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Message-ID: <20190714080529.GA7952@debian>
Date: Sun, 14 Jul 2019 13:35:34 +0530
From: Bhaskar Chowdhury <unixbhaskar@...il.com>
To: Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
torvalds@...ux-foundation.org, stable@...r.kernel.org, lwn@....net,
Jiri Slaby <jslaby@...e.cz>
Subject: Re: Linux 5.2.1
Thanks, a bunch Greg!
On 09:19 Sun 14 Jul , Greg KH wrote:
>diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst
>index ffc064c1ec68..49311f3da6f2 100644
>--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst
>+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst
>@@ -9,5 +9,6 @@ are configurable at compile, boot or run time.
> .. toctree::
> :maxdepth: 1
>
>+ spectre
> l1tf
> mds
>diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
>new file mode 100644
>index 000000000000..25f3b2532198
>--- /dev/null
>+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
>@@ -0,0 +1,697 @@
>+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
>+
>+Spectre Side Channels
>+=====================
>+
>+Spectre is a class of side channel attacks that exploit branch prediction
>+and speculative execution on modern CPUs to read memory, possibly
>+bypassing access controls. Speculative execution side channel exploits
>+do not modify memory but attempt to infer privileged data in the memory.
>+
>+This document covers Spectre variant 1 and Spectre variant 2.
>+
>+Affected processors
>+-------------------
>+
>+Speculative execution side channel methods affect a wide range of modern
>+high performance processors, since most modern high speed processors
>+use branch prediction and speculative execution.
>+
>+The following CPUs are vulnerable:
>+
>+ - Intel Core, Atom, Pentium, and Xeon processors
>+
>+ - AMD Phenom, EPYC, and Zen processors
>+
>+ - IBM POWER and zSeries processors
>+
>+ - Higher end ARM processors
>+
>+ - Apple CPUs
>+
>+ - Higher end MIPS CPUs
>+
>+ - Likely most other high performance CPUs. Contact your CPU vendor for details.
>+
>+Whether a processor is affected or not can be read out from the Spectre
>+vulnerability files in sysfs. See :ref:`spectre_sys_info`.
>+
>+Related CVEs
>+------------
>+
>+The following CVE entries describe Spectre variants:
>+
>+ ============= ======================= =================
>+ CVE-2017-5753 Bounds check bypass Spectre variant 1
>+ CVE-2017-5715 Branch target injection Spectre variant 2
>+ ============= ======================= =================
>+
>+Problem
>+-------
>+
>+CPUs use speculative operations to improve performance. That may leave
>+traces of memory accesses or computations in the processor's caches,
>+buffers, and branch predictors. Malicious software may be able to
>+influence the speculative execution paths, and then use the side effects
>+of the speculative execution in the CPUs' caches and buffers to infer
>+privileged data touched during the speculative execution.
>+
>+Spectre variant 1 attacks take advantage of speculative execution of
>+conditional branches, while Spectre variant 2 attacks use speculative
>+execution of indirect branches to leak privileged memory.
>+See :ref:`[1] <spec_ref1>` :ref:`[5] <spec_ref5>` :ref:`[7] <spec_ref7>`
>+:ref:`[10] <spec_ref10>` :ref:`[11] <spec_ref11>`.
>+
>+Spectre variant 1 (Bounds Check Bypass)
>+---------------------------------------
>+
>+The bounds check bypass attack :ref:`[2] <spec_ref2>` takes advantage
>+of speculative execution that bypasses conditional branch instructions
>+used for memory access bounds check (e.g. checking if the index of an
>+array results in memory access within a valid range). This results in
>+memory accesses to invalid memory (with out-of-bound index) that are
>+done speculatively before validation checks resolve. Such speculative
>+memory accesses can leave side effects, creating side channels which
>+leak information to the attacker.
>+
>+There are some extensions of Spectre variant 1 attacks for reading data
>+over the network, see :ref:`[12] <spec_ref12>`. However such attacks
>+are difficult, low bandwidth, fragile, and are considered low risk.
>+
>+Spectre variant 2 (Branch Target Injection)
>+-------------------------------------------
>+
>+The branch target injection attack takes advantage of speculative
>+execution of indirect branches :ref:`[3] <spec_ref3>`. The indirect
>+branch predictors inside the processor used to guess the target of
>+indirect branches can be influenced by an attacker, causing gadget code
>+to be speculatively executed, thus exposing sensitive data touched by
>+the victim. The side effects left in the CPU's caches during speculative
>+execution can be measured to infer data values.
>+
>+.. _poison_btb:
>+
>+In Spectre variant 2 attacks, the attacker can steer speculative indirect
>+branches in the victim to gadget code by poisoning the branch target
>+buffer of a CPU used for predicting indirect branch addresses. Such
>+poisoning could be done by indirect branching into existing code,
>+with the address offset of the indirect branch under the attacker's
>+control. Since the branch prediction on impacted hardware does not
>+fully disambiguate branch address and uses the offset for prediction,
>+this could cause privileged code's indirect branch to jump to a gadget
>+code with the same offset.
>+
>+The most useful gadgets take an attacker-controlled input parameter (such
>+as a register value) so that the memory read can be controlled. Gadgets
>+without input parameters might be possible, but the attacker would have
>+very little control over what memory can be read, reducing the risk of
>+the attack revealing useful data.
>+
>+One other variant 2 attack vector is for the attacker to poison the
>+return stack buffer (RSB) :ref:`[13] <spec_ref13>` to cause speculative
>+subroutine return instruction execution to go to a gadget. An attacker's
>+imbalanced subroutine call instructions might "poison" entries in the
>+return stack buffer which are later consumed by a victim's subroutine
>+return instructions. This attack can be mitigated by flushing the return
>+stack buffer on context switch, or virtual machine (VM) exit.
>+
>+On systems with simultaneous multi-threading (SMT), attacks are possible
>+from the sibling thread, as level 1 cache and branch target buffer
>+(BTB) may be shared between hardware threads in a CPU core. A malicious
>+program running on the sibling thread may influence its peer's BTB to
>+steer its indirect branch speculations to gadget code, and measure the
>+speculative execution's side effects left in level 1 cache to infer the
>+victim's data.
>+
>+Attack scenarios
>+----------------
>+
>+The following list of attack scenarios have been anticipated, but may
>+not cover all possible attack vectors.
>+
>+1. A user process attacking the kernel
>+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
>+
>+ The attacker passes a parameter to the kernel via a register or
>+ via a known address in memory during a syscall. Such parameter may
>+ be used later by the kernel as an index to an array or to derive
>+ a pointer for a Spectre variant 1 attack. The index or pointer
>+ is invalid, but bound checks are bypassed in the code branch taken
>+ for speculative execution. This could cause privileged memory to be
>+ accessed and leaked.
>+
>+ For kernel code that has been identified where data pointers could
>+ potentially be influenced for Spectre attacks, new "nospec" accessor
>+ macros are used to prevent speculative loading of data.
>+
>+ Spectre variant 2 attacker can :ref:`poison <poison_btb>` the branch
>+ target buffer (BTB) before issuing syscall to launch an attack.
>+ After entering the kernel, the kernel could use the poisoned branch
>+ target buffer on indirect jump and jump to gadget code in speculative
>+ execution.
>+
>+ If an attacker tries to control the memory addresses leaked during
>+ speculative execution, he would also need to pass a parameter to the
>+ gadget, either through a register or a known address in memory. After
>+ the gadget has executed, he can measure the side effect.
>+
>+ The kernel can protect itself against consuming poisoned branch
>+ target buffer entries by using return trampolines (also known as
>+ "retpoline") :ref:`[3] <spec_ref3>` :ref:`[9] <spec_ref9>` for all
>+ indirect branches. Return trampolines trap speculative execution paths
>+ to prevent jumping to gadget code during speculative execution.
>+ x86 CPUs with Enhanced Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation
>+ (Enhanced IBRS) available in hardware should use the feature to
>+ mitigate Spectre variant 2 instead of retpoline. Enhanced IBRS is
>+ more efficient than retpoline.
>+
>+ There may be gadget code in firmware which could be exploited with
>+ Spectre variant 2 attack by a rogue user process. To mitigate such
>+ attacks on x86, Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation (IBRS) feature
>+ is turned on before the kernel invokes any firmware code.
>+
>+2. A user process attacking another user process
>+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
>+
>+ A malicious user process can try to attack another user process,
>+ either via a context switch on the same hardware thread, or from the
>+ sibling hyperthread sharing a physical processor core on simultaneous
>+ multi-threading (SMT) system.
>+
>+ Spectre variant 1 attacks generally require passing parameters
>+ between the processes, which needs a data passing relationship, such
>+ as remote procedure calls (RPC). Those parameters are used in gadget
>+ code to derive invalid data pointers accessing privileged memory in
>+ the attacked process.
>+
>+ Spectre variant 2 attacks can be launched from a rogue process by
>+ :ref:`poisoning <poison_btb>` the branch target buffer. This can
>+ influence the indirect branch targets for a victim process that either
>+ runs later on the same hardware thread, or running concurrently on
>+ a sibling hardware thread sharing the same physical core.
>+
>+ A user process can protect itself against Spectre variant 2 attacks
>+ by using the prctl() syscall to disable indirect branch speculation
>+ for itself. An administrator can also cordon off an unsafe process
>+ from polluting the branch target buffer by disabling the process's
>+ indirect branch speculation. This comes with a performance cost
>+ from not using indirect branch speculation and clearing the branch
>+ target buffer. When SMT is enabled on x86, for a process that has
>+ indirect branch speculation disabled, Single Threaded Indirect Branch
>+ Predictors (STIBP) :ref:`[4] <spec_ref4>` are turned on to prevent the
>+ sibling thread from controlling branch target buffer. In addition,
>+ the Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier (IBPB) is issued to clear the
>+ branch target buffer when context switching to and from such process.
>+
>+ On x86, the return stack buffer is stuffed on context switch.
>+ This prevents the branch target buffer from being used for branch
>+ prediction when the return stack buffer underflows while switching to
>+ a deeper call stack. Any poisoned entries in the return stack buffer
>+ left by the previous process will also be cleared.
>+
>+ User programs should use address space randomization to make attacks
>+ more difficult (Set /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space = 1 or 2).
>+
>+3. A virtualized guest attacking the host
>+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
>+
>+ The attack mechanism is similar to how user processes attack the
>+ kernel. The kernel is entered via hyper-calls or other virtualization
>+ exit paths.
>+
>+ For Spectre variant 1 attacks, rogue guests can pass parameters
>+ (e.g. in registers) via hyper-calls to derive invalid pointers to
>+ speculate into privileged memory after entering the kernel. For places
>+ where such kernel code has been identified, nospec accessor macros
>+ are used to stop speculative memory access.
>+
>+ For Spectre variant 2 attacks, rogue guests can :ref:`poison
>+ <poison_btb>` the branch target buffer or return stack buffer, causing
>+ the kernel to jump to gadget code in the speculative execution paths.
>+
>+ To mitigate variant 2, the host kernel can use return trampolines
>+ for indirect branches to bypass the poisoned branch target buffer,
>+ and flushing the return stack buffer on VM exit. This prevents rogue
>+ guests from affecting indirect branching in the host kernel.
>+
>+ To protect host processes from rogue guests, host processes can have
>+ indirect branch speculation disabled via prctl(). The branch target
>+ buffer is cleared before context switching to such processes.
>+
>+4. A virtualized guest attacking other guest
>+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
>+
>+ A rogue guest may attack another guest to get data accessible by the
>+ other guest.
>+
>+ Spectre variant 1 attacks are possible if parameters can be passed
>+ between guests. This may be done via mechanisms such as shared memory
>+ or message passing. Such parameters could be used to derive data
>+ pointers to privileged data in guest. The privileged data could be
>+ accessed by gadget code in the victim's speculation paths.
>+
>+ Spectre variant 2 attacks can be launched from a rogue guest by
>+ :ref:`poisoning <poison_btb>` the branch target buffer or the return
>+ stack buffer. Such poisoned entries could be used to influence
>+ speculation execution paths in the victim guest.
>+
>+ Linux kernel mitigates attacks to other guests running in the same
>+ CPU hardware thread by flushing the return stack buffer on VM exit,
>+ and clearing the branch target buffer before switching to a new guest.
>+
>+ If SMT is used, Spectre variant 2 attacks from an untrusted guest
>+ in the sibling hyperthread can be mitigated by the administrator,
>+ by turning off the unsafe guest's indirect branch speculation via
>+ prctl(). A guest can also protect itself by turning on microcode
>+ based mitigations (such as IBPB or STIBP on x86) within the guest.
>+
>+.. _spectre_sys_info:
>+
>+Spectre system information
>+--------------------------
>+
>+The Linux kernel provides a sysfs interface to enumerate the current
>+mitigation status of the system for Spectre: whether the system is
>+vulnerable, and which mitigations are active.
>+
>+The sysfs file showing Spectre variant 1 mitigation status is:
>+
>+ /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v1
>+
>+The possible values in this file are:
>+
>+ ======================================= =================================
>+ 'Mitigation: __user pointer sanitation' Protection in kernel on a case by
>+ case base with explicit pointer
>+ sanitation.
>+ ======================================= =================================
>+
>+However, the protections are put in place on a case by case basis,
>+and there is no guarantee that all possible attack vectors for Spectre
>+variant 1 are covered.
>+
>+The spectre_v2 kernel file reports if the kernel has been compiled with
>+retpoline mitigation or if the CPU has hardware mitigation, and if the
>+CPU has support for additional process-specific mitigation.
>+
>+This file also reports CPU features enabled by microcode to mitigate
>+attack between user processes:
>+
>+1. Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier (IBPB) to add additional
>+ isolation between processes of different users.
>+2. Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors (STIBP) to add additional
>+ isolation between CPU threads running on the same core.
>+
>+These CPU features may impact performance when used and can be enabled
>+per process on a case-by-case base.
>+
>+The sysfs file showing Spectre variant 2 mitigation status is:
>+
>+ /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2
>+
>+The possible values in this file are:
>+
>+ - Kernel status:
>+
>+ ==================================== =================================
>+ 'Not affected' The processor is not vulnerable
>+ 'Vulnerable' Vulnerable, no mitigation
>+ 'Mitigation: Full generic retpoline' Software-focused mitigation
>+ 'Mitigation: Full AMD retpoline' AMD-specific software mitigation
>+ 'Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS' Hardware-focused mitigation
>+ ==================================== =================================
>+
>+ - Firmware status: Show if Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation (IBRS) is
>+ used to protect against Spectre variant 2 attacks when calling firmware (x86 only).
