[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <CAFbcbMBFS5h6asOpAma_Zq3T1TS31Pno1s9BkWDnYg0zk2ps0g@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 26 Jun 2019 12:40:01 +0800
From: Dianzhang Chen <dianzhangchen0@...il.com>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Cc: mingo@...hat.com, bp@...en8.de, hpa@...or.com, x86@...nel.org,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] x86/tls: Fix possible spectre-v1 in do_get_thread_area()
On Wed, Jun 26, 2019 at 12:38 AM Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de> wrote:
>
> On Wed, 26 Jun 2019, Dianzhang Chen wrote:
>
> > The index to access the threads tls array is controlled by userspace
> > via syscall: sys_ptrace(), hence leading to a potential exploitation
> > of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
> > The idx can be controlled from:
> > ptrace -> arch_ptrace -> do_get_thread_area.
> >
> > Fix this by sanitizing idx before using it to index p->thread.tls_array.
>
> Just that I can't find a place which sanitizes the value....
>
> > +#include <linux/nospec.h>
>
> and nothing which uses anything from this header file.
>
> > #include <linux/uaccess.h>
> > #include <asm/desc.h>
> > @@ -220,6 +221,7 @@ int do_get_thread_area(struct task_struct *p, int idx,
> > struct user_desc __user *u_info)
> > {
> > struct user_desc info;
> > + int index;
> >
> > if (idx == -1 && get_user(idx, &u_info->entry_number))
> > return -EFAULT;
> > @@ -227,8 +229,9 @@ int do_get_thread_area(struct task_struct *p, int idx,
> > if (idx < GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN || idx > GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MAX)
> > return -EINVAL;
> >
> > - fill_user_desc(&info, idx,
> > - &p->thread.tls_array[idx - GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN]);
> > + index = idx - GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN;
> > +
> > + fill_user_desc(&info, idx, &p->thread.tls_array[index]);
>
> So this is just a cosmetic change and the compiler will create probably
> exactly the same binary.
>
> Thanks,
>
> tglx
>
sorry for being careless, my bad.
And thanks for suggestion, i'll fix that in next version.
Powered by blists - more mailing lists