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Message-ID: <201906201034.9E44D8A2A8@keescook>
Date: Thu, 20 Jun 2019 10:35:56 -0700
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@...tuozzo.com>,
Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>, kasan-dev@...glegroups.com,
Alexander Popov <alex.popov@...ux.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@...ionext.com>,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] structleak: disable BYREF_ALL in combination with
KASAN_STACK
On Tue, Jun 18, 2019 at 11:47:13AM +0200, Arnd Bergmann wrote:
> The combination of KASAN_STACK and GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF_ALL
> leads to much larger kernel stack usage, as seen from the warnings
> about functions that now exceed the 2048 byte limit:
Is the preference that this go into v5.2 (there's not much time left),
or should this be v5.3? (You didn't mark it as Cc: stable?)
> one. I picked the dependency in GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF_ALL, as
> this option is designed to make uninitialized stack usage less harmful
> when enabled on its own, but it also prevents KASAN from detecting those
> cases in which it was in fact needed.
Right -- there's not much sense in both being enabled. I'd agree with
this rationale.
--
Kees Cook
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