>+
>+ ========== =============================================================
>+ 'IBRS_FW' Protection against user program attacks when calling firmware
>+ ========== =============================================================
>+
>+ - Indirect branch prediction barrier (IBPB) status for protection between
>+ processes of different users. This feature can be controlled through
>+ prctl() per process, or through kernel command line options. This is
>+ an x86 only feature. For more details see below.
>+
>+ =================== ========================================================
>+ 'IBPB: disabled' IBPB unused
>+ 'IBPB: always-on' Use IBPB on all tasks
>+ 'IBPB: conditional' Use IBPB on SECCOMP or indirect branch restricted tasks
>+ =================== ========================================================
>+
>+ - Single threaded indirect branch prediction (STIBP) status for protection
>+ between different hyper threads. This feature can be controlled through
>+ prctl per process, or through kernel command line options. This is x86
>+ only feature. For more details see below.
>+
>+ ==================== ========================================================
>+ 'STIBP: disabled' STIBP unused
>+ 'STIBP: forced' Use STIBP on all tasks
>+ 'STIBP: conditional' Use STIBP on SECCOMP or indirect branch restricted tasks
>+ ==================== ========================================================
>+
>+ - Return stack buffer (RSB) protection status:
>+
>+ ============= ===========================================
>+ 'RSB filling' Protection of RSB on context switch enabled
>+ ============= ===========================================
>+
>+Full mitigation might require a microcode update from the CPU
>+vendor. When the necessary microcode is not available, the kernel will
>+report vulnerability.
>+
>+Turning on mitigation for Spectre variant 1 and Spectre variant 2
>+-----------------------------------------------------------------
>+
>+1. Kernel mitigation
>+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
>+
>+ For the Spectre variant 1, vulnerable kernel code (as determined
>+ by code audit or scanning tools) is annotated on a case by case
>+ basis to use nospec accessor macros for bounds clipping :ref:`[2]
>+ <spec_ref2>` to avoid any usable disclosure gadgets. However, it may
>+ not cover all attack vectors for Spectre variant 1.
>+
>+ For Spectre variant 2 mitigation, the compiler turns indirect calls or
>+ jumps in the kernel into equivalent return trampolines (retpolines)
>+ :ref:`[3] <spec_ref3>` :ref:`[9] <spec_ref9>` to go to the target
>+ addresses. Speculative execution paths under retpolines are trapped
>+ in an infinite loop to prevent any speculative execution jumping to
>+ a gadget.
>+
>+ To turn on retpoline mitigation on a vulnerable CPU, the kernel
>+ needs to be compiled with a gcc compiler that supports the
>+ -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern -mindirect-branch-register options.
>+ If the kernel is compiled with a Clang compiler, the compiler needs
>+ to support -mretpoline-external-thunk option. The kernel config
>+ CONFIG_RETPOLINE needs to be turned on, and the CPU needs to run with
>+ the latest updated microcode.
>+
>+ On Intel Skylake-era systems the mitigation covers most, but not all,
>+ cases. See :ref:`[3] <spec_ref3>` for more details.
>+
>+ On CPUs with hardware mitigation for Spectre variant 2 (e.g. Enhanced
>+ IBRS on x86), retpoline is automatically disabled at run time.
>+
>+ The retpoline mitigation is turned on by default on vulnerable
>+ CPUs. It can be forced on or off by the administrator
>+ via the kernel command line and sysfs control files. See
>+ :ref:`spectre_mitigation_control_command_line`.
>+
>+ On x86, indirect branch restricted speculation is turned on by default
>+ before invoking any firmware code to prevent Spectre variant 2 exploits
>+ using the firmware.
>+
>+ Using kernel address space randomization (CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_SLAB=y
>+ and CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM=y in the kernel configuration) makes
>+ attacks on the kernel generally more difficult.
>+
>+2. User program mitigation
>+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
>+
>+ User programs can mitigate Spectre variant 1 using LFENCE or "bounds
>+ clipping". For more details see :ref:`[2] <spec_ref2>`.
>+
>+ For Spectre variant 2 mitigation, individual user programs
>+ can be compiled with return trampolines for indirect branches.
>+ This protects them from consuming poisoned entries in the branch
>+ target buffer left by malicious software. Alternatively, the
>+ programs can disable their indirect branch speculation via prctl()
>+ (See :ref:`Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst <set_spec_ctrl>`).
>+ On x86, this will turn on STIBP to guard against attacks from the
>+ sibling thread when the user program is running, and use IBPB to
>+ flush the branch target buffer when switching to/from the program.
>+
>+ Restricting indirect branch speculation on a user program will
>+ also prevent the program from launching a variant 2 attack
>+ on x86. All sand-boxed SECCOMP programs have indirect branch
>+ speculation restricted by default. Administrators can change
>+ that behavior via the kernel command line and sysfs control files.
>+ See :ref:`spectre_mitigation_control_command_line`.
>+
>+ Programs that disable their indirect branch speculation will have
>+ more overhead and run slower.
>+
>+ User programs should use address space randomization
>+ (/proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space = 1 or 2) to make attacks more
>+ difficult.
>+
>+3. VM mitigation
>+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
>+
>+ Within the kernel, Spectre variant 1 attacks from rogue guests are
>+ mitigated on a case by case basis in VM exit paths. Vulnerable code
>+ uses nospec accessor macros for "bounds clipping", to avoid any
>+ usable disclosure gadgets. However, this may not cover all variant
>+ 1 attack vectors.
>+
>+ For Spectre variant 2 attacks from rogue guests to the kernel, the
>+ Linux kernel uses retpoline or Enhanced IBRS to prevent consumption of
>+ poisoned entries in branch target buffer left by rogue guests. It also
>+ flushes the return stack buffer on every VM exit to prevent a return
>+ stack buffer underflow so poisoned branch target buffer could be used,
>+ or attacker guests leaving poisoned entries in the return stack buffer.
>+
>+ To mitigate guest-to-guest attacks in the same CPU hardware thread,
>+ the branch target buffer is sanitized by flushing before switching
>+ to a new guest on a CPU.
>+
>+ The above mitigations are turned on by default on vulnerable CPUs.
>+
>+ To mitigate guest-to-guest attacks from sibling thread when SMT is
>+ in use, an untrusted guest running in the sibling thread can have
>+ its indirect branch speculation disabled by administrator via prctl().
>+
>+ The kernel also allows guests to use any microcode based mitigation
>+ they choose to use (such as IBPB or STIBP on x86) to protect themselves.
>+
>+.. _spectre_mitigation_control_command_line:
>+
>+Mitigation control on the kernel command line
>+---------------------------------------------
>+
>+Spectre variant 2 mitigation can be disabled or force enabled at the
>+kernel command line.
>+
>+ nospectre_v2
>+
>+ [X86] Disable all mitigations for the Spectre variant 2
>+ (indirect branch prediction) vulnerability. System may
>+ allow data leaks with this option, which is equivalent
>+ to spectre_v2=off.
>+
>+
>+ spectre_v2=
>+
>+ [X86] Control mitigation of Spectre variant 2
>+ (indirect branch speculation) vulnerability.
>+ The default operation protects the kernel from
>+ user space attacks.
>+
>+ on
>+ unconditionally enable, implies
>+ spectre_v2_user=on
>+ off
>+ unconditionally disable, implies
>+ spectre_v2_user=off
>+ auto
>+ kernel detects whether your CPU model is
>+ vulnerable
>+
>+ Selecting 'on' will, and 'auto' may, choose a
>+ mitigation method at run time according to the
>+ CPU, the available microcode, the setting of the
>+ CONFIG_RETPOLINE configuration option, and the
>+ compiler with which the kernel was built.
>+
>+ Selecting 'on' will also enable the mitigation
>+ against user space to user space task attacks.
>+
>+ Selecting 'off' will disable both the kernel and
>+ the user space protections.
>+
>+ Specific mitigations can also be selected manually:
>+
>+ retpoline
>+ replace indirect branches
>+ retpoline,generic
>+ google's original retpoline
>+ retpoline,amd
>+ AMD-specific minimal thunk
>+
>+ Not specifying this option is equivalent to
>+ spectre_v2=auto.
>+
>+For user space mitigation:
>+
>+ spectre_v2_user=
>+
>+ [X86] Control mitigation of Spectre variant 2
>+ (indirect branch speculation) vulnerability between
>+ user space tasks
>+
>+ on
>+ Unconditionally enable mitigations. Is
>+ enforced by spectre_v2=on
>+
>+ off
>+ Unconditionally disable mitigations. Is
>+ enforced by spectre_v2=off
>+
>+ prctl
>+ Indirect branch speculation is enabled,
>+ but mitigation can be enabled via prctl
>+ per thread. The mitigation control state
>+ is inherited on fork.
>+
>+ prctl,ibpb
>+ Like "prctl" above, but only STIBP is
>+ controlled per thread. IBPB is issued
>+ always when switching between different user
>+ space processes.
>+
>+ seccomp
>+ Same as "prctl" above, but all seccomp
>+ threads will enable the mitigation unless
>+ they explicitly opt out.
>+
>+ seccomp,ibpb
>+ Like "seccomp" above, but only STIBP is
>+ controlled per thread. IBPB is issued
>+ always when switching between different
>+ user space processes.
>+
>+ auto
>+ Kernel selects the mitigation depending on
>+ the available CPU features and vulnerability.
>+
>+ Default mitigation:
>+ If CONFIG_SECCOMP=y then "seccomp", otherwise "prctl"
>+
>+ Not specifying this option is equivalent to
>+ spectre_v2_user=auto.
>+
>+ In general the kernel by default selects
>+ reasonable mitigations for the current CPU. To
>+ disable Spectre variant 2 mitigations, boot with
>+ spectre_v2=off. Spectre variant 1 mitigations
>+ cannot be disabled.
>+
>+Mitigation selection guide
>+--------------------------
>+
>+1. Trusted userspace
>+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
>+
>+ If all userspace applications are from trusted sources and do not
>+ execute externally supplied untrusted code, then the mitigations can
>+ be disabled.
>+
>+2. Protect sensitive programs
>+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
>+
>+ For security-sensitive programs that have secrets (e.g. crypto
>+ keys), protection against Spectre variant 2 can be put in place by
>+ disabling indirect branch speculation when the program is running
>+ (See :ref:`Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst <set_spec_ctrl>`).
>+
>+3. Sandbox untrusted programs
>+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
>+
>+ Untrusted programs that could be a source of attacks can be cordoned
>+ off by disabling their indirect branch speculation when they are run
>+ (See :ref:`Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst <set_spec_ctrl>`).
>+ This prevents untrusted programs from polluting the branch target
>+ buffer. All programs running in SECCOMP sandboxes have indirect
>+ branch speculation restricted by default. This behavior can be
>+ changed via the kernel command line and sysfs control files. See
>+ :ref:`spectre_mitigation_control_command_line`.
>+
>+3. High security mode
>+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
>+
>+ All Spectre variant 2 mitigations can be forced on
>+ at boot time for all programs (See the "on" option in
>+ :ref:`spectre_mitigation_control_command_line`). This will add
>+ overhead as indirect branch speculations for all programs will be
>+ restricted.
>+
>+ On x86, branch target buffer will be flushed with IBPB when switching
>+ to a new program. STIBP is left on all the time to protect programs
>+ against variant 2 attacks originating from programs running on
>+ sibling threads.
>+
>+ Alternatively, STIBP can be used only when running programs
>+ whose indirect branch speculation is explicitly disabled,
>+ while IBPB is still used all the time when switching to a new
>+ program to clear the branch target buffer (See "ibpb" option in
>+ :ref:`spectre_mitigation_control_command_line`). This "ibpb" option
>+ has less performance cost than the "on" option, which leaves STIBP
>+ on all the time.
>+
>+References on Spectre
>+---------------------
>+
>+Intel white papers:
>+
>+.. _spec_ref1:
>+
>+[1] `Intel analysis of speculative execution side channels <https://newsroom.intel.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2018/01/Intel-Analysis-of-Speculative-Execution-Side-Channels.pdf>`_.
>+
>+.. _spec_ref2:
>+
>+[2] `Bounds check bypass <https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/software-guidance/bounds-check-bypass>`_.
>+
>+.. _spec_ref3:
>+
>+[3] `Deep dive: Retpoline: A branch target injection mitigation <https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/insights/deep-dive-retpoline-branch-target-injection-mitigation>`_.
>+
>+.. _spec_ref4:
>+
>+[4] `Deep Dive: Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors <https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/insights/deep-dive-single-thread-indirect-branch-predictors>`_.
>+
>+AMD white papers:
>+
>+.. _spec_ref5:
>+
>+[5] `AMD64 technology indirect branch control extension <https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/Architecture_Guidelines_Update_Indirect_Branch_Control.pdf>`_.
>+
>+.. _spec_ref6:
>+
>+[6] `Software techniques for managing speculation on AMD processors <https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/90343-B_SoftwareTechniquesforManagingSpeculation_WP_7-18Update_FNL.pdf>`_.
>+
>+ARM white papers:
>+
>+.. _spec_ref7:
>+
>+[7] `Cache speculation side-channels <https://developer.arm.com/support/arm-security-updates/speculative-processor-vulnerability/download-the-whitepaper>`_.
>+
>+.. _spec_ref8:
>+
>+[8] `Cache speculation issues update <https://developer.arm.com/support/arm-security-updates/speculative-processor-vulnerability/latest-updates/cache-speculation-issues-update>`_.
>+
>+Google white paper:
>+
>+.. _spec_ref9:
>+
>+[9] `Retpoline: a software construct for preventing branch-target-injection <https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7625886>`_.
>+
>+MIPS white paper:
>+
>+.. _spec_ref10:
>+
>+[10] `MIPS: response on speculative execution and side channel vulnerabilities <https://www.mips.com/blog/mips-response-on-speculative-execution-and-side-channel-vulnerabilities/>`_.
>+
>+Academic papers:
>+
>+.. _spec_ref11:
>+
>+[11] `Spectre Attacks: Exploiting Speculative Execution <https://spectreattack.com/spectre.pdf>`_.
>+
>+.. _spec_ref12:
>+
>+[12] `NetSpectre: Read Arbitrary Memory over Network <https://arxiv.org/abs/1807.10535>`_.
>+
>+.. _spec_ref13:
>+
>+[13] `Spectre Returns! Speculation Attacks using the Return Stack Buffer <https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/woot18/woot18-paper-koruyeh.pdf>`_.
>diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
>index 138f6664b2e2..0082d1e56999 100644
>--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
>+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
>@@ -5102,12 +5102,6 @@
> emulate [default] Vsyscalls turn into traps and are
> emulated reasonably safely.
>
>- native Vsyscalls are native syscall instructions.
>- This is a little bit faster than trapping
>- and makes a few dynamic recompilers work
>- better than they would in emulation mode.
>- It also makes exploits much easier to write.
>-
> none Vsyscalls don't work at all. This makes
> them quite hard to use for exploits but
> might break your system.
>diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst
>index 1129c7550a48..7ddd8f667459 100644
>--- a/Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst
>+++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst
>@@ -49,6 +49,8 @@ If PR_SPEC_PRCTL is set, then the per-task control of the mitigation is
> available. If not set, prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL) for the speculation
> misfeature will fail.
>
>+.. _set_spec_ctrl:
>+
> PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL
> -----------------------
>
>diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
>index 3e4868a6498b..d8f5dbfd6b76 100644
>--- a/Makefile
>+++ b/Makefile
>@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
> # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> VERSION = 5
> PATCHLEVEL = 2
>-SUBLEVEL = 0
>+SUBLEVEL = 1
> EXTRAVERSION =
> NAME = Bobtail Squid
>
>diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c
>index a166c960bc9e..e9d0bc3a5e88 100644
>--- a/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c
>+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c
>@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
> #include <linux/rcupdate.h>
> #include <linux/export.h>
> #include <linux/context_tracking.h>
>+#include <linux/nospec.h>
>
> #include <linux/uaccess.h>
> #include <asm/pgtable.h>
>@@ -643,9 +644,11 @@ static unsigned long ptrace_get_debugreg(struct task_struct *tsk, int n)
> {
> struct thread_struct *thread = &tsk->thread;
> unsigned long val = 0;
>+ int index = n;
>
> if (n < HBP_NUM) {
>- struct perf_event *bp = thread->ptrace_bps[n];
>+ struct perf_event *bp = thread->ptrace_bps[index];
>+ index = array_index_nospec(index, HBP_NUM);
>
> if (bp)
> val = bp->hw.info.address;
>diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/tls.c b/arch/x86/kernel/tls.c
>index a5b802a12212..71d3fef1edc9 100644
>--- a/arch/x86/kernel/tls.c
>+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/tls.c
>@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
> #include <linux/user.h>
> #include <linux/regset.h>
> #include <linux/syscalls.h>
>+#include <linux/nospec.h>
>
> #include <linux/uaccess.h>
> #include <asm/desc.h>
>@@ -220,6 +221,7 @@ int do_get_thread_area(struct task_struct *p, int idx,
> struct user_desc __user *u_info)
> {
> struct user_desc info;
>+ int index;
>
> if (idx == -1 && get_user(idx, &u_info->entry_number))
> return -EFAULT;
>@@ -227,8 +229,11 @@ int do_get_thread_area(struct task_struct *p, int idx,
> if (idx < GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN || idx > GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MAX)
> return -EINVAL;
>
>- fill_user_desc(&info, idx,
>- &p->thread.tls_array[idx - GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN]);
>+ index = idx - GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN;
>+ index = array_index_nospec(index,
>+ GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MAX - GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN + 1);
>+
>+ fill_user_desc(&info, idx, &p->thread.tls_array[index]);
>
> if (copy_to_user(u_info, &info, sizeof(info)))
> return -EFAULT;
>diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
>index 0850b5149345..4d1517022a14 100644
>--- a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
>+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
>@@ -141,10 +141,10 @@ SECTIONS
> *(.text.__x86.indirect_thunk)
> __indirect_thunk_end = .;
> #endif
>- } :text = 0x9090
>
>- /* End of text section */
>- _etext = .;
>+ /* End of text section */
>+ _etext = .;
>+ } :text = 0x9090
>
> NOTES :text :note
>
>diff --git a/block/bfq-iosched.c b/block/bfq-iosched.c
>index f9269ae6da9c..e5db3856b194 100644
>--- a/block/bfq-iosched.c
>+++ b/block/bfq-iosched.c
>@@ -4584,6 +4584,7 @@ static void bfq_exit_icq_bfqq(struct bfq_io_cq *bic, bool is_sync)
> unsigned long flags;
>
> spin_lock_irqsave(&bfqd->lock, flags);
>+ bfqq->bic = NULL;
> bfq_exit_bfqq(bfqd, bfqq);
> bic_set_bfqq(bic, NULL, is_sync);
> spin_unlock_irqrestore(&bfqd->lock, flags);
>diff --git a/block/bio.c b/block/bio.c
>index ce797d73bb43..67bba12d273b 100644
>--- a/block/bio.c
>+++ b/block/bio.c
>@@ -731,7 +731,7 @@ static int __bio_add_pc_page(struct request_queue *q, struct bio *bio,
> }
> }
>
>- if (bio_full(bio))
>+ if (bio_full(bio, len))
> return 0;
>
> if (bio->bi_phys_segments >= queue_max_segments(q))
>@@ -807,7 +807,7 @@ void __bio_add_page(struct bio *bio, struct page *page,
> struct bio_vec *bv = &bio->bi_io_vec[bio->bi_vcnt];
>
> WARN_ON_ONCE(bio_flagged(bio, BIO_CLONED));
>- WARN_ON_ONCE(bio_full(bio));
>+ WARN_ON_ONCE(bio_full(bio, len));
>
> bv->bv_page = page;
> bv->bv_offset = off;
>@@ -834,7 +834,7 @@ int bio_add_page(struct bio *bio, struct page *page,
> bool same_page = false;
>
> if (!__bio_try_merge_page(bio, page, len, offset, &same_page)) {
>- if (bio_full(bio))
>+ if (bio_full(bio, len))
> return 0;
> __bio_add_page(bio, page, len, offset);
> }
>@@ -922,7 +922,7 @@ static int __bio_iov_iter_get_pages(struct bio *bio, struct iov_iter *iter)
> if (same_page)
> put_page(page);
> } else {
>- if (WARN_ON_ONCE(bio_full(bio)))
>+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(bio_full(bio, len)))
> return -EINVAL;
> __bio_add_page(bio, page, len, offset);
> }
>@@ -966,7 +966,7 @@ int bio_iov_iter_get_pages(struct bio *bio, struct iov_iter *iter)
> ret = __bio_iov_bvec_add_pages(bio, iter);
> else
> ret = __bio_iov_iter_get_pages(bio, iter);
>- } while (!ret && iov_iter_count(iter) && !bio_full(bio));
>+ } while (!ret && iov_iter_count(iter) && !bio_full(bio, 0));
>
> if (iov_iter_bvec_no_ref(iter))
> bio_set_flag(bio, BIO_NO_PAGE_REF);
>diff --git a/crypto/lrw.c b/crypto/lrw.c
>index 58009cf63a6e..be829f6afc8e 100644
>--- a/crypto/lrw.c
>+++ b/crypto/lrw.c
>@@ -384,7 +384,7 @@ static int create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb)
> inst->alg.base.cra_priority = alg->base.cra_priority;
> inst->alg.base.cra_blocksize = LRW_BLOCK_SIZE;
> inst->alg.base.cra_alignmask = alg->base.cra_alignmask |
>- (__alignof__(__be32) - 1);
>+ (__alignof__(be128) - 1);
>
> inst->alg.ivsize = LRW_BLOCK_SIZE;
> inst->alg.min_keysize = crypto_skcipher_alg_min_keysize(alg) +
>diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
>index bc26b5511f0a..38a59a630cd4 100644
>--- a/drivers/android/binder.c
>+++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
>@@ -2059,10 +2059,9 @@ static size_t binder_get_object(struct binder_proc *proc,
>
> read_size = min_t(size_t, sizeof(*object), buffer->data_size - offset);
> if (offset > buffer->data_size || read_size < sizeof(*hdr) ||
>- !IS_ALIGNED(offset, sizeof(u32)))
>+ binder_alloc_copy_from_buffer(&proc->alloc, object, buffer,
>+ offset, read_size))
> return 0;
>- binder_alloc_copy_from_buffer(&proc->alloc, object, buffer,
>- offset, read_size);
>
> /* Ok, now see if we read a complete object. */
> hdr = &object->hdr;
>@@ -2131,8 +2130,10 @@ static struct binder_buffer_object *binder_validate_ptr(
> return NULL;
>
> buffer_offset = start_offset + sizeof(binder_size_t) * index;
>- binder_alloc_copy_from_buffer(&proc->alloc, &object_offset,
>- b, buffer_offset, sizeof(object_offset));
>+ if (binder_alloc_copy_from_buffer(&proc->alloc, &object_offset,
>+ b, buffer_offset,
>+ sizeof(object_offset)))
>+ return NULL;
> object_size = binder_get_object(proc, b, object_offset, object);
> if (!object_size || object->hdr.type != BINDER_TYPE_PTR)
> return NULL;
>@@ -2212,10 +2213,12 @@ static bool binder_validate_fixup(struct binder_proc *proc,
> return false;
> last_min_offset = last_bbo->parent_offset + sizeof(uintptr_t);
> buffer_offset = objects_start_offset +
>- sizeof(binder_size_t) * last_bbo->parent,
>- binder_alloc_copy_from_buffer(&proc->alloc, &last_obj_offset,
>- b, buffer_offset,
>- sizeof(last_obj_offset));
>+ sizeof(binder_size_t) * last_bbo->parent;
>+ if (binder_alloc_copy_from_buffer(&proc->alloc,
>+ &last_obj_offset,
>+ b, buffer_offset,
>+ sizeof(last_obj_offset)))
>+ return false;
> }
> return (fixup_offset >= last_min_offset);
> }
>@@ -2301,15 +2304,15 @@ static void binder_transaction_buffer_release(struct binder_proc *proc,
> for (buffer_offset = off_start_offset; buffer_offset < off_end_offset;
> buffer_offset += sizeof(binder_size_t)) {
> struct binder_object_header *hdr;
>- size_t object_size;
>+ size_t object_size = 0;
> struct binder_object object;
> binder_size_t object_offset;
>
>- binder_alloc_copy_from_buffer(&proc->alloc, &object_offset,
>- buffer, buffer_offset,
>- sizeof(object_offset));
>- object_size = binder_get_object(proc, buffer,
>- object_offset, &object);
>+ if (!binder_alloc_copy_from_buffer(&proc->alloc, &object_offset,
>+ buffer, buffer_offset,
>+ sizeof(object_offset)))
>+ object_size = binder_get_object(proc, buffer,
>+ object_offset, &object);
> if (object_size == 0) {
> pr_err("transaction release %d bad object at offset %lld, size %zd\n",
> debug_id, (u64)object_offset, buffer->data_size);
>@@ -2432,15 +2435,16 @@ static void binder_transaction_buffer_release(struct binder_proc *proc,
> for (fd_index = 0; fd_index < fda->num_fds;
> fd_index++) {
> u32 fd;
>+ int err;
> binder_size_t offset = fda_offset +
> fd_index * sizeof(fd);
>
>- binder_alloc_copy_from_buffer(&proc->alloc,
>- &fd,
>- buffer,
>- offset,
>- sizeof(fd));
>- binder_deferred_fd_close(fd);
>+ err = binder_alloc_copy_from_buffer(
>+ &proc->alloc, &fd, buffer,
>+ offset, sizeof(fd));
>+ WARN_ON(err);
>+ if (!err)
>+ binder_deferred_fd_close(fd);
> }
> } break;
> default:
>@@ -2683,11 +2687,12 @@ static int binder_translate_fd_array(struct binder_fd_array_object *fda,
> int ret;
> binder_size_t offset = fda_offset + fdi * sizeof(fd);
>
>- binder_alloc_copy_from_buffer(&target_proc->alloc,
>- &fd, t->buffer,
>- offset, sizeof(fd));
>- ret = binder_translate_fd(fd, offset, t, thread,
>- in_reply_to);
>+ ret = binder_alloc_copy_from_buffer(&target_proc->alloc,
>+ &fd, t->buffer,
>+ offset, sizeof(fd));
>+ if (!ret)
>+ ret = binder_translate_fd(fd, offset, t, thread,
>+ in_reply_to);
> if (ret < 0)
> return ret;
> }
>@@ -2740,8 +2745,12 @@ static int binder_fixup_parent(struct binder_transaction *t,
> }
> buffer_offset = bp->parent_offset +
> (uintptr_t)parent->buffer - (uintptr_t)b->user_data;
>- binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&target_proc->alloc, b, buffer_offset,
>- &bp->buffer, sizeof(bp->buffer));
>+ if (binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&target_proc->alloc, b, buffer_offset,
>+ &bp->buffer, sizeof(bp->buffer))) {
>+ binder_user_error("%d:%d got transaction with invalid parent offset\n",
>+ proc->pid, thread->pid);
>+ return -EINVAL;
>+ }
>
> return 0;
> }
>@@ -3160,15 +3169,20 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
> goto err_binder_alloc_buf_failed;
> }
> if (secctx) {
>+ int err;
> size_t buf_offset = ALIGN(tr->data_size, sizeof(void *)) +
> ALIGN(tr->offsets_size, sizeof(void *)) +
> ALIGN(extra_buffers_size, sizeof(void *)) -
> ALIGN(secctx_sz, sizeof(u64));
>
> t->security_ctx = (uintptr_t)t->buffer->user_data + buf_offset;
>- binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&target_proc->alloc,
>- t->buffer, buf_offset,
>- secctx, secctx_sz);
>+ err = binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&target_proc->alloc,
>+ t->buffer, buf_offset,
>+ secctx, secctx_sz);
>+ if (err) {
>+ t->security_ctx = 0;
>+ WARN_ON(1);
>+ }
> security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_sz);
> secctx = NULL;
> }
