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Message-ID: <20190625025148.GA4024@dhcp-128-65.nay.redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 25 Jun 2019 10:51:48 +0800
From: Dave Young <dyoung@...hat.com>
To: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...gle.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>, Jiri Bohac <jbohac@...e.cz>,
Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>,
kexec@...ts.infradead.org,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
LSM List <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH V31 07/25] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel
is locked down
On 06/24/19 at 02:06pm, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> On Sun, Jun 23, 2019 at 6:52 PM Dave Young <dyoung@...hat.com> wrote:
> >
> > On 06/21/19 at 01:18pm, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> > > I don't think so - we want it to be possible to load images if they
> > > have a valid signature.
> >
> > I know it works like this way because of the previous patch. But from
> > the patch log "When KEXEC_SIG is not enabled, kernel should not load
> > images", it is simple to check it early for !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG) &&
> > kernel_is_locked_down(reason, LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY) instead of depending
> > on the late code to verify signature. In that way, easier to
> > understand the logic, no?
>
> But that combination doesn't enforce signature validation? We can't
> depend on !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG_FORCE) because then it'll
> enforce signature validation even if lockdown is disabled.
Ok, got your point. still something could be improved though, in the switch
chunk, the errno, reason and IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG_FORCE) etc is
not necessary for this -EPERM case.
/* add some comment to describe the behavior */
if (ret && security_is_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_KEXEC)) {
ret = -EPERM;
goto out;
}
Thanks
Dave
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