSR_IA32_CORE_CAP_SPLIT_LOCK_DETECT)
+ mask |= MSR_TEST_CTL_SPLIT_LOCK_DETECT;
+
+ return mask;
+}
+
static int vmx_get_msr_feature(struct kvm_msr_entry *msr)
{
switch (msr->index) {
@@ -1666,6 +1676,11 @@ static int vmx_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
u32 index;
switch (msr_info->index) {
+ case MSR_TEST_CTL:
+ if (!vmx->msr_test_ctl_mask)
+ return 1;
+ msr_info->data = vmx->msr_test_ctl;
+ break;
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
case MSR_FS_BASE:
msr_info->data = vmcs_readl(GUEST_FS_BASE);
@@ -1803,6 +1818,18 @@ static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
u32 index;
switch (msr_index) {
+ case MSR_TEST_CTL:
+ if (!vmx->msr_test_ctl_mask ||
+ (data & vmx->msr_test_ctl_mask) != data)
+ return 1;
+ vmx->msr_test_ctl = data;
+ break;
+ case MSR_IA32_CORE_CAP:
+ if (!msr_info->host_initiated)
+ return 1;
+ vcpu->arch.core_capability = data;
+ vmx->msr_test_ctl_mask = vmx_get_msr_test_ctl_mask(vcpu);
+ break;
case MSR_EFER:
ret = kvm_set_msr_common(vcpu, msr_info);
break;
@@ -4121,6 +4148,8 @@ static void vmx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event)
vmx->rmode.vm86_active = 0;
vmx->spec_ctrl = 0;
+ vmx->msr_test_ctl = 0;
+ vmx->msr_test_ctl_mask = vmx_get_msr_test_ctl_mask(vcpu);
vcpu->arch.microcode_version = 0x100000000ULL;
vmx->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RDX] = get_rdx_init_val();
@@ -4449,6 +4478,28 @@ static int handle_machine_check(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
return 1;
}
+/*
+ * In intel SDM, #AC can be caused in two way:
+ * 1. Unaligned memory access when CPL = 3 && CR0.AM == 1 && EFLAGS.AC == 1
+ * 2. Lock on crossing cache line memory access, when split lock detection
+ * is enabled (bit 29 of MSR_TEST_CTL is set). This #AC can be generated
+ * in any CPL.
+ *
+ * So, when guest's split lock detection is enabled, it can be assumed capable
+ * of handling #AC in any CPL.
+ * Or when guest's CR0.AM and EFLAGS.AC are both set, it can be assumed capable
+ * of handling #AC in CPL == 3.
+ */
+static bool guest_can_handle_ac(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
+ return (vmx->msr_test_ctl & MSR_TEST_CTL_SPLIT_LOCK_DETECT) ||
+ ((vmx_get_cpl(vcpu) == 3) &&
+ kvm_read_cr0_bits(vcpu, X86_CR0_AM) &&
+ (kvm_get_rflags(vcpu) & X86_EFLAGS_AC));
+}
+
static int handle_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
@@ -4514,9 +4565,6 @@ static int handle_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
return handle_rmode_exception(vcpu, ex_no, error_code);
switch (ex_no) {
- case AC_VECTOR:
- kvm_queue_exception_e(vcpu, AC_VECTOR, error_code);
- return 1;
case DB_VECTOR:
dr6 = vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION);
if (!(vcpu->guest_debug &
@@ -4545,6 +4593,15 @@ static int handle_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
kvm_run->debug.arch.pc = vmcs_readl(GUEST_CS_BASE) + rip;
kvm_run->debug.arch.exception = ex_no;
break;
+ case AC_VECTOR:
+ if (guest_can_handle_ac(vcpu)) {
+ kvm_queue_exception_e(vcpu, AC_VECTOR, error_code);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ pr_warn("kvm: %s[%d]: there is an #AC exception in guest due to split lock. "
+ "Please try to fix it, or disable the split lock detection in host to workaround.",
+ current->comm, current->pid);
+ /* fall through */
default:
kvm_run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_EXCEPTION;
kvm_run->ex.exception = ex_no;
@@ -6335,6 +6392,33 @@ static void atomic_switch_perf_msrs(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
msrs[i].host, false);
}
+static void atomic_switch_msr_test_ctl(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+ u64 guest_val;
+ u64 host_val = this_cpu_read(msr_test_ctl_cached);
+ u64 mask = vmx->msr_test_ctl_mask;
+
+ /*
+ * Guest can cause overall system performance degradation (of host or
+ * other guest) by using split lock. Hence, it takes following policy:
+ * - If host has split lock detection enabled, forcing it enabled in
+ * guest during vm entry.
+ * - If host has split lock detection disabled, guest can enable it for
+ * it's own purpose that it will load guest's value during vm entry.
+ *
+ * So use adjusted mask to achieve this.
+ */
+ if (host_val & MSR_TEST_CTL_SPLIT_LOCK_DETECT)
+ mask &= ~MSR_TEST_CTL_SPLIT_LOCK_DETECT;
+
+ guest_val = (host_val & ~mask) | (vmx->msr_test_ctl & mask);
+
+ if (host_val == guest_val)
+ clear_atomic_switch_msr(vmx, MSR_TEST_CTL);
+ else
+ add_atomic_switch_msr(vmx, MSR_TEST_CTL, guest_val, host_val, false);
+}
+
static void vmx_arm_hv_timer(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u32 val)
{
vmcs_write32(VMX_PREEMPTION_TIMER_VALUE, val);
@@ -6443,6 +6527,8 @@ static void vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
atomic_switch_perf_msrs(vmx);
+ atomic_switch_msr_test_ctl(vmx);
+
vmx_update_hv_timer(vcpu);
/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
index 61128b48c503..2a54b0b5741e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
@@ -193,6 +193,8 @@ struct vcpu_vmx {
u64 msr_guest_kernel_gs_base;
#endif
+ u64 msr_test_ctl;
+ u64 msr_test_ctl_mask;
u64 spec_ctrl;
u32 vm_entry_controls_shadow;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index dc4c72bd6781..741ad4e61386 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -1238,7 +1238,24 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_get_arch_capabilities);
static u64 kvm_get_core_capability(void)
{
- return 0;
+ u64 data = 0;
+
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CORE_CAPABILITY)) {
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_CORE_CAP, data);
+
+ /* mask non-virtualizable functions */
+ data &= MSR_IA32_CORE_CAP_SPLIT_LOCK_DETECT;
+ } else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPLIT_LOCK_DETECT)) {
+ /*
+ * There will be a list of FMS values that have split lock
+ * detection but lack the CORE CAPABILITY MSR. In this case,
+ * set MSR_IA32_CORE_CAP_SPLIT_LOCK_DETECT since we emulate
+ * MSR CORE_CAPABILITY.
+ */
+ data |= MSR_IA32_CORE_CAP_SPLIT_LOCK_DETECT;
+ }
+
+ return data;
}
static int kvm_get_msr_feature(struct kvm_msr_entry *msr)
--
2.19.1
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