>@@ -3234,11 +3248,16 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
> struct binder_object object;
> binder_size_t object_offset;
>
>- binder_alloc_copy_from_buffer(&target_proc->alloc,
>- &object_offset,
>- t->buffer,
>- buffer_offset,
>- sizeof(object_offset));
>+ if (binder_alloc_copy_from_buffer(&target_proc->alloc,
>+ &object_offset,
>+ t->buffer,
>+ buffer_offset,
>+ sizeof(object_offset))) {
>+ return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
>+ return_error_param = -EINVAL;
>+ return_error_line = __LINE__;
>+ goto err_bad_offset;
>+ }
> object_size = binder_get_object(target_proc, t->buffer,
> object_offset, &object);
> if (object_size == 0 || object_offset < off_min) {
>@@ -3262,15 +3281,17 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
>
> fp = to_flat_binder_object(hdr);
> ret = binder_translate_binder(fp, t, thread);
>- if (ret < 0) {
>+
>+ if (ret < 0 ||
>+ binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&target_proc->alloc,
>+ t->buffer,
>+ object_offset,
>+ fp, sizeof(*fp))) {
> return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
> return_error_param = ret;
> return_error_line = __LINE__;
> goto err_translate_failed;
> }
>- binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&target_proc->alloc,
>- t->buffer, object_offset,
>- fp, sizeof(*fp));
> } break;
> case BINDER_TYPE_HANDLE:
> case BINDER_TYPE_WEAK_HANDLE: {
>@@ -3278,15 +3299,16 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
>
> fp = to_flat_binder_object(hdr);
> ret = binder_translate_handle(fp, t, thread);
>- if (ret < 0) {
>+ if (ret < 0 ||
>+ binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&target_proc->alloc,
>+ t->buffer,
>+ object_offset,
>+ fp, sizeof(*fp))) {
> return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
> return_error_param = ret;
> return_error_line = __LINE__;
> goto err_translate_failed;
> }
>- binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&target_proc->alloc,
>- t->buffer, object_offset,
>- fp, sizeof(*fp));
> } break;
>
> case BINDER_TYPE_FD: {
>@@ -3296,16 +3318,17 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
> int ret = binder_translate_fd(fp->fd, fd_offset, t,
> thread, in_reply_to);
>
>- if (ret < 0) {
>+ fp->pad_binder = 0;
>+ if (ret < 0 ||
>+ binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&target_proc->alloc,
>+ t->buffer,
>+ object_offset,
>+ fp, sizeof(*fp))) {
> return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
> return_error_param = ret;
> return_error_line = __LINE__;
> goto err_translate_failed;
> }
>- fp->pad_binder = 0;
>- binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&target_proc->alloc,
>- t->buffer, object_offset,
>- fp, sizeof(*fp));
> } break;
> case BINDER_TYPE_FDA: {
> struct binder_object ptr_object;
>@@ -3393,15 +3416,16 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
> num_valid,
> last_fixup_obj_off,
> last_fixup_min_off);
>- if (ret < 0) {
>+ if (ret < 0 ||
>+ binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&target_proc->alloc,
>+ t->buffer,
>+ object_offset,
>+ bp, sizeof(*bp))) {
> return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
> return_error_param = ret;
> return_error_line = __LINE__;
> goto err_translate_failed;
> }
>- binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&target_proc->alloc,
>- t->buffer, object_offset,
>- bp, sizeof(*bp));
> last_fixup_obj_off = object_offset;
> last_fixup_min_off = 0;
> } break;
>@@ -4140,20 +4164,27 @@ static int binder_apply_fd_fixups(struct binder_proc *proc,
> trace_binder_transaction_fd_recv(t, fd, fixup->offset);
> fd_install(fd, fixup->file);
> fixup->file = NULL;
>- binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&proc->alloc, t->buffer,
>- fixup->offset, &fd,
>- sizeof(u32));
>+ if (binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&proc->alloc, t->buffer,
>+ fixup->offset, &fd,
>+ sizeof(u32))) {
>+ ret = -EINVAL;
>+ break;
>+ }
> }
> list_for_each_entry_safe(fixup, tmp, &t->fd_fixups, fixup_entry) {
> if (fixup->file) {
> fput(fixup->file);
> } else if (ret) {
> u32 fd;
>-
>- binder_alloc_copy_from_buffer(&proc->alloc, &fd,
>- t->buffer, fixup->offset,
>- sizeof(fd));
>- binder_deferred_fd_close(fd);
>+ int err;
>+
>+ err = binder_alloc_copy_from_buffer(&proc->alloc, &fd,
>+ t->buffer,
>+ fixup->offset,
>+ sizeof(fd));
>+ WARN_ON(err);
>+ if (!err)
>+ binder_deferred_fd_close(fd);
> }
> list_del(&fixup->fixup_entry);
> kfree(fixup);
>@@ -4268,6 +4299,8 @@ static int binder_thread_read(struct binder_proc *proc,
> case BINDER_WORK_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE: {
> binder_inner_proc_unlock(proc);
> cmd = BR_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE;
>+ kfree(w);
>+ binder_stats_deleted(BINDER_STAT_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE);
> if (put_user(cmd, (uint32_t __user *)ptr))
> return -EFAULT;
> ptr += sizeof(uint32_t);
>@@ -4276,8 +4309,6 @@ static int binder_thread_read(struct binder_proc *proc,
> binder_debug(BINDER_DEBUG_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE,
> "%d:%d BR_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE\n",
> proc->pid, thread->pid);
>- kfree(w);
>- binder_stats_deleted(BINDER_STAT_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE);
> } break;
> case BINDER_WORK_NODE: {
> struct binder_node *node = container_of(w, struct binder_node, work);
>diff --git a/drivers/android/binder_alloc.c b/drivers/android/binder_alloc.c
>index ce5603c2291c..6d79a1b0d446 100644
>--- a/drivers/android/binder_alloc.c
>+++ b/drivers/android/binder_alloc.c
>@@ -1119,15 +1119,16 @@ binder_alloc_copy_user_to_buffer(struct binder_alloc *alloc,
> return 0;
> }
>
>-static void binder_alloc_do_buffer_copy(struct binder_alloc *alloc,
>- bool to_buffer,
>- struct binder_buffer *buffer,
>- binder_size_t buffer_offset,
>- void *ptr,
>- size_t bytes)
>+static int binder_alloc_do_buffer_copy(struct binder_alloc *alloc,
>+ bool to_buffer,
>+ struct binder_buffer *buffer,
>+ binder_size_t buffer_offset,
>+ void *ptr,
>+ size_t bytes)
> {
> /* All copies must be 32-bit aligned and 32-bit size */
>- BUG_ON(!check_buffer(alloc, buffer, buffer_offset, bytes));
>+ if (!check_buffer(alloc, buffer, buffer_offset, bytes))
>+ return -EINVAL;
>
> while (bytes) {
> unsigned long size;
>@@ -1155,25 +1156,26 @@ static void binder_alloc_do_buffer_copy(struct binder_alloc *alloc,
> ptr = ptr + size;
> buffer_offset += size;
> }
>+ return 0;
> }
>
>-void binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(struct binder_alloc *alloc,
>- struct binder_buffer *buffer,
>- binder_size_t buffer_offset,
>- void *src,
>- size_t bytes)
>+int binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(struct binder_alloc *alloc,
>+ struct binder_buffer *buffer,
>+ binder_size_t buffer_offset,
>+ void *src,
>+ size_t bytes)
> {
>- binder_alloc_do_buffer_copy(alloc, true, buffer, buffer_offset,
>- src, bytes);
>+ return binder_alloc_do_buffer_copy(alloc, true, buffer, buffer_offset,
>+ src, bytes);
> }
>
>-void binder_alloc_copy_from_buffer(struct binder_alloc *alloc,
>- void *dest,
>- struct binder_buffer *buffer,
>- binder_size_t buffer_offset,
>- size_t bytes)
>+int binder_alloc_copy_from_buffer(struct binder_alloc *alloc,
>+ void *dest,
>+ struct binder_buffer *buffer,
>+ binder_size_t buffer_offset,
>+ size_t bytes)
> {
>- binder_alloc_do_buffer_copy(alloc, false, buffer, buffer_offset,
>- dest, bytes);
>+ return binder_alloc_do_buffer_copy(alloc, false, buffer, buffer_offset,
>+ dest, bytes);
> }
>
>diff --git a/drivers/android/binder_alloc.h b/drivers/android/binder_alloc.h
>index 71bfa95f8e09..db9c1b984695 100644
>--- a/drivers/android/binder_alloc.h
>+++ b/drivers/android/binder_alloc.h
>@@ -159,17 +159,17 @@ binder_alloc_copy_user_to_buffer(struct binder_alloc *alloc,
> const void __user *from,
> size_t bytes);
>
>-void binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(struct binder_alloc *alloc,
>- struct binder_buffer *buffer,
>- binder_size_t buffer_offset,
>- void *src,
>- size_t bytes);
>-
>-void binder_alloc_copy_from_buffer(struct binder_alloc *alloc,
>- void *dest,
>- struct binder_buffer *buffer,
>- binder_size_t buffer_offset,
>- size_t bytes);
>+int binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(struct binder_alloc *alloc,
>+ struct binder_buffer *buffer,
>+ binder_size_t buffer_offset,
>+ void *src,
>+ size_t bytes);
>+
>+int binder_alloc_copy_from_buffer(struct binder_alloc *alloc,
>+ void *dest,
>+ struct binder_buffer *buffer,
>+ binder_size_t buffer_offset,
>+ size_t bytes);
>
> #endif /* _LINUX_BINDER_ALLOC_H */
>
>diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c
>index 90325e1749fb..d47ad10a35fe 100644
>--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c
>+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c
>@@ -289,15 +289,15 @@ static int tpm_class_shutdown(struct device *dev)
> {
> struct tpm_chip *chip = container_of(dev, struct tpm_chip, dev);
>
>+ down_write(&chip->ops_sem);
> if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2) {
>- down_write(&chip->ops_sem);
> if (!tpm_chip_start(chip)) {
> tpm2_shutdown(chip, TPM2_SU_CLEAR);
> tpm_chip_stop(chip);
> }
>- chip->ops = NULL;
>- up_write(&chip->ops_sem);
> }
>+ chip->ops = NULL;
>+ up_write(&chip->ops_sem);
>
> return 0;
> }
>diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm1-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm1-cmd.c
>index 85dcf2654d11..faacbe1ffa1a 100644
>--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm1-cmd.c
>+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm1-cmd.c
>@@ -510,7 +510,7 @@ struct tpm1_get_random_out {
> *
> * Return:
> * * number of bytes read
>- * * -errno or a TPM return code otherwise
>+ * * -errno (positive TPM return codes are masked to -EIO)
> */
> int tpm1_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *dest, size_t max)
> {
>@@ -531,8 +531,11 @@ int tpm1_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *dest, size_t max)
>
> rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, sizeof(out->rng_data_len),
> "attempting get random");
>- if (rc)
>+ if (rc) {
>+ if (rc > 0)
>+ rc = -EIO;
> goto out;
>+ }
>
> out = (struct tpm1_get_random_out *)&buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE];
>
>diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
>index 4de49924cfc4..d103545e4055 100644
>--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
>+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
>@@ -297,7 +297,7 @@ struct tpm2_get_random_out {
> *
> * Return:
> * size of the buffer on success,
>- * -errno otherwise
>+ * -errno otherwise (positive TPM return codes are masked to -EIO)
> */
> int tpm2_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *dest, size_t max)
> {
>@@ -324,8 +324,11 @@ int tpm2_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *dest, size_t max)
> offsetof(struct tpm2_get_random_out,
> buffer),
> "attempting get random");
>- if (err)
>+ if (err) {
>+ if (err > 0)
>+ err = -EIO;
> goto out;
>+ }
>
> out = (struct tpm2_get_random_out *)
> &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE];
>diff --git a/drivers/crypto/talitos.c b/drivers/crypto/talitos.c
>index fbc7bf9d7380..427c78d4d948 100644
>--- a/drivers/crypto/talitos.c
>+++ b/drivers/crypto/talitos.c
>@@ -2339,7 +2339,7 @@ static struct talitos_alg_template driver_algs[] = {
> .base = {
> .cra_name = "authenc(hmac(sha1),cbc(aes))",
> .cra_driver_name = "authenc-hmac-sha1-"
>- "cbc-aes-talitos",
>+ "cbc-aes-talitos-hsna",
> .cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
> .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC,
> },
>@@ -2384,7 +2384,7 @@ static struct talitos_alg_template driver_algs[] = {
> .cra_name = "authenc(hmac(sha1),"
> "cbc(des3_ede))",
> .cra_driver_name = "authenc-hmac-sha1-"
>- "cbc-3des-talitos",
>+ "cbc-3des-talitos-hsna",
> .cra_blocksize = DES3_EDE_BLOCK_SIZE,
> .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC,
> },
>@@ -2427,7 +2427,7 @@ static struct talitos_alg_template driver_algs[] = {
> .base = {
> .cra_name = "authenc(hmac(sha224),cbc(aes))",
> .cra_driver_name = "authenc-hmac-sha224-"
>- "cbc-aes-talitos",
