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Message-ID: <386316d0-f844-d88c-8b78-0ffc4ffe0aaa@codeaurora.org>
Date: Tue, 9 Jul 2019 19:48:25 +0530
From: Neeraj Upadhyay <neeraju@...eaurora.org>
To: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@....com>, will@...nel.org,
mark.rutland@....com, julien.thierry@....com, tglx@...utronix.de
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-arm-msm@...r.kernel.org, gkohli@...eaurora.org,
parthd@...eaurora.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] arm64: Explicitly set pstate.ssbs for el0 on kernel entry
Hi Marc,
On 7/9/19 6:38 PM, Marc Zyngier wrote:
> Hi Neeraj,
>
> On 09/07/2019 12:22, Neeraj Upadhyay wrote:
>> For cpus which do not support pstate.ssbs feature, el0
>> might not retain spsr.ssbs. This is problematic, if this
>> task migrates to a cpu supporting this feature, thus
>> relying on its state to be correct. On kernel entry,
>> explicitly set spsr.ssbs, so that speculation is enabled
>> for el0, when this task migrates to a cpu supporting
>> ssbs feature. Restoring state at kernel entry ensures
>> that el0 ssbs state is always consistent while we are
>> in el1.
>>
>> As alternatives are applied by boot cpu, at the end of smp
>> init, presence/absence of ssbs feature on boot cpu, is used
>> for deciding, whether the capability is uniformly provided.
> I've seen the same issue, but went for a slightly different
> approach, see below.
>
>> Signed-off-by: Neeraj Upadhyay <neeraju@...eaurora.org>
>> ---
>> arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++
>> arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 26 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-
>> 2 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
>> index ca11ff7..c84a56d 100644
>> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
>> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
>> @@ -336,6 +336,22 @@ void __init arm64_enable_wa2_handling(struct alt_instr *alt,
>> *updptr = cpu_to_le32(aarch64_insn_gen_nop());
>> }
>>
>> +void __init arm64_restore_ssbs_state(struct alt_instr *alt,
>> + __le32 *origptr, __le32 *updptr,
>> + int nr_inst)
>> +{
>> + BUG_ON(nr_inst != 1);
>> + /*
>> + * Only restore EL0 SSBS state on EL1 entry if cpu does not
>> + * support the capability and capability is present for at
>> + * least one cpu and if the SSBD state allows it to
>> + * be changed.
>> + */
>> + if (!this_cpu_has_cap(ARM64_SSBS) && cpus_have_cap(ARM64_SSBS) &&
>> + arm64_get_ssbd_state() != ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_ENABLE)
>> + *updptr = cpu_to_le32(aarch64_insn_gen_nop());
>> +}
>> +
>> void arm64_set_ssbd_mitigation(bool state)
>> {
>> if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD)) {
>> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
>> index 9cdc459..7e79305 100644
>> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
>> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
>> @@ -143,6 +143,25 @@ alternative_cb_end
>> #endif
>> .endm
>>
>> + // This macro updates spsr. It also corrupts the condition
>> + // codes state.
>> + .macro restore_ssbs_state, saved_spsr, tmp
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD
>> +alternative_cb arm64_restore_ssbs_state
>> + b .L__asm_ssbs_skip\@
>> +alternative_cb_end
>> + ldr \tmp, [tsk, #TSK_TI_FLAGS]
>> + tbnz \tmp, #TIF_SSBD, .L__asm_ssbs_skip\@
>> + tst \saved_spsr, #PSR_MODE32_BIT // native task?
>> + b.ne .L__asm_ssbs_compat\@
>> + orr \saved_spsr, \saved_spsr, #PSR_SSBS_BIT
>> + b .L__asm_ssbs_skip\@
>> +.L__asm_ssbs_compat\@:
>> + orr \saved_spsr, \saved_spsr, #PSR_AA32_SSBS_BIT
>> +.L__asm_ssbs_skip\@:
>> +#endif
>> + .endm
> Although this is in keeping with the rest of entry.S (perfectly
> unreadable ;-), I think we can do something a bit simpler, that
> doesn't rely on patching. Also, this doesn't seem to take the
> SSBD options such as ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_ENABLE into account.
arm64_restore_ssbs_state has a check for ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_ENABLE,
does that look wrong?
