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Message-ID: <b5c3bc4a-eb39-d994-7723-947a464383a2@android.com>
Date: Tue, 9 Jul 2019 09:23:16 -0700
From: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@...roid.com>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>,
Miklos Szeredi <miklos@...redi.hu>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>,
Eric Paris <eparis@...isplace.org>, selinux@...r.kernel.org,
kernel-team@...roid.com
Subject: RFC: BUG: overlayfs getxattr recursion leaves a poison sid.
For EACCES return for getxattr, sid appears to be expected updated in
parent node. For some accesses purely cosmetic for correct avc logging,
and depending on kernel vintage for others (older than 4.4) the lack of
the corrected sid in the parent overlay inode poisons the security cache
and results in false denials.
The avc denials would contain an (incorrect) unlabelled target
references, we could fix this by copying up the sid to the parent inode.
However the test (below) needs to refactored to the pleasure of the
security, selinux and overlayfs maintainers. The security_socket_accept
function is _close_, it will copy sid and class from the old socket to
the new. Along those lines, we probably need to add a new
security_copy_to_upper handler that takes the upper and lower dentries
and ensures that the upper contains all the security information
associated with the lower.
Prototype adjustment (tested in 3.18 to ToT)
int ovl_xattr_get(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, const char
*name, { ssize_t res; const struct cred *old_cred; struct dentry
*realdentry = ovl_i_dentry_upper(inode) ?: ovl_dentry_lower(dentry);
old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb); res =
vfs_getxattr(realdentry, name, value, size); ovl_revert_creds(old_cred);
+ if (res == -EACCES) { + selinux_copy_sid(dentry, realdentry); return
res; }
. . .
+ void selinux_copy_sid(struct dentry *parent, struct dentry *child) + {
+ struct inode *pinode, *cinode; + struct inode_security_struct *pisec,
*cisec; + + if (!parent || !child) + return; + pinode = parent->d_inode;
+ cinode = child->d_inode; + if (!pinode || !cinode) + return; + pisec =
pinode->i_security; + cisec = cinode->i_security; + if (!pisec ||
!cisec) + return; + pisec->sid = cisec->sid; + } +
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(selinux_copy_sid);
Sincerely -- Mark Salyzyn
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