>+ "cbc-aes-talitos-hsna",
> .cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
> .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC,
> },
>@@ -2472,7 +2472,7 @@ static struct talitos_alg_template driver_algs[] = {
> .cra_name = "authenc(hmac(sha224),"
> "cbc(des3_ede))",
> .cra_driver_name = "authenc-hmac-sha224-"
>- "cbc-3des-talitos",
>+ "cbc-3des-talitos-hsna",
> .cra_blocksize = DES3_EDE_BLOCK_SIZE,
> .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC,
> },
>@@ -2515,7 +2515,7 @@ static struct talitos_alg_template driver_algs[] = {
> .base = {
> .cra_name = "authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(aes))",
> .cra_driver_name = "authenc-hmac-sha256-"
>- "cbc-aes-talitos",
>+ "cbc-aes-talitos-hsna",
> .cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
> .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC,
> },
>@@ -2560,7 +2560,7 @@ static struct talitos_alg_template driver_algs[] = {
> .cra_name = "authenc(hmac(sha256),"
> "cbc(des3_ede))",
> .cra_driver_name = "authenc-hmac-sha256-"
>- "cbc-3des-talitos",
>+ "cbc-3des-talitos-hsna",
> .cra_blocksize = DES3_EDE_BLOCK_SIZE,
> .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC,
> },
>@@ -2689,7 +2689,7 @@ static struct talitos_alg_template driver_algs[] = {
> .base = {
> .cra_name = "authenc(hmac(md5),cbc(aes))",
> .cra_driver_name = "authenc-hmac-md5-"
>- "cbc-aes-talitos",
>+ "cbc-aes-talitos-hsna",
> .cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
> .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC,
> },
>@@ -2732,7 +2732,7 @@ static struct talitos_alg_template driver_algs[] = {
> .base = {
> .cra_name = "authenc(hmac(md5),cbc(des3_ede))",
> .cra_driver_name = "authenc-hmac-md5-"
>- "cbc-3des-talitos",
>+ "cbc-3des-talitos-hsna",
> .cra_blocksize = DES3_EDE_BLOCK_SIZE,
> .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC,
> },
>diff --git a/drivers/hid/hid-ids.h b/drivers/hid/hid-ids.h
>index b032d3899fa3..bfc584ada4eb 100644
>--- a/drivers/hid/hid-ids.h
>+++ b/drivers/hid/hid-ids.h
>@@ -1241,6 +1241,7 @@
> #define USB_DEVICE_ID_PRIMAX_KEYBOARD 0x4e05
> #define USB_DEVICE_ID_PRIMAX_REZEL 0x4e72
> #define USB_DEVICE_ID_PRIMAX_PIXART_MOUSE_4D0F 0x4d0f
>+#define USB_DEVICE_ID_PRIMAX_PIXART_MOUSE_4D65 0x4d65
> #define USB_DEVICE_ID_PRIMAX_PIXART_MOUSE_4E22 0x4e22
>
>
>diff --git a/drivers/hid/hid-quirks.c b/drivers/hid/hid-quirks.c
>index 671a285724f9..1549c7a2f04c 100644
>--- a/drivers/hid/hid-quirks.c
>+++ b/drivers/hid/hid-quirks.c
>@@ -130,6 +130,7 @@ static const struct hid_device_id hid_quirks[] = {
> { HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_PIXART, USB_DEVICE_ID_PIXART_USB_OPTICAL_MOUSE), HID_QUIRK_ALWAYS_POLL },
> { HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_PRIMAX, USB_DEVICE_ID_PRIMAX_MOUSE_4D22), HID_QUIRK_ALWAYS_POLL },
> { HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_PRIMAX, USB_DEVICE_ID_PRIMAX_PIXART_MOUSE_4D0F), HID_QUIRK_ALWAYS_POLL },
>+ { HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_PRIMAX, USB_DEVICE_ID_PRIMAX_PIXART_MOUSE_4D65), HID_QUIRK_ALWAYS_POLL },
> { HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_PRIMAX, USB_DEVICE_ID_PRIMAX_PIXART_MOUSE_4E22), HID_QUIRK_ALWAYS_POLL },
> { HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_PRODIGE, USB_DEVICE_ID_PRODIGE_CORDLESS), HID_QUIRK_NOGET },
> { HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_QUANTA, USB_DEVICE_ID_QUANTA_OPTICAL_TOUCH_3001), HID_QUIRK_NOGET },
>diff --git a/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-etb10.c b/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-etb10.c
>index 4ee4c80a4354..543cc3d36e1d 100644
>--- a/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-etb10.c
>+++ b/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-etb10.c
>@@ -373,12 +373,10 @@ static void *etb_alloc_buffer(struct coresight_device *csdev,
> struct perf_event *event, void **pages,
> int nr_pages, bool overwrite)
> {
>- int node, cpu = event->cpu;
>+ int node;
> struct cs_buffers *buf;
>
>- if (cpu == -1)
>- cpu = smp_processor_id();
>- node = cpu_to_node(cpu);
>+ node = (event->cpu == -1) ? NUMA_NO_NODE : cpu_to_node(event->cpu);
>
> buf = kzalloc_node(sizeof(struct cs_buffers), GFP_KERNEL, node);
> if (!buf)
>diff --git a/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-funnel.c b/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-funnel.c
>index 16b0c0e1e43a..ad6e16c96263 100644
>--- a/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-funnel.c
>+++ b/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-funnel.c
>@@ -241,6 +241,7 @@ static int funnel_probe(struct device *dev, struct resource *res)
> }
>
> pm_runtime_put(dev);
>+ ret = 0;
>
> out_disable_clk:
> if (ret && !IS_ERR_OR_NULL(drvdata->atclk))
>diff --git a/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-tmc-etf.c b/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-tmc-etf.c
>index 2527b5d3b65e..8de109de171f 100644
>--- a/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-tmc-etf.c
>+++ b/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-tmc-etf.c
>@@ -378,12 +378,10 @@ static void *tmc_alloc_etf_buffer(struct coresight_device *csdev,
> struct perf_event *event, void **pages,
> int nr_pages, bool overwrite)
> {
>- int node, cpu = event->cpu;
>+ int node;
> struct cs_buffers *buf;
>
>- if (cpu == -1)
>- cpu = smp_processor_id();
>- node = cpu_to_node(cpu);
>+ node = (event->cpu == -1) ? NUMA_NO_NODE : cpu_to_node(event->cpu);
>
> /* Allocate memory structure for interaction with Perf */
> buf = kzalloc_node(sizeof(struct cs_buffers), GFP_KERNEL, node);
>diff --git a/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-tmc-etr.c b/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-tmc-etr.c
>index df6e4b0b84e9..9f293b9dce8c 100644
>--- a/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-tmc-etr.c
>+++ b/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-tmc-etr.c
>@@ -1178,14 +1178,11 @@ static struct etr_buf *
> alloc_etr_buf(struct tmc_drvdata *drvdata, struct perf_event *event,
> int nr_pages, void **pages, bool snapshot)
> {
>- int node, cpu = event->cpu;
>+ int node;
> struct etr_buf *etr_buf;
> unsigned long size;
>
>- if (cpu == -1)
>- cpu = smp_processor_id();
>- node = cpu_to_node(cpu);
>-
>+ node = (event->cpu == -1) ? NUMA_NO_NODE : cpu_to_node(event->cpu);
> /*
> * Try to match the perf ring buffer size if it is larger
> * than the size requested via sysfs.
>@@ -1317,13 +1314,11 @@ static struct etr_perf_buffer *
> tmc_etr_setup_perf_buf(struct tmc_drvdata *drvdata, struct perf_event *event,
> int nr_pages, void **pages, bool snapshot)
> {
>- int node, cpu = event->cpu;
>+ int node;
> struct etr_buf *etr_buf;
> struct etr_perf_buffer *etr_perf;
>
>- if (cpu == -1)
>- cpu = smp_processor_id();
>- node = cpu_to_node(cpu);
>+ node = (event->cpu == -1) ? NUMA_NO_NODE : cpu_to_node(event->cpu);
>
> etr_perf = kzalloc_node(sizeof(*etr_perf), GFP_KERNEL, node);
> if (!etr_perf)
>diff --git a/drivers/iio/adc/stm32-adc-core.c b/drivers/iio/adc/stm32-adc-core.c
>index 2327ec18b40c..1f7ce5186dfc 100644
>--- a/drivers/iio/adc/stm32-adc-core.c
>+++ b/drivers/iio/adc/stm32-adc-core.c
>@@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ struct stm32_adc_priv_cfg {
> * @domain: irq domain reference
> * @aclk: clock reference for the analog circuitry
> * @bclk: bus clock common for all ADCs, depends on part used
>+ * @vdda: vdda analog supply reference
> * @vref: regulator reference
> * @cfg: compatible configuration data
> * @common: common data for all ADC instances
>@@ -97,6 +98,7 @@ struct stm32_adc_priv {
> struct irq_domain *domain;
> struct clk *aclk;
> struct clk *bclk;
>+ struct regulator *vdda;
> struct regulator *vref;
> const struct stm32_adc_priv_cfg *cfg;
> struct stm32_adc_common common;
>@@ -394,10 +396,16 @@ static int stm32_adc_core_hw_start(struct device *dev)
> struct stm32_adc_priv *priv = to_stm32_adc_priv(common);
> int ret;
>
>+ ret = regulator_enable(priv->vdda);
>+ if (ret < 0) {
>+ dev_err(dev, "vdda enable failed %d\n", ret);
>+ return ret;
>+ }
>+
> ret = regulator_enable(priv->vref);
> if (ret < 0) {
> dev_err(dev, "vref enable failed\n");
>- return ret;
>+ goto err_vdda_disable;
> }
>
> if (priv->bclk) {
>@@ -425,6 +433,8 @@ static int stm32_adc_core_hw_start(struct device *dev)
> clk_disable_unprepare(priv->bclk);
> err_regulator_disable:
> regulator_disable(priv->vref);
>+err_vdda_disable:
>+ regulator_disable(priv->vdda);
>
> return ret;
> }
>@@ -441,6 +451,7 @@ static void stm32_adc_core_hw_stop(struct device *dev)
> if (priv->bclk)
> clk_disable_unprepare(priv->bclk);
> regulator_disable(priv->vref);
>+ regulator_disable(priv->vdda);
> }
>
> static int stm32_adc_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
>@@ -468,6 +479,14 @@ static int stm32_adc_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
> return PTR_ERR(priv->common.base);
> priv->common.phys_base = res->start;
>
>+ priv->vdda = devm_regulator_get(&pdev->dev, "vdda");
>+ if (IS_ERR(priv->vdda)) {
>+ ret = PTR_ERR(priv->vdda);
>+ if (ret != -EPROBE_DEFER)
>+ dev_err(&pdev->dev, "vdda get failed, %d\n", ret);
>+ return ret;
>+ }
>+
> priv->vref = devm_regulator_get(&pdev->dev, "vref");
> if (IS_ERR(priv->vref)) {
> ret = PTR_ERR(priv->vref);
>diff --git a/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/stv0297.c b/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/stv0297.c
>index dac396c95a59..6d5962d5697a 100644
>--- a/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/stv0297.c
>+++ b/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/stv0297.c
>@@ -682,7 +682,7 @@ static const struct dvb_frontend_ops stv0297_ops = {
> .delsys = { SYS_DVBC_ANNEX_A },
> .info = {
> .name = "ST STV0297 DVB-C",
>- .frequency_min_hz = 470 * MHz,
>+ .frequency_min_hz = 47 * MHz,
> .frequency_max_hz = 862 * MHz,
> .frequency_stepsize_hz = 62500,
> .symbol_rate_min = 870000,
>diff --git a/drivers/misc/lkdtm/Makefile b/drivers/misc/lkdtm/Makefile
>index 951c984de61a..fb10eafe9bde 100644
>--- a/drivers/misc/lkdtm/Makefile
>+++ b/drivers/misc/lkdtm/Makefile
>@@ -15,8 +15,7 @@ KCOV_INSTRUMENT_rodata.o := n
>
> OBJCOPYFLAGS :=
> OBJCOPYFLAGS_rodata_objcopy.o := \
>- --set-section-flags .text=alloc,readonly \
>- --rename-section .text=.rodata
>+ --rename-section .text=.rodata,alloc,readonly,load
> targets += rodata.o rodata_objcopy.o
> $(obj)/rodata_objcopy.o: $(obj)/rodata.o FORCE
> $(call if_changed,objcopy)
>diff --git a/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_context.c b/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_context.c
>index 300ed69fe2c7..16695366ec92 100644
>--- a/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_context.c
>+++ b/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_context.c
>@@ -21,6 +21,9 @@
> #include "vmci_driver.h"
> #include "vmci_event.h"
>
>+/* Use a wide upper bound for the maximum contexts. */
>+#define VMCI_MAX_CONTEXTS 2000
>+
> /*
> * List of current VMCI contexts. Contexts can be added by
> * vmci_ctx_create() and removed via vmci_ctx_destroy().
>@@ -117,19 +120,22 @@ struct vmci_ctx *vmci_ctx_create(u32 cid, u32 priv_flags,
> /* Initialize host-specific VMCI context. */
> init_waitqueue_head(&context->host_context.wait_queue);
>
>- context->queue_pair_array = vmci_handle_arr_create(0);
>+ context->queue_pair_array =
>+ vmci_handle_arr_create(0, VMCI_MAX_GUEST_QP_COUNT);
> if (!context->queue_pair_array) {
> error = -ENOMEM;
> goto err_free_ctx;
> }
>
>- context->doorbell_array = vmci_handle_arr_create(0);
>+ context->doorbell_array =
>+ vmci_handle_arr_create(0, VMCI_MAX_GUEST_DOORBELL_COUNT);
> if (!context->doorbell_array) {
> error = -ENOMEM;
> goto err_free_qp_array;
> }
>
>- context->pending_doorbell_array = vmci_handle_arr_create(0);
>+ context->pending_doorbell_array =
>+ vmci_handle_arr_create(0, VMCI_MAX_GUEST_DOORBELL_COUNT);
> if (!context->pending_doorbell_array) {
> error = -ENOMEM;
> goto err_free_db_array;
>@@ -204,7 +210,7 @@ static int ctx_fire_notification(u32 context_id, u32 priv_flags)
> * We create an array to hold the subscribers we find when
> * scanning through all contexts.
