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Message-Id: <1562689905.28089.52.camel@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Tue, 09 Jul 2019 12:31:45 -0400
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>
To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>,
James Bottomley <jejb@...ux.ibm.com>
Cc: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>, jgg@...pe.ca,
linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, keyrings@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, crazyt2019+lml@...il.com,
tyhicks@...onical.com, nayna@...ux.vnet.ibm.com,
silviu.vlasceanu@...wei.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH] KEYS: trusted: allow module init if TPM is inactive or
deactivated
On Tue, 2019-07-09 at 19:24 +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Mon, Jul 08, 2019 at 01:34:59PM -0700, James Bottomley wrote:
> > Not a criticism of your patch, but can we please stop doing this.
> > Single random number sources are horrendously bad practice because it
> > gives an attacker a single target to subvert. We should ensure the TPM
> > is plugged into the kernel RNG as a source and then take randomness
> > from the mixed pool so it's harder for an attacker because they have to
> > subvert all our sources to predict what came out.
>
> It is and I agree.
I still haven't quite figured out why the digests need to be
initialized to anything other than 0.
Mimi
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