linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v8 26/29] vfio-pci: Register an iommu fault handler

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Message-ID: <77405d39-81a4-d9a8-5d35-27602199867a@arm.com>
Date:   Tue, 18 Jun 2019 15:04:36 +0100
From:   Jean-Philippe Brucker <jean-philippe.brucker@....com>
To:     Jacob Pan <jacob.jun.pan@...ux.intel.com>
Cc:     "peter.maydell@...aro.org" <peter.maydell@...aro.org>,
        "kevin.tian@...el.com" <kevin.tian@...el.com>,
        "ashok.raj@...el.com" <ashok.raj@...el.com>,
        "kvm@...r.kernel.org" <kvm@...r.kernel.org>,
        Marc Zyngier <Marc.Zyngier@....com>,
        Will Deacon <Will.Deacon@....com>,
        "iommu@...ts.linux-foundation.org" <iommu@...ts.linux-foundation.org>,
        "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@...hat.com>,
        Vincent Stehle <Vincent.Stehle@....com>,
        Robin Murphy <Robin.Murphy@....com>,
        "kvmarm@...ts.cs.columbia.edu" <kvmarm@...ts.cs.columbia.edu>,
        "eric.auger.pro@...il.com" <eric.auger.pro@...il.com>,
        "Liu, Yi L" <yi.l.liu@...el.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 26/29] vfio-pci: Register an iommu fault handler

On 12/06/2019 19:53, Jacob Pan wrote:
>>> You are right, the worst case of the spurious PS is to terminate the
>>> group prematurely. Need to know the scope of the HW damage in case
>>> of mdev where group IDs can be shared among mdevs belong to the
>>> same PF.  
>>
>> But from the IOMMU fault API point of view, the full page request is
>> identified by both PRGI and PASID. Given that each mdev has its own
>> set of PASIDs, it should be easy to isolate page responses per mdev.
>>
> On Intel platform, devices sending page request with private data must
> receive page response with matching private data. If we solely depend
> on PRGI and PASID, we may send stale private data to the device in
> those incorrect page response. Since private data may represent PF
> device wide contexts, the consequence of sending page response with
> wrong private data may affect other mdev/PASID.
> 
> One solution we are thinking to do is to inject the sequence #(e.g.
> ktime raw mono clock) as vIOMMU private data into to the guest. Guest
> would return this fake private data in page response, then host will
> send page response back to the device that matches PRG1 and PASID and
> private_data.
> 
> This solution does not expose HW context related private data to the
> guest but need to extend page response in iommu uapi.
> 
> /**
>  * struct iommu_page_response - Generic page response information
>  * @version: API version of this structure
>  * @flags: encodes whether the corresponding fields are valid
>  *         (IOMMU_FAULT_PAGE_RESPONSE_* values)
>  * @pasid: Process Address Space ID
>  * @grpid: Page Request Group Index
>  * @code: response code from &enum iommu_page_response_code
>  * @private_data: private data for the matching page request
>  */
> struct iommu_page_response {
> #define IOMMU_PAGE_RESP_VERSION_1	1
> 	__u32	version;
> #define IOMMU_PAGE_RESP_PASID_VALID	(1 << 0)
> #define IOMMU_PAGE_RESP_PRIVATE_DATA	(1 << 1)
> 	__u32	flags;
> 	__u32	pasid;
> 	__u32	grpid;
> 	__u32	code;
> 	__u32	padding;
> 	__u64	private_data[2];
> };
> 
> There is also the change needed for separating storage for the real and
> fake private data.
> 
> Sorry for the last minute change, did not realize the HW implications.
> 
> I see this as a future extension due to limited testing, 

I'm wondering how we deal with:
(1) old userspace that won't fill the new private_data field in
page_response. A new kernel still has to support it.
(2) old kernel that won't recognize the new PRIVATE_DATA flag. Currently
iommu_page_response() rejects page responses with unknown flags.

I guess we'll need a two-way negotiation, where userspace queries
whether the kernel supports the flag (2), and the kernel learns whether
it should expect the private data to come back (1).

> perhaps for
> now, can you add paddings similar to page request? Make it 64B as well.

I don't think padding is necessary, because iommu_page_response is sent
by userspace to the kernel, unlike iommu_fault which is allocated by
userspace and filled by the kernel.

Page response looks a lot more like existing VFIO mechanisms, so I
suppose we'll wrap the iommu_page_response structure and include an
argsz parameter at the top:

	struct vfio_iommu_page_response {
		u32 argsz;
		struct iommu_page_response pr;
	};

	struct vfio_iommu_page_response vpr = {
		.argsz = sizeof(vpr),
		.pr = ...
		...
	};

	ioctl(devfd, VFIO_IOMMU_PAGE_RESPONSE, &vpr);

In that case supporting private data can be done by simply appending a
field at the end (plus the negotiation above).

Thanks,
Jean