> */
>- subscriber_array = vmci_handle_arr_create(0);
>+ subscriber_array = vmci_handle_arr_create(0, VMCI_MAX_CONTEXTS);
> if (subscriber_array == NULL)
> return VMCI_ERROR_NO_MEM;
>
>@@ -623,20 +629,26 @@ int vmci_ctx_add_notification(u32 context_id, u32 remote_cid)
>
> spin_lock(&context->lock);
>
>- list_for_each_entry(n, &context->notifier_list, node) {
>- if (vmci_handle_is_equal(n->handle, notifier->handle)) {
>- exists = true;
>- break;
>+ if (context->n_notifiers < VMCI_MAX_CONTEXTS) {
>+ list_for_each_entry(n, &context->notifier_list, node) {
>+ if (vmci_handle_is_equal(n->handle, notifier->handle)) {
>+ exists = true;
>+ break;
>+ }
> }
>- }
>
>- if (exists) {
>- kfree(notifier);
>- result = VMCI_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS;
>+ if (exists) {
>+ kfree(notifier);
>+ result = VMCI_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS;
>+ } else {
>+ list_add_tail_rcu(¬ifier->node,
>+ &context->notifier_list);
>+ context->n_notifiers++;
>+ result = VMCI_SUCCESS;
>+ }
> } else {
>- list_add_tail_rcu(¬ifier->node, &context->notifier_list);
>- context->n_notifiers++;
>- result = VMCI_SUCCESS;
>+ kfree(notifier);
>+ result = VMCI_ERROR_NO_MEM;
> }
>
> spin_unlock(&context->lock);
>@@ -721,8 +733,7 @@ static int vmci_ctx_get_chkpt_doorbells(struct vmci_ctx *context,
> u32 *buf_size, void **pbuf)
> {
> struct dbell_cpt_state *dbells;
>- size_t n_doorbells;
>- int i;
>+ u32 i, n_doorbells;
>
> n_doorbells = vmci_handle_arr_get_size(context->doorbell_array);
> if (n_doorbells > 0) {
>@@ -860,7 +871,8 @@ int vmci_ctx_rcv_notifications_get(u32 context_id,
> spin_lock(&context->lock);
>
> *db_handle_array = context->pending_doorbell_array;
>- context->pending_doorbell_array = vmci_handle_arr_create(0);
>+ context->pending_doorbell_array =
>+ vmci_handle_arr_create(0, VMCI_MAX_GUEST_DOORBELL_COUNT);
> if (!context->pending_doorbell_array) {
> context->pending_doorbell_array = *db_handle_array;
> *db_handle_array = NULL;
>@@ -942,12 +954,11 @@ int vmci_ctx_dbell_create(u32 context_id, struct vmci_handle handle)
> return VMCI_ERROR_NOT_FOUND;
>
> spin_lock(&context->lock);
>- if (!vmci_handle_arr_has_entry(context->doorbell_array, handle)) {
>- vmci_handle_arr_append_entry(&context->doorbell_array, handle);
>- result = VMCI_SUCCESS;
>- } else {
>+ if (!vmci_handle_arr_has_entry(context->doorbell_array, handle))
>+ result = vmci_handle_arr_append_entry(&context->doorbell_array,
>+ handle);
>+ else
> result = VMCI_ERROR_DUPLICATE_ENTRY;
>- }
>
> spin_unlock(&context->lock);
> vmci_ctx_put(context);
>@@ -1083,15 +1094,16 @@ int vmci_ctx_notify_dbell(u32 src_cid,
> if (!vmci_handle_arr_has_entry(
> dst_context->pending_doorbell_array,
> handle)) {
>- vmci_handle_arr_append_entry(
>+ result = vmci_handle_arr_append_entry(
> &dst_context->pending_doorbell_array,
> handle);
>-
>- ctx_signal_notify(dst_context);
>- wake_up(&dst_context->host_context.wait_queue);
>-
>+ if (result == VMCI_SUCCESS) {
>+ ctx_signal_notify(dst_context);
>+ wake_up(&dst_context->host_context.wait_queue);
>+ }
>+ } else {
>+ result = VMCI_SUCCESS;
> }
>- result = VMCI_SUCCESS;
> }
> spin_unlock(&dst_context->lock);
> }
>@@ -1118,13 +1130,11 @@ int vmci_ctx_qp_create(struct vmci_ctx *context, struct vmci_handle handle)
> if (context == NULL || vmci_handle_is_invalid(handle))
> return VMCI_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS;
>
>- if (!vmci_handle_arr_has_entry(context->queue_pair_array, handle)) {
>- vmci_handle_arr_append_entry(&context->queue_pair_array,
>- handle);
>- result = VMCI_SUCCESS;
>- } else {
>+ if (!vmci_handle_arr_has_entry(context->queue_pair_array, handle))
>+ result = vmci_handle_arr_append_entry(
>+ &context->queue_pair_array, handle);
>+ else
> result = VMCI_ERROR_DUPLICATE_ENTRY;
>- }
>
> return result;
> }
>diff --git a/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_handle_array.c b/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_handle_array.c
>index c527388f5d7b..de7fee7ead1b 100644
>--- a/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_handle_array.c
>+++ b/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_handle_array.c
>@@ -8,24 +8,29 @@
> #include <linux/slab.h>
> #include "vmci_handle_array.h"
>
>-static size_t handle_arr_calc_size(size_t capacity)
>+static size_t handle_arr_calc_size(u32 capacity)
> {
>- return sizeof(struct vmci_handle_arr) +
>+ return VMCI_HANDLE_ARRAY_HEADER_SIZE +
> capacity * sizeof(struct vmci_handle);
> }
>
>-struct vmci_handle_arr *vmci_handle_arr_create(size_t capacity)
>+struct vmci_handle_arr *vmci_handle_arr_create(u32 capacity, u32 max_capacity)
> {
> struct vmci_handle_arr *array;
>
>+ if (max_capacity == 0 || capacity > max_capacity)
>+ return NULL;
>+
> if (capacity == 0)
>- capacity = VMCI_HANDLE_ARRAY_DEFAULT_SIZE;
>+ capacity = min((u32)VMCI_HANDLE_ARRAY_DEFAULT_CAPACITY,
>+ max_capacity);
>
> array = kmalloc(handle_arr_calc_size(capacity), GFP_ATOMIC);
> if (!array)
> return NULL;
>
> array->capacity = capacity;
>+ array->max_capacity = max_capacity;
> array->size = 0;
>
> return array;
>@@ -36,27 +41,34 @@ void vmci_handle_arr_destroy(struct vmci_handle_arr *array)
> kfree(array);
> }
>
>-void vmci_handle_arr_append_entry(struct vmci_handle_arr **array_ptr,
>- struct vmci_handle handle)
>+int vmci_handle_arr_append_entry(struct vmci_handle_arr **array_ptr,
>+ struct vmci_handle handle)
> {
> struct vmci_handle_arr *array = *array_ptr;
>
> if (unlikely(array->size >= array->capacity)) {
> /* reallocate. */
> struct vmci_handle_arr *new_array;
>- size_t new_capacity = array->capacity * VMCI_ARR_CAP_MULT;
>- size_t new_size = handle_arr_calc_size(new_capacity);
>+ u32 capacity_bump = min(array->max_capacity - array->capacity,
>+ array->capacity);
>+ size_t new_size = handle_arr_calc_size(array->capacity +
>+ capacity_bump);
>+
>+ if (array->size >= array->max_capacity)
>+ return VMCI_ERROR_NO_MEM;
>
> new_array = krealloc(array, new_size, GFP_ATOMIC);
> if (!new_array)
>- return;
>+ return VMCI_ERROR_NO_MEM;
>
>- new_array->capacity = new_capacity;
>+ new_array->capacity += capacity_bump;
> *array_ptr = array = new_array;
> }
>
> array->entries[array->size] = handle;
> array->size++;
>+
>+ return VMCI_SUCCESS;
> }
>
> /*
>@@ -66,7 +78,7 @@ struct vmci_handle vmci_handle_arr_remove_entry(struct vmci_handle_arr *array,
> struct vmci_handle entry_handle)
> {
> struct vmci_handle handle = VMCI_INVALID_HANDLE;
>- size_t i;
>+ u32 i;
>
> for (i = 0; i < array->size; i++) {
> if (vmci_handle_is_equal(array->entries[i], entry_handle)) {
>@@ -101,7 +113,7 @@ struct vmci_handle vmci_handle_arr_remove_tail(struct vmci_handle_arr *array)
> * Handle at given index, VMCI_INVALID_HANDLE if invalid index.
> */
> struct vmci_handle
>-vmci_handle_arr_get_entry(const struct vmci_handle_arr *array, size_t index)
>+vmci_handle_arr_get_entry(const struct vmci_handle_arr *array, u32 index)
> {
> if (unlikely(index >= array->size))
> return VMCI_INVALID_HANDLE;
>@@ -112,7 +124,7 @@ vmci_handle_arr_get_entry(const struct vmci_handle_arr *array, size_t index)
> bool vmci_handle_arr_has_entry(const struct vmci_handle_arr *array,
> struct vmci_handle entry_handle)
> {
>- size_t i;
>+ u32 i;
>
> for (i = 0; i < array->size; i++)
> if (vmci_handle_is_equal(array->entries[i], entry_handle))
>diff --git a/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_handle_array.h b/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_handle_array.h
>index bd1559a548e9..96193f85be5b 100644
>--- a/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_handle_array.h
>+++ b/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_handle_array.h
>@@ -9,32 +9,41 @@
> #define _VMCI_HANDLE_ARRAY_H_
>
> #include <linux/vmw_vmci_defs.h>
>+#include <linux/limits.h>
> #include <linux/types.h>
>
>-#define VMCI_HANDLE_ARRAY_DEFAULT_SIZE 4
>-#define VMCI_ARR_CAP_MULT 2 /* Array capacity multiplier */
>-
> struct vmci_handle_arr {
>- size_t capacity;
>- size_t size;
>+ u32 capacity;
>+ u32 max_capacity;
>+ u32 size;
>+ u32 pad;
> struct vmci_handle entries[];
> };
>
>-struct vmci_handle_arr *vmci_handle_arr_create(size_t capacity);
>+#define VMCI_HANDLE_ARRAY_HEADER_SIZE \
>+ offsetof(struct vmci_handle_arr, entries)
>+/* Select a default capacity that results in a 64 byte sized array */
>+#define VMCI_HANDLE_ARRAY_DEFAULT_CAPACITY 6
>+/* Make sure that the max array size can be expressed by a u32 */
>+#define VMCI_HANDLE_ARRAY_MAX_CAPACITY \
>+ ((U32_MAX - VMCI_HANDLE_ARRAY_HEADER_SIZE - 1) / \
>+ sizeof(struct vmci_handle))
>+
>+struct vmci_handle_arr *vmci_handle_arr_create(u32 capacity, u32 max_capacity);
> void vmci_handle_arr_destroy(struct vmci_handle_arr *array);
>-void vmci_handle_arr_append_entry(struct vmci_handle_arr **array_ptr,
>- struct vmci_handle handle);
>+int vmci_handle_arr_append_entry(struct vmci_handle_arr **array_ptr,
>+ struct vmci_handle handle);
> struct vmci_handle vmci_handle_arr_remove_entry(struct vmci_handle_arr *array,
> struct vmci_handle
> entry_handle);
> struct vmci_handle vmci_handle_arr_remove_tail(struct vmci_handle_arr *array);
> struct vmci_handle
>-vmci_handle_arr_get_entry(const struct vmci_handle_arr *array, size_t index);
>+vmci_handle_arr_get_entry(const struct vmci_handle_arr *array, u32 index);
> bool vmci_handle_arr_has_entry(const struct vmci_handle_arr *array,
> struct vmci_handle entry_handle);
> struct vmci_handle *vmci_handle_arr_get_handles(struct vmci_handle_arr *array);
>
>-static inline size_t vmci_handle_arr_get_size(
>+static inline u32 vmci_handle_arr_get_size(
> const struct vmci_handle_arr *array)
> {
> return array->size;
>diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/carl9170/usb.c b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/carl9170/usb.c
>index e7c3f3b8457d..99f1897a775d 100644
>--- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/carl9170/usb.c
>+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/carl9170/usb.c
>@@ -128,6 +128,8 @@ static const struct usb_device_id carl9170_usb_ids[] = {
> };
> MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(usb, carl9170_usb_ids);
>
>+static struct usb_driver carl9170_driver;
>+
> static void carl9170_usb_submit_data_urb(struct ar9170 *ar)
> {
> struct urb *urb;
>@@ -966,32 +968,28 @@ static int carl9170_usb_init_device(struct ar9170 *ar)
>
> static void carl9170_usb_firmware_failed(struct ar9170 *ar)
> {
>- struct device *parent = ar->udev->dev.parent;
>- struct usb_device *udev;
>-
>- /*
>- * Store a copy of the usb_device pointer locally.
>- * This is because device_release_driver initiates
>- * carl9170_usb_disconnect, which in turn frees our
>- * driver context (ar).
>+ /* Store a copies of the usb_interface and usb_device pointer locally.
>+ * This is because release_driver initiates carl9170_usb_disconnect,
>+ * which in turn frees our driver context (ar).
> */
>- udev = ar->udev;
>+ struct usb_interface *intf = ar->intf;
>+ struct usb_device *udev = ar->udev;
>
> complete(&ar->fw_load_wait);
>+ /* at this point 'ar' could be already freed. Don't use it anymore */
>+ ar = NULL;
>
> /* unbind anything failed */
>- if (parent)
>- device_lock(parent);
>-
>- device_release_driver(&udev->dev);
>- if (parent)
>- device_unlock(parent);
>+ usb_lock_device(udev);
>+ usb_driver_release_interface(&carl9170_driver, intf);
>+ usb_unlock_device(udev);
>
>- usb_put_dev(udev);
>+ usb_put_intf(intf);
> }
>
> static void carl9170_usb_firmware_finish(struct ar9170 *ar)
> {
>+ struct usb_interface *intf = ar->intf;
> int err;
>
> err = carl9170_parse_firmware(ar);
>@@ -1009,7 +1007,7 @@ static void carl9170_usb_firmware_finish(struct ar9170 *ar)
> goto err_unrx;
>
> complete(&ar->fw_load_wait);
>- usb_put_dev(ar->udev);
>+ usb_put_intf(intf);
> return;
>
> err_unrx:
>@@ -1052,7 +1050,6 @@ static int carl9170_usb_probe(struct usb_interface *intf,
> return PTR_ERR(ar);
>
> udev = interface_to_usbdev(intf);
>- usb_get_dev(udev);
> ar->udev = udev;
> ar->intf = intf;
> ar->features = id->driver_info;
>@@ -1094,15 +1091,14 @@ static int carl9170_usb_probe(struct usb_interface *intf,
> atomic_set(&ar->rx_anch_urbs, 0);
> atomic_set(&ar->rx_pool_urbs, 0);
>
>- usb_get_dev(ar->udev);
>+ usb_get_intf(intf);
>
> carl9170_set_state(ar, CARL9170_STOPPED);
>
> err = request_firmware_nowait(THIS_MODULE, 1, CARL9170FW_NAME,
> &ar->udev->dev, GFP_KERNEL, ar, carl9170_usb_firmware_step2);
> if (err) {
>- usb_put_dev(udev);
>- usb_put_dev(udev);
>+ usb_put_intf(intf);
> carl9170_free(ar);
> }
> return err;
>@@ -1131,7 +1127,6 @@ static void carl9170_usb_disconnect(struct usb_interface *intf)
>
> carl9170_release_firmware(ar);
> carl9170_free(ar);
>- usb_put_dev(udev);
> }
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_PM
>diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/intersil/p54/p54usb.c b/drivers/net/wireless/intersil/p54/p54usb.c
>index f937815f0f2c..b94764c88750 100644
>--- a/drivers/net/wireless/intersil/p54/p54usb.c
>+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/intersil/p54/p54usb.c
>@@ -30,6 +30,8 @@ MODULE_ALIAS("prism54usb");
> MODULE_FIRMWARE("isl3886usb");
> MODULE_FIRMWARE("isl3887usb");
>
>+static struct usb_driver p54u_driver;
>+
> /*
> * Note:
> *
>@@ -918,9 +920,9 @@ static void p54u_load_firmware_cb(const struct firmware *firmware,
> {
> struct p54u_priv *priv = context;
> struct usb_device *udev = priv->udev;
>+ struct usb_interface *intf = priv->intf;
> int err;
>
>- complete(&priv->fw_wait_load);
> if (firmware) {
> priv->fw = firmware;
> err = p54u_start_ops(priv);
>@@ -929,26 +931,22 @@ static void p54u_load_firmware_cb(const struct firmware *firmware,
> dev_err(&udev->dev, "Firmware not found.\n");
> }
>
>- if (err) {
>- struct device *parent = priv->udev->dev.parent;
>-
>- dev_err(&udev->dev, "failed to initialize device (%d)\n", err);
>-
>- if (parent)
>- device_lock(parent);
>+ complete(&priv->fw_wait_load);
>+ /*
>+ * At this point p54u_disconnect may have already freed
>+ * the "priv" context. Do not use it anymore!
