linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] arm64: defconfig: update and enable CONFIG_RANDOMIZE

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Message-ID: <CAGXu5j+aihyZWUUTTxweXxEMfgL12HULqNhHj_mUedLefFrcLA@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Fri, 21 Jun 2019 13:54:10 -0700
From:   Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To:     Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@...gle.com>
Cc:     Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>,
        Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@...gle.com>,
        Jeffrey Vander Stoep <jeffv@...gle.com>,
        Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>,
        Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
        Mark Brown <broonie@...nel.org>,
        Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>,
        Olof Johansson <olof@...om.net>,
        Maxime Ripard <maxime.ripard@...tlin.com>,
        Jagan Teki <jagan@...rulasolutions.com>,
        Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>, Shawn Guo <shawnguo@...nel.org>,
        Bjorn Andersson <bjorn.andersson@...aro.org>,
        Dinh Nguyen <dinguyen@...nel.org>,
        Enric Balletbo i Serra <enric.balletbo@...labora.com>,
        linux-arm-kernel <linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org>,
        Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] arm64: defconfig: update and enable CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE

On Fri, Jun 21, 2019 at 1:28 PM Nick Desaulniers
<ndesaulniers@...gle.com> wrote:
>
> On Thu, Jun 20, 2019 at 1:17 AM Ard Biesheuvel
> <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org> wrote:
> > I think it is mostly controversial among non-security folks, who think
> > that every mitigation by itself should be bullet proof. Security folks
> > tend to think more about how each layer reduces the attack surface,
> > hopefully resulting in a secure system when all layers are enabled.
>
> + Kees, Sami, Jeff
> It's a relatively low cost part of our defense in depth strategy.
> Maybe (Kees, Sami, Jeff) have more thoughts?

Right -- the thought is that it provides more benefit than
complication. It is hardly a perfect defense, but it does provide
building blocks to more interesting situations. For example, once
execute-only memory is more common, KASLR + XOM means there is a not
insignificant defense against automated ROP. And KASLR is a general
precursor to fine-grained KASLR (i.e. randomizing on function).

> > So KASLR is known to be broken unless you enable KPTI as well, so that
> > is something we could take into account. I.e., mitigations that don't
> > reduce the attack surface at all are just pointless complexity, which
> > should obviously be avoided.
>
> (Note to Sami + Jeff if they had KPTI on their radar)

I prefer that KPTI always stay enabled. :)

> > Another thing to note is that the runtime cost of KASLR is ~zero, with
> > the exception of the module PLTs. However, the latter could do with
> > some additional coverage as well, so in summary, I think enabling this
> > is a good thing. Otherwise, we could disable full module randomization
> > so that the module PLT code doesn't get used in practice.
> >
> > Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>

Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>

-- 
Kees Cook