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Message-ID: <lsq.1560868082.707403898@decadent.org.uk>
Date: Tue, 18 Jun 2019 15:28:02 +0100
From: Ben Hutchings <ben@...adent.org.uk>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, stable@...r.kernel.org
CC: akpm@...ux-foundation.org, Denis Kirjanov <kda@...ux-powerpc.org>,
"Young Xiao" <YangX92@...mail.com>,
"Marcel Holtmann" <marcel@...tmann.org>
Subject: [PATCH 3.16 06/10] Bluetooth: hidp: fix buffer overflow
3.16.69-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Young Xiao <YangX92@...mail.com>
commit a1616a5ac99ede5d605047a9012481ce7ff18b16 upstream.
Struct ca is copied from userspace. It is not checked whether the "name"
field is NULL terminated, which allows local users to obtain potentially
sensitive information from kernel stack memory, via a HIDPCONNADD command.
This vulnerability is similar to CVE-2011-1079.
Signed-off-by: Young Xiao <YangX92@...mail.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@...tmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@...adent.org.uk>
---
net/bluetooth/hidp/sock.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/net/bluetooth/hidp/sock.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/hidp/sock.c
@@ -76,6 +76,7 @@ static int hidp_sock_ioctl(struct socket
sockfd_put(csock);
return err;
}
+ ca.name[sizeof(ca.name)-1] = 0;
err = hidp_connection_add(&ca, csock, isock);
if (!err && copy_to_user(argp, &ca, sizeof(ca)))
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