>+ */
>+ priv = NULL;
>
>- device_release_driver(&udev->dev);
>- /*
>- * At this point p54u_disconnect has already freed
>- * the "priv" context. Do not use it anymore!
>- */
>- priv = NULL;
>+ if (err) {
>+ dev_err(&intf->dev, "failed to initialize device (%d)\n", err);
>
>- if (parent)
>- device_unlock(parent);
>+ usb_lock_device(udev);
>+ usb_driver_release_interface(&p54u_driver, intf);
>+ usb_unlock_device(udev);
> }
>
>- usb_put_dev(udev);
>+ usb_put_intf(intf);
> }
>
> static int p54u_load_firmware(struct ieee80211_hw *dev,
>@@ -969,14 +967,14 @@ static int p54u_load_firmware(struct ieee80211_hw *dev,
> dev_info(&priv->udev->dev, "Loading firmware file %s\n",
> p54u_fwlist[i].fw);
>
>- usb_get_dev(udev);
>+ usb_get_intf(intf);
> err = request_firmware_nowait(THIS_MODULE, 1, p54u_fwlist[i].fw,
> device, GFP_KERNEL, priv,
> p54u_load_firmware_cb);
> if (err) {
> dev_err(&priv->udev->dev, "(p54usb) cannot load firmware %s "
> "(%d)!\n", p54u_fwlist[i].fw, err);
>- usb_put_dev(udev);
>+ usb_put_intf(intf);
> }
>
> return err;
>@@ -1008,8 +1006,6 @@ static int p54u_probe(struct usb_interface *intf,
> skb_queue_head_init(&priv->rx_queue);
> init_usb_anchor(&priv->submitted);
>
>- usb_get_dev(udev);
>-
> /* really lazy and simple way of figuring out if we're a 3887 */
> /* TODO: should just stick the identification in the device table */
> i = intf->altsetting->desc.bNumEndpoints;
>@@ -1050,10 +1046,8 @@ static int p54u_probe(struct usb_interface *intf,
> priv->upload_fw = p54u_upload_firmware_net2280;
> }
> err = p54u_load_firmware(dev, intf);
>- if (err) {
>- usb_put_dev(udev);
>+ if (err)
> p54_free_common(dev);
>- }
> return err;
> }
>
>@@ -1069,7 +1063,6 @@ static void p54u_disconnect(struct usb_interface *intf)
> wait_for_completion(&priv->fw_wait_load);
> p54_unregister_common(dev);
>
>- usb_put_dev(interface_to_usbdev(intf));
> release_firmware(priv->fw);
> p54_free_common(dev);
> }
>diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/intersil/p54/txrx.c b/drivers/net/wireless/intersil/p54/txrx.c
>index ff9acd1563f4..5892898f8853 100644
>--- a/drivers/net/wireless/intersil/p54/txrx.c
>+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/intersil/p54/txrx.c
>@@ -139,7 +139,10 @@ static int p54_assign_address(struct p54_common *priv, struct sk_buff *skb)
> unlikely(GET_HW_QUEUE(skb) == P54_QUEUE_BEACON))
> priv->beacon_req_id = data->req_id;
>
>- __skb_queue_after(&priv->tx_queue, target_skb, skb);
>+ if (target_skb)
>+ __skb_queue_after(&priv->tx_queue, target_skb, skb);
>+ else
>+ __skb_queue_head(&priv->tx_queue, skb);
> spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->tx_queue.lock, flags);
> return 0;
> }
>diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/fw.h b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/fw.h
>index b73f99dc5a72..1fb76d2f5d3f 100644
>--- a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/fw.h
>+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/fw.h
>@@ -1759,9 +1759,10 @@ struct mwifiex_ie_types_wmm_queue_status {
> struct ieee_types_vendor_header {
> u8 element_id;
> u8 len;
>- u8 oui[4]; /* 0~2: oui, 3: oui_type */
>- u8 oui_subtype;
>- u8 version;
>+ struct {
>+ u8 oui[3];
>+ u8 oui_type;
>+ } __packed oui;
> } __packed;
>
> struct ieee_types_wmm_parameter {
>@@ -1775,6 +1776,9 @@ struct ieee_types_wmm_parameter {
> * Version [1]
> */
> struct ieee_types_vendor_header vend_hdr;
>+ u8 oui_subtype;
>+ u8 version;
>+
> u8 qos_info_bitmap;
> u8 reserved;
> struct ieee_types_wmm_ac_parameters ac_params[IEEE80211_NUM_ACS];
>@@ -1792,6 +1796,8 @@ struct ieee_types_wmm_info {
> * Version [1]
> */
> struct ieee_types_vendor_header vend_hdr;
>+ u8 oui_subtype;
>+ u8 version;
>
> u8 qos_info_bitmap;
> } __packed;
>diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/scan.c b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/scan.c
>index c269a0de9413..e2786ab612ca 100644
>--- a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/scan.c
>+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/scan.c
>@@ -1361,21 +1361,25 @@ int mwifiex_update_bss_desc_with_ie(struct mwifiex_adapter *adapter,
> break;
>
> case WLAN_EID_VENDOR_SPECIFIC:
>- if (element_len + 2 < sizeof(vendor_ie->vend_hdr))
>- return -EINVAL;
>-
> vendor_ie = (struct ieee_types_vendor_specific *)
> current_ptr;
>
>- if (!memcmp
>- (vendor_ie->vend_hdr.oui, wpa_oui,
>- sizeof(wpa_oui))) {
>+ /* 802.11 requires at least 3-byte OUI. */
>+ if (element_len < sizeof(vendor_ie->vend_hdr.oui.oui))
>+ return -EINVAL;
>+
>+ /* Not long enough for a match? Skip it. */
>+ if (element_len < sizeof(wpa_oui))
>+ break;
>+
>+ if (!memcmp(&vendor_ie->vend_hdr.oui, wpa_oui,
>+ sizeof(wpa_oui))) {
> bss_entry->bcn_wpa_ie =
> (struct ieee_types_vendor_specific *)
> current_ptr;
> bss_entry->wpa_offset = (u16)
> (current_ptr - bss_entry->beacon_buf);
>- } else if (!memcmp(vendor_ie->vend_hdr.oui, wmm_oui,
>+ } else if (!memcmp(&vendor_ie->vend_hdr.oui, wmm_oui,
> sizeof(wmm_oui))) {
> if (total_ie_len ==
> sizeof(struct ieee_types_wmm_parameter) ||
>diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/sta_ioctl.c b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/sta_ioctl.c
>index ebc0e41e5d3b..74e50566db1f 100644
>--- a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/sta_ioctl.c
>+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/sta_ioctl.c
>@@ -1351,7 +1351,7 @@ mwifiex_set_gen_ie_helper(struct mwifiex_private *priv, u8 *ie_data_ptr,
> /* Test to see if it is a WPA IE, if not, then
> * it is a gen IE
> */
>- if (!memcmp(pvendor_ie->oui, wpa_oui,
>+ if (!memcmp(&pvendor_ie->oui, wpa_oui,
> sizeof(wpa_oui))) {
> /* IE is a WPA/WPA2 IE so call set_wpa function
> */
>@@ -1361,7 +1361,7 @@ mwifiex_set_gen_ie_helper(struct mwifiex_private *priv, u8 *ie_data_ptr,
> goto next_ie;
> }
>
>- if (!memcmp(pvendor_ie->oui, wps_oui,
>+ if (!memcmp(&pvendor_ie->oui, wps_oui,
> sizeof(wps_oui))) {
> /* Test to see if it is a WPS IE,
> * if so, enable wps session flag
>diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/wmm.c b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/wmm.c
>index 407b9932ca4d..64916ba15df5 100644
>--- a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/wmm.c
>+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/wmm.c
>@@ -240,7 +240,7 @@ mwifiex_wmm_setup_queue_priorities(struct mwifiex_private *priv,
> mwifiex_dbg(priv->adapter, INFO,
> "info: WMM Parameter IE: version=%d,\t"
> "qos_info Parameter Set Count=%d, Reserved=%#x\n",
>- wmm_ie->vend_hdr.version, wmm_ie->qos_info_bitmap &
>+ wmm_ie->version, wmm_ie->qos_info_bitmap &
> IEEE80211_WMM_IE_AP_QOSINFO_PARAM_SET_CNT_MASK,
> wmm_ie->reserved);
>
>diff --git a/drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/amplc_pci230.c b/drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/amplc_pci230.c
>index 65f60c2b702a..f7e673121864 100644
>--- a/drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/amplc_pci230.c
>+++ b/drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/amplc_pci230.c
>@@ -2330,7 +2330,8 @@ static irqreturn_t pci230_interrupt(int irq, void *d)
> devpriv->intr_running = false;
> spin_unlock_irqrestore(&devpriv->isr_spinlock, irqflags);
>
>- comedi_handle_events(dev, s_ao);
>+ if (s_ao)
>+ comedi_handle_events(dev, s_ao);
> comedi_handle_events(dev, s_ai);
>
> return IRQ_HANDLED;
>diff --git a/drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/dt282x.c b/drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/dt282x.c
>index 3be927f1d3a9..e15e33ed94ae 100644
>--- a/drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/dt282x.c
>+++ b/drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/dt282x.c
>@@ -557,7 +557,8 @@ static irqreturn_t dt282x_interrupt(int irq, void *d)
> }
> #endif
> comedi_handle_events(dev, s);
>- comedi_handle_events(dev, s_ao);
>+ if (s_ao)
>+ comedi_handle_events(dev, s_ao);
>
> return IRQ_RETVAL(handled);
> }
>diff --git a/drivers/staging/fsl-dpaa2/ethsw/ethsw.c b/drivers/staging/fsl-dpaa2/ethsw/ethsw.c
>index e3c3e427309a..f73edaf6ce87 100644
>--- a/drivers/staging/fsl-dpaa2/ethsw/ethsw.c
>+++ b/drivers/staging/fsl-dpaa2/ethsw/ethsw.c
>@@ -1086,6 +1086,7 @@ static int port_switchdev_event(struct notifier_block *unused,
> dev_hold(dev);
> break;
> default:
>+ kfree(switchdev_work);
> return NOTIFY_DONE;
> }
>
>diff --git a/drivers/staging/mt7621-pci/pci-mt7621.c b/drivers/staging/mt7621-pci/pci-mt7621.c
>index 03d919a94552..93763d40e3a1 100644
>--- a/drivers/staging/mt7621-pci/pci-mt7621.c
>+++ b/drivers/staging/mt7621-pci/pci-mt7621.c
>@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@
> /* MediaTek specific configuration registers */
> #define PCIE_FTS_NUM 0x70c
> #define PCIE_FTS_NUM_MASK GENMASK(15, 8)
>-#define PCIE_FTS_NUM_L0(x) ((x) & 0xff << 8)
>+#define PCIE_FTS_NUM_L0(x) (((x) & 0xff) << 8)
>
> /* rt_sysc_membase relative registers */
> #define RALINK_PCIE_CLK_GEN 0x7c
>diff --git a/drivers/staging/rtl8712/rtl871x_ioctl_linux.c b/drivers/staging/rtl8712/rtl871x_ioctl_linux.c
>index a7230c0c7b23..8f5a8ac1b010 100644
>--- a/drivers/staging/rtl8712/rtl871x_ioctl_linux.c
>+++ b/drivers/staging/rtl8712/rtl871x_ioctl_linux.c
>@@ -124,10 +124,91 @@ static inline void handle_group_key(struct ieee_param *param,
> }
> }
>
>-static noinline_for_stack char *translate_scan(struct _adapter *padapter,
>- struct iw_request_info *info,
>- struct wlan_network *pnetwork,
>- char *start, char *stop)
>+static noinline_for_stack char *translate_scan_wpa(struct iw_request_info *info,
>+ struct wlan_network *pnetwork,
>+ struct iw_event *iwe,
>+ char *start, char *stop)
>+{
>+ /* parsing WPA/WPA2 IE */
>+ u8 buf[MAX_WPA_IE_LEN];
>+ u8 wpa_ie[255], rsn_ie[255];
>+ u16 wpa_len = 0, rsn_len = 0;
>+ int n, i;
>+
>+ r8712_get_sec_ie(pnetwork->network.IEs,
>+ pnetwork->network.IELength, rsn_ie, &rsn_len,
>+ wpa_ie, &wpa_len);
>+ if (wpa_len > 0) {
>+ memset(buf, 0, MAX_WPA_IE_LEN);
>+ n = sprintf(buf, "wpa_ie=");
>+ for (i = 0; i < wpa_len; i++) {
>+ n += snprintf(buf + n, MAX_WPA_IE_LEN - n,
>+ "%02x", wpa_ie[i]);
>+ if (n >= MAX_WPA_IE_LEN)
>+ break;
>+ }
>+ memset(iwe, 0, sizeof(*iwe));
>+ iwe->cmd = IWEVCUSTOM;
>+ iwe->u.data.length = (u16)strlen(buf);
>+ start = iwe_stream_add_point(info, start, stop,
>+ iwe, buf);
>+ memset(iwe, 0, sizeof(*iwe));
>+ iwe->cmd = IWEVGENIE;
>+ iwe->u.data.length = (u16)wpa_len;
>+ start = iwe_stream_add_point(info, start, stop,
>+ iwe, wpa_ie);
>+ }
>+ if (rsn_len > 0) {
>+ memset(buf, 0, MAX_WPA_IE_LEN);
>+ n = sprintf(buf, "rsn_ie=");
>+ for (i = 0; i < rsn_len; i++) {
>+ n += snprintf(buf + n, MAX_WPA_IE_LEN - n,
