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Message-Id: <20190624092315.965604081@linuxfoundation.org>
Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 17:56:17 +0800
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
stable@...r.kernel.org, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
John Johansen <john.johansen@...onical.com>
Subject: [PATCH 4.19 27/90] apparmor: enforce nullbyte at end of tag string
From: Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>
commit 8404d7a674c49278607d19726e0acc0cae299357 upstream.
A packed AppArmor policy contains null-terminated tag strings that are read
by unpack_nameX(). However, unpack_nameX() uses string functions on them
without ensuring that they are actually null-terminated, potentially
leading to out-of-bounds accesses.
Make sure that the tag string is null-terminated before passing it to
strcmp().
Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
Fixes: 736ec752d95e ("AppArmor: policy routines for loading and unpacking policy")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@...onical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
---
security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
@@ -276,7 +276,7 @@ static bool unpack_nameX(struct aa_ext *
char *tag = NULL;
size_t size = unpack_u16_chunk(e, &tag);
/* if a name is specified it must match. otherwise skip tag */
- if (name && (!size || strcmp(name, tag)))
+ if (name && (!size || tag[size-1] != '\0' || strcmp(name, tag)))
goto fail;
} else if (name) {
/* if a name is specified and there is no name tag fail */
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