linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH, RFC 45/62] mm: Add the encrypt

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <f701f859-0990-9f02-baa2-451dd6c8b3c4@intel.com>
Date:   Tue, 18 Jun 2019 09:22:10 -0700
From:   Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>
To:     "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@...temov.name>
Cc:     Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Kai Huang <kai.huang@...ux.intel.com>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        Jacob Pan <jacob.jun.pan@...ux.intel.com>,
        Alison Schofield <alison.schofield@...el.com>,
        Linux-MM <linux-mm@...ck.org>, kvm list <kvm@...r.kernel.org>,
        keyrings@...r.kernel.org, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH, RFC 45/62] mm: Add the encrypt_mprotect() system call for
 MKTME

On 6/18/19 9:15 AM, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
>> We'd need two rules:
>> 1. A page must not be faulted into a VMA if the page's page_keyid()
>>    is not consistent with the VMA's
>> 2. Upon changing the VMA's KeyID, all underlying PTEs must either be
>>    checked or zapped.
>>
>> If the rules are broken, we SIGBUS.  Andy's suggestion has the same
>> basic requirements.  But, with his scheme, the error can be to the
>> ioctl() instead of in the form of a SIGBUS.  I guess that makes the
>> fuzzers' lives a bit easier.
> I see a problem with the scheme: if we don't have a way to decide if the
> key is right for the file, user without access to the right key is able to
> prevent legitimate user from accessing the file. Attacker just need read
> access to the encrypted file to prevent any legitimate use to access it.

I think you're bringing up a separate issue.

We were talking about how you resolve a conflict when someone attempts
to use two *different* keyids to decrypt the data in the API and what
the resulting API interaction looks like.

You're describing the situation where one of those is the wrong *key*
(not keyid).  That's a subtly different scenario and requires different
handling (or no handling IMNHO).