>+ "%02x", rsn_ie[i]);
>+ if (n >= MAX_WPA_IE_LEN)
>+ break;
>+ }
>+ memset(iwe, 0, sizeof(*iwe));
>+ iwe->cmd = IWEVCUSTOM;
>+ iwe->u.data.length = strlen(buf);
>+ start = iwe_stream_add_point(info, start, stop,
>+ iwe, buf);
>+ memset(iwe, 0, sizeof(*iwe));
>+ iwe->cmd = IWEVGENIE;
>+ iwe->u.data.length = rsn_len;
>+ start = iwe_stream_add_point(info, start, stop, iwe,
>+ rsn_ie);
>+ }
>+
>+ return start;
>+}
>+
>+static noinline_for_stack char *translate_scan_wps(struct iw_request_info *info,
>+ struct wlan_network *pnetwork,
>+ struct iw_event *iwe,
>+ char *start, char *stop)
>+{
>+ /* parsing WPS IE */
>+ u8 wps_ie[512];
>+ uint wps_ielen;
>+
>+ if (r8712_get_wps_ie(pnetwork->network.IEs,
>+ pnetwork->network.IELength,
>+ wps_ie, &wps_ielen)) {
>+ if (wps_ielen > 2) {
>+ iwe->cmd = IWEVGENIE;
>+ iwe->u.data.length = (u16)wps_ielen;
>+ start = iwe_stream_add_point(info, start, stop,
>+ iwe, wps_ie);
>+ }
>+ }
>+
>+ return start;
>+}
>+
>+static char *translate_scan(struct _adapter *padapter,
>+ struct iw_request_info *info,
>+ struct wlan_network *pnetwork,
>+ char *start, char *stop)
> {
> struct iw_event iwe;
> struct ieee80211_ht_cap *pht_capie;
>@@ -240,73 +321,11 @@ static noinline_for_stack char *translate_scan(struct _adapter *padapter,
> /* Check if we added any event */
> if ((current_val - start) > iwe_stream_lcp_len(info))
> start = current_val;
>- /* parsing WPA/WPA2 IE */
>- {
>- u8 buf[MAX_WPA_IE_LEN];
>- u8 wpa_ie[255], rsn_ie[255];
>- u16 wpa_len = 0, rsn_len = 0;
>- int n;
>-
>- r8712_get_sec_ie(pnetwork->network.IEs,
>- pnetwork->network.IELength, rsn_ie, &rsn_len,
>- wpa_ie, &wpa_len);
>- if (wpa_len > 0) {
>- memset(buf, 0, MAX_WPA_IE_LEN);
>- n = sprintf(buf, "wpa_ie=");
>- for (i = 0; i < wpa_len; i++) {
>- n += snprintf(buf + n, MAX_WPA_IE_LEN - n,
>- "%02x", wpa_ie[i]);
>- if (n >= MAX_WPA_IE_LEN)
>- break;
>- }
>- memset(&iwe, 0, sizeof(iwe));
>- iwe.cmd = IWEVCUSTOM;
>- iwe.u.data.length = (u16)strlen(buf);
>- start = iwe_stream_add_point(info, start, stop,
>- &iwe, buf);
>- memset(&iwe, 0, sizeof(iwe));
>- iwe.cmd = IWEVGENIE;
>- iwe.u.data.length = (u16)wpa_len;
>- start = iwe_stream_add_point(info, start, stop,
>- &iwe, wpa_ie);
>- }
>- if (rsn_len > 0) {
>- memset(buf, 0, MAX_WPA_IE_LEN);
>- n = sprintf(buf, "rsn_ie=");
>- for (i = 0; i < rsn_len; i++) {
>- n += snprintf(buf + n, MAX_WPA_IE_LEN - n,
>- "%02x", rsn_ie[i]);
>- if (n >= MAX_WPA_IE_LEN)
>- break;
>- }
>- memset(&iwe, 0, sizeof(iwe));
>- iwe.cmd = IWEVCUSTOM;
>- iwe.u.data.length = strlen(buf);
>- start = iwe_stream_add_point(info, start, stop,
>- &iwe, buf);
>- memset(&iwe, 0, sizeof(iwe));
>- iwe.cmd = IWEVGENIE;
>- iwe.u.data.length = rsn_len;
>- start = iwe_stream_add_point(info, start, stop, &iwe,
>- rsn_ie);
>- }
>- }
>
>- { /* parsing WPS IE */
>- u8 wps_ie[512];
>- uint wps_ielen;
>+ start = translate_scan_wpa(info, pnetwork, &iwe, start, stop);
>+
>+ start = translate_scan_wps(info, pnetwork, &iwe, start, stop);
>
>- if (r8712_get_wps_ie(pnetwork->network.IEs,
>- pnetwork->network.IELength,
>- wps_ie, &wps_ielen)) {
>- if (wps_ielen > 2) {
>- iwe.cmd = IWEVGENIE;
>- iwe.u.data.length = (u16)wps_ielen;
>- start = iwe_stream_add_point(info, start, stop,
>- &iwe, wps_ie);
>- }
>- }
>- }
> /* Add quality statistics */
> iwe.cmd = IWEVQUAL;
> rssi = r8712_signal_scale_mapping(pnetwork->network.Rssi);
>diff --git a/drivers/staging/vc04_services/bcm2835-camera/bcm2835-camera.c b/drivers/staging/vc04_services/bcm2835-camera/bcm2835-camera.c
>index 68f08dc18da9..5e9187edeef4 100644
>--- a/drivers/staging/vc04_services/bcm2835-camera/bcm2835-camera.c
>+++ b/drivers/staging/vc04_services/bcm2835-camera/bcm2835-camera.c
>@@ -336,16 +336,13 @@ static void buffer_cb(struct vchiq_mmal_instance *instance,
> return;
> } else if (length == 0) {
> /* stream ended */
>- if (buf) {
>- /* this should only ever happen if the port is
>- * disabled and there are buffers still queued
>+ if (dev->capture.frame_count) {
>+ /* empty buffer whilst capturing - expected to be an
>+ * EOS, so grab another frame
> */
>- vb2_buffer_done(&buf->vb.vb2_buf, VB2_BUF_STATE_ERROR);
>- pr_debug("Empty buffer");
>- } else if (dev->capture.frame_count) {
>- /* grab another frame */
> if (is_capturing(dev)) {
>- pr_debug("Grab another frame");
>+ v4l2_dbg(1, bcm2835_v4l2_debug, &dev->v4l2_dev,
>+ "Grab another frame");
> vchiq_mmal_port_parameter_set(
> instance,
> dev->capture.camera_port,
>@@ -353,8 +350,14 @@ static void buffer_cb(struct vchiq_mmal_instance *instance,
> &dev->capture.frame_count,
> sizeof(dev->capture.frame_count));
> }
>+ if (vchiq_mmal_submit_buffer(instance, port, buf))
>+ v4l2_dbg(1, bcm2835_v4l2_debug, &dev->v4l2_dev,
>+ "Failed to return EOS buffer");
> } else {
>- /* signal frame completion */
>+ /* stopping streaming.
>+ * return buffer, and signal frame completion
>+ */
>+ vb2_buffer_done(&buf->vb.vb2_buf, VB2_BUF_STATE_ERROR);
> complete(&dev->capture.frame_cmplt);
> }
> } else {
>@@ -576,6 +579,7 @@ static void stop_streaming(struct vb2_queue *vq)
> int ret;
> unsigned long timeout;
> struct bm2835_mmal_dev *dev = vb2_get_drv_priv(vq);
>+ struct vchiq_mmal_port *port = dev->capture.port;
>
> v4l2_dbg(1, bcm2835_v4l2_debug, &dev->v4l2_dev, "%s: dev:%p\n",
> __func__, dev);
>@@ -599,12 +603,6 @@ static void stop_streaming(struct vb2_queue *vq)
> &dev->capture.frame_count,
> sizeof(dev->capture.frame_count));
>
>- /* wait for last frame to complete */
>- timeout = wait_for_completion_timeout(&dev->capture.frame_cmplt, HZ);
>- if (timeout == 0)
>- v4l2_err(&dev->v4l2_dev,
>- "timed out waiting for frame completion\n");
>-
> v4l2_dbg(1, bcm2835_v4l2_debug, &dev->v4l2_dev,
> "disabling connection\n");
>
>@@ -619,6 +617,21 @@ static void stop_streaming(struct vb2_queue *vq)
> ret);
> }
>
>+ /* wait for all buffers to be returned */
>+ while (atomic_read(&port->buffers_with_vpu)) {
>+ v4l2_dbg(1, bcm2835_v4l2_debug, &dev->v4l2_dev,
>+ "%s: Waiting for buffers to be returned - %d outstanding\n",
>+ __func__, atomic_read(&port->buffers_with_vpu));
>+ timeout = wait_for_completion_timeout(&dev->capture.frame_cmplt,
>+ HZ);
>+ if (timeout == 0) {
>+ v4l2_err(&dev->v4l2_dev, "%s: Timeout waiting for buffers to be returned - %d outstanding\n",
>+ __func__,
>+ atomic_read(&port->buffers_with_vpu));
>+ break;
>+ }
>+ }
>+
> if (disable_camera(dev) < 0)
> v4l2_err(&dev->v4l2_dev, "Failed to disable camera\n");
> }
>diff --git a/drivers/staging/vc04_services/bcm2835-camera/controls.c b/drivers/staging/vc04_services/bcm2835-camera/controls.c
>index dade79738a29..12ac3ef61fe6 100644
>--- a/drivers/staging/vc04_services/bcm2835-camera/controls.c
>+++ b/drivers/staging/vc04_services/bcm2835-camera/controls.c
>@@ -603,15 +603,28 @@ static int ctrl_set_bitrate(struct bm2835_mmal_dev *dev,
> struct v4l2_ctrl *ctrl,
> const struct bm2835_mmal_v4l2_ctrl *mmal_ctrl)
> {
>+ int ret;
> struct vchiq_mmal_port *encoder_out;
>
> dev->capture.encode_bitrate = ctrl->val;
>
> encoder_out = &dev->component[MMAL_COMPONENT_VIDEO_ENCODE]->output[0];
>
>- return vchiq_mmal_port_parameter_set(dev->instance, encoder_out,
>- mmal_ctrl->mmal_id, &ctrl->val,
>- sizeof(ctrl->val));
>+ ret = vchiq_mmal_port_parameter_set(dev->instance, encoder_out,
>+ mmal_ctrl->mmal_id, &ctrl->val,
>+ sizeof(ctrl->val));
>+
>+ v4l2_dbg(1, bcm2835_v4l2_debug, &dev->v4l2_dev,
>+ "%s: After: mmal_ctrl:%p ctrl id:0x%x ctrl val:%d ret %d(%d)\n",
>+ __func__, mmal_ctrl, ctrl->id, ctrl->val, ret,
>+ (ret == 0 ? 0 : -EINVAL));
>+
>+ /*
>+ * Older firmware versions (pre July 2019) have a bug in handling
>+ * MMAL_PARAMETER_VIDEO_BIT_RATE that result in the call
>+ * returning -MMAL_MSG_STATUS_EINVAL. So ignore errors from this call.
>+ */
>+ return 0;
> }
>
> static int ctrl_set_bitrate_mode(struct bm2835_mmal_dev *dev,
>diff --git a/drivers/staging/vc04_services/bcm2835-camera/mmal-vchiq.c b/drivers/staging/vc04_services/bcm2835-camera/mmal-vchiq.c
>index 16af735af5c3..29761f6c3b55 100644
>--- a/drivers/staging/vc04_services/bcm2835-camera/mmal-vchiq.c
>+++ b/drivers/staging/vc04_services/bcm2835-camera/mmal-vchiq.c
>@@ -161,7 +161,8 @@ struct vchiq_mmal_instance {
> void *bulk_scratch;
>
> struct idr context_map;
>- spinlock_t context_map_lock;
>+ /* protect accesses to context_map */
>+ struct mutex context_map_lock;
>
> /* component to use next */
> int component_idx;
>@@ -184,10 +185,10 @@ get_msg_context(struct vchiq_mmal_instance *instance)
> * that when we service the VCHI reply, we can look up what
> * message is being replied to.
> */
>- spin_lock(&instance->context_map_lock);
>+ mutex_lock(&instance->context_map_lock);
> handle = idr_alloc(&instance->context_map, msg_context,
> 0, 0, GFP_KERNEL);
>- spin_unlock(&instance->context_map_lock);
>+ mutex_unlock(&instance->context_map_lock);
>
> if (handle < 0) {
> kfree(msg_context);
>@@ -211,9 +212,9 @@ release_msg_context(struct mmal_msg_context *msg_context)
> {
> struct vchiq_mmal_instance *instance = msg_context->instance;
>
>- spin_lock(&instance->context_map_lock);
>+ mutex_lock(&instance->context_map_lock);
> idr_remove(&instance->context_map, msg_context->handle);
>- spin_unlock(&instance->context_map_lock);
>+ mutex_unlock(&instance->context_map_lock);
> kfree(msg_context);
> }
>
>@@ -239,6 +240,8 @@ static void buffer_work_cb(struct work_struct *work)
> struct mmal_msg_context *msg_context =
> container_of(work, struct mmal_msg_context, u.bulk.work);
>
>+ atomic_dec(&msg_context->u.bulk.port->buffers_with_vpu);
>+
> msg_context->u.bulk.port->buffer_cb(msg_context->u.bulk.instance,
> msg_context->u.bulk.port,
> msg_context->u.bulk.status,
>@@ -287,8 +290,6 @@ static int bulk_receive(struct vchiq_mmal_instance *instance,
>
> /* store length */
> msg_context->u.bulk.buffer_used = rd_len;
>- msg_context->u.bulk.mmal_flags =
>- msg->u.buffer_from_host.buffer_header.flags;
> msg_context->u.bulk.dts = msg->u.buffer_from_host.buffer_header.dts;
> msg_context->u.bulk.pts = msg->u.buffer_from_host.buffer_header.pts;
>
>@@ -379,6 +380,8 @@ buffer_from_host(struct vchiq_mmal_instance *instance,
> /* initialise work structure ready to schedule callback */
> INIT_WORK(&msg_context->u.bulk.work, buffer_work_cb);
>
>+ atomic_inc(&port->buffers_with_vpu);
>+
> /* prep the buffer from host message */
> memset(&m, 0xbc, sizeof(m)); /* just to make debug clearer */
>
>@@ -447,6 +450,9 @@ static void buffer_to_host_cb(struct vchiq_mmal_instance *instance,
> return;
> }
>
>+ msg_context->u.bulk.mmal_flags =
>+ msg->u.buffer_from_host.buffer_header.flags;
>+
> if (msg->h.status != MMAL_MSG_STATUS_SUCCESS) {
> /* