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Message-ID: <20190710142653.GJ3419@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net>
Date: Wed, 10 Jul 2019 16:26:53 +0200
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
To: Jiri Kosina <jikos@...nel.org>
Cc: Xi Ruoyao <xry111@...gyan1223.wang>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
Linux List Kernel Mailing <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>, Len Brown <lenb@...nel.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
"Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael.j.wysocki@...el.com>,
Tony Luck <tony.luck@...el.com>,
Bob Moore <robert.moore@...el.com>,
Erik Schmauss <erik.schmauss@...el.com>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>,
Daniel Bristot de Oliveira <bristot@...hat.com>,
Nadav Amit <namit@...are.com>
Subject: Re: [GIT PULL] x86/topology changes for v5.3
On Wed, Jul 10, 2019 at 04:22:51PM +0200, Jiri Kosina wrote:
> On Wed, 10 Jul 2019, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
>
> > If we mark the key as RO after init, and then try and modify the key to
> > link module usage sites, things might go bang as described.
> >
> > Thanks!
> >
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
> > index 27d7864e7252..5bf7a8354da2 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
> > @@ -366,7 +366,7 @@ static __always_inline void setup_umip(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
> > cr4_clear_bits(X86_CR4_UMIP);
> > }
> >
> > -DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE_RO(cr_pinning);
> > +DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(cr_pinning);
>
> Good catch, I guess that is going to fix it.
>
> At the same time though, it sort of destroys the original intent of Kees'
> patch, right? The exploits will just have to call static_key_disable()
> prior to calling native_write_cr4() again, and the protection is gone.
This is fixable by moving native_write_cr*() out-of-line, such that they
never end up in a module.
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