>
>> +
>> .macro kernel_entry, el, regsize = 64
>> .if \regsize == 32
>> mov w0, w0 // zero upper 32 bits of x0
>> @@ -182,8 +201,13 @@ alternative_cb_end
>> str x20, [tsk, #TSK_TI_ADDR_LIMIT]
>> /* No need to reset PSTATE.UAO, hardware's already set it to 0 for us */
>> .endif /* \el == 0 */
>> - mrs x22, elr_el1
>> mrs x23, spsr_el1
>> +
>> + .if \el == 0
>> + restore_ssbs_state x23, x22
>> + .endif
>> +
>> + mrs x22, elr_el1
>> stp lr, x21, [sp, #S_LR]
>>
>> /*
>>
> How about the patch below?
Looks good; was just going to mention PF_KTHREAD check, but Mark R. has
already
given detailed information about it.
Thanks
Neeraj
>
> Thanks,
>
> M.
>
> From 7d4314d1ef3122d8bf56a7ef239c8c68e0c81277 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> From: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@....com>
> Date: Tue, 4 Jun 2019 17:35:18 +0100
> Subject: [PATCH] arm64: Force SSBS on context switch
>
> On a CPU that doesn't support SSBS, PSTATE[12] is RES0. In a system
> where only some of the CPUs implement SSBS, we end-up losing track of
> the SSBS bit across task migration.
>
> To address this issue, let's force the SSBS bit on context switch.
>
> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@....com>
> ---
> arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h | 14 ++++++++++++--
> arch/arm64/kernel/process.c | 14 ++++++++++++++
> 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h
> index fd5b1a4efc70..844e2964b0f5 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h
> +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h
> @@ -193,6 +193,16 @@ static inline void start_thread_common(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long pc)
> regs->pmr_save = GIC_PRIO_IRQON;
> }
>
> +static inline void set_ssbs_bit(struct pt_regs *regs)
> +{
> + regs->pstate |= PSR_SSBS_BIT;
> +}
> +
> +static inline void set_compat_ssbs_bit(struct pt_regs *regs)
> +{
> + regs->pstate |= PSR_AA32_SSBS_BIT;
> +}
> +
> static inline void start_thread(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long pc,
> unsigned long sp)
> {
> @@ -200,7 +210,7 @@ static inline void start_thread(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long pc,
> regs->pstate = PSR_MODE_EL0t;
>
> if (arm64_get_ssbd_state() != ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_ENABLE)
> - regs->pstate |= PSR_SSBS_BIT;
> + set_ssbs_bit(regs);
>
> regs->sp = sp;
> }
> @@ -219,7 +229,7 @@ static inline void compat_start_thread(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long pc,
> #endif
>
> if (arm64_get_ssbd_state() != ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_ENABLE)
> - regs->pstate |= PSR_AA32_SSBS_BIT;
> + set_compat_ssbs_bit(regs);
>
> regs->compat_sp = sp;
> }
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c
> index 9856395ccdb7..d451b3b248cf 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c
> @@ -442,6 +442,19 @@ void uao_thread_switch(struct task_struct *next)
> }
> }
>
> +static void ssbs_thread_switch(struct task_struct *next)
> +{
> + if (arm64_get_ssbd_state() != ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_ENABLE &&
> + !test_tsk_thread_flag(next, TIF_SSBD)) {
> + struct pt_regs *regs = task_pt_regs(next);
> +
> + if (compat_user_mode(regs))
> + set_compat_ssbs_bit(regs);
> + else if (user_mode(regs))
> + set_ssbs_bit(regs);
> + }
> +}
> +
> /*
> * We store our current task in sp_el0, which is clobbered by userspace. Keep a
> * shadow copy so that we can restore this upon entry from userspace.
> @@ -471,6 +484,7 @@ __notrace_funcgraph struct task_struct *__switch_to(struct task_struct *prev,
> entry_task_switch(next);
> uao_thread_switch(next);
> ptrauth_thread_switch(next);
> + ssbs_thread_switch(next);
>
> /*
> * Complete any pending TLB or cache maintenance on this CPU in case
--
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