linux-kernel - Re: [GIT PULL] x86/topology changes for v5.3

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Message-ID: <alpine.DEB.2.21.1907110915570.1889@nanos.tec.linutronix.de>
Date:   Thu, 11 Jul 2019 09:16:19 +0200 (CEST)
From:   Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
To:     Nadav Amit <namit@...are.com>
cc:     Jiri Kosina <jikos@...nel.org>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Xi Ruoyao <xry111@...gyan1223.wang>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
        Linux List Kernel Mailing <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>, Len Brown <lenb@...nel.org>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael.j.wysocki@...el.com>,
        Tony Luck <tony.luck@...el.com>,
        Bob Moore <robert.moore@...el.com>,
        Erik Schmauss <erik.schmauss@...el.com>,
        Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>,
        Daniel Bristot de Oliveira <bristot@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: [GIT PULL] x86/topology changes for v5.3

On Thu, 11 Jul 2019, Nadav Amit wrote:
> > On Jul 10, 2019, at 7:22 AM, Jiri Kosina <jikos@...nel.org> wrote:
> > 
> > On Wed, 10 Jul 2019, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> > 
> >> If we mark the key as RO after init, and then try and modify the key to
> >> link module usage sites, things might go bang as described.
> >> 
> >> Thanks!
> >> 
> >> 
> >> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
> >> index 27d7864e7252..5bf7a8354da2 100644
> >> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
> >> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
> >> @@ -366,7 +366,7 @@ static __always_inline void setup_umip(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
> >> 	cr4_clear_bits(X86_CR4_UMIP);
> >> }
> >> 
> >> -DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE_RO(cr_pinning);
> >> +DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(cr_pinning);
> > 
> > Good catch, I guess that is going to fix it.
> > 
> > At the same time though, it sort of destroys the original intent of Kees' 
> > patch, right? The exploits will just have to call static_key_disable() 
> > prior to calling native_write_cr4() again, and the protection is gone.
> 
> Even with DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE_RO(), I presume you can just call
> set_memory_rw(), make the page that holds the key writable, and then call
> static_key_disable(), followed by a call to native_write_cr4().

That's true, but it's not worth the trouble.

Thanks,

	tglx