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Message-ID: <tip-31a2fbb390fee4231281b939e1979e810f945415@git.kernel.org>
Date: Thu, 27 Jun 2019 14:52:00 -0700
From: tip-bot for Dianzhang Chen <tipbot@...or.com>
To: linux-tip-commits@...r.kernel.org
Cc: dianzhangchen0@...il.com, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
mingo@...nel.org, hpa@...or.com, tglx@...utronix.de
Subject: [tip:x86/pti] x86/ptrace: Fix possible spectre-v1 in
ptrace_get_debugreg()
Commit-ID: 31a2fbb390fee4231281b939e1979e810f945415
Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/31a2fbb390fee4231281b939e1979e810f945415
Author: Dianzhang Chen <dianzhangchen0@...il.com>
AuthorDate: Tue, 25 Jun 2019 23:30:17 +0800
Committer: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
CommitDate: Thu, 27 Jun 2019 23:48:04 +0200
x86/ptrace: Fix possible spectre-v1 in ptrace_get_debugreg()
The index to access the threads ptrace_bps is controlled by userspace via
syscall: sys_ptrace(), hence leading to a potential exploitation of the
Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
The index can be controlled from:
ptrace -> arch_ptrace -> ptrace_get_debugreg.
Fix this by sanitizing the user supplied index before using it access
thread->ptrace_bps.
Signed-off-by: Dianzhang Chen <dianzhangchen0@...il.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Cc: bp@...en8.de
Cc: hpa@...or.com
Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1561476617-3759-1-git-send-email-dianzhangchen0@gmail.com
---
arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c | 5 ++++-
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c
index a166c960bc9e..cbac64659dc4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
#include <linux/export.h>
#include <linux/context_tracking.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <asm/pgtable.h>
@@ -643,9 +644,11 @@ static unsigned long ptrace_get_debugreg(struct task_struct *tsk, int n)
{
struct thread_struct *thread = &tsk->thread;
unsigned long val = 0;
+ int index = n;
if (n < HBP_NUM) {
- struct perf_event *bp = thread->ptrace_bps[n];
+ index = array_index_nospec(index, HBP_NUM);
+ struct perf_event *bp = thread->ptrace_bps[index];
if (bp)
val = bp->hw.info.address;
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