[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-Id: <1561411657.4340.70.camel@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 17:27:37 -0400
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>
To: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...gle.com>, Dave Young <dyoung@...hat.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>, Jiri Bohac <jbohac@...e.cz>,
Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>,
kexec@...ts.infradead.org,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
LSM List <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH V31 07/25] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel
is locked down
Hi Matthew,
On Mon, 2019-06-24 at 14:06 -0700, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> On Sun, Jun 23, 2019 at 6:52 PM Dave Young <dyoung@...hat.com> wrote:
> >
> > On 06/21/19 at 01:18pm, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> > > I don't think so - we want it to be possible to load images if they
> > > have a valid signature.
> >
> > I know it works like this way because of the previous patch. But from
> > the patch log "When KEXEC_SIG is not enabled, kernel should not load
> > images", it is simple to check it early for !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG) &&
> > kernel_is_locked_down(reason, LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY) instead of depending
> > on the late code to verify signature. In that way, easier to
> > understand the logic, no?
>
> But that combination doesn't enforce signature validation? We can't
> depend on !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG_FORCE) because then it'll
> enforce signature validation even if lockdown is disabled.
I agree with Dave. There should be a stub lockdown function to
prevent enforcing lockdown when it isn't enabled.
Mimi
Powered by blists - more mailing lists