linux-kernel - linux-next: manual merge of the keys tree with the ecryptfs tree

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Date:   Wed, 26 Jun 2019 14:28:38 +1000
From:   Stephen Rothwell <sfr@...b.auug.org.au>
To:     David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
        Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@...onical.com>
Cc:     Linux Next Mailing List <linux-next@...r.kernel.org>,
        Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        YueHaibing <yuehaibing@...wei.com>
Subject: linux-next: manual merge of the keys tree with the ecryptfs tree

Hi all,

Today's linux-next merge of the keys tree got a conflict in:

  fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c

between commit:

  29a51df0609c ("ecryptfs: remove unnessesary null check in ecryptfs_keyring_auth_tok_for_sig")

from the ecryptfs tree and commit:

  79512db59dc8 ("keys: Replace uid/gid/perm permissions checking with an ACL")

from the keys tree.

I fixed it up (see below) and can carry the fix as necessary. This
is now fixed as far as linux-next is concerned, but any non trivial
conflicts should be mentioned to your upstream maintainer when your tree
is submitted for merging.  You may also want to consider cooperating
with the maintainer of the conflicting tree to minimise any particularly
complex conflicts.

-- 
Cheers,
Stephen Rothwell

diff --cc fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c
index 216fbe6a4837,ba382f135918..000000000000
--- a/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c
+++ b/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c
@@@ -1611,10 -1610,10 +1611,10 @@@ int ecryptfs_keyring_auth_tok_for_sig(s
  {
  	int rc = 0;
  
- 	(*auth_tok_key) = request_key(&key_type_user, sig, NULL);
+ 	(*auth_tok_key) = request_key(&key_type_user, sig, NULL, NULL);
 -	if (!(*auth_tok_key) || IS_ERR(*auth_tok_key)) {
 +	if (IS_ERR(*auth_tok_key)) {
  		(*auth_tok_key) = ecryptfs_get_encrypted_key(sig);
 -		if (!(*auth_tok_key) || IS_ERR(*auth_tok_key)) {
 +		if (IS_ERR(*auth_tok_key)) {
  			printk(KERN_ERR "Could not find key with description: [%s]\n",
  			      sig);
  			rc = process_request_key_err(PTR_ERR(*auth_tok_key));

Content of type "application/pgp-signature" skipped