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Message-ID: <3ccae31c-da8d-86bd-c456-5665a1d4f5b0@intel.com>
Date: Fri, 12 Jul 2019 06:58:48 -0700
From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>
To: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@...cle.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, pbonzini@...hat.com,
rkrcmar@...hat.com, mingo@...hat.com, bp@...en8.de, hpa@...or.com,
dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com, luto@...nel.org, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
x86@...nel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
konrad.wilk@...cle.com, jan.setjeeilers@...cle.com,
liran.alon@...cle.com, jwadams@...gle.com, graf@...zon.de,
rppt@...ux.vnet.ibm.com, Paul Turner <pjt@...gle.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC v2 00/27] Kernel Address Space Isolation
On 7/12/19 6:43 AM, Alexandre Chartre wrote:
> The current approach is assuming that anything in the user address space
> can be sensitive, and so the user address space shouldn't be mapped in ASI.
Is this universally true?
There's certainly *some* mitigation provided by SMAP that would allow
userspace to remain mapped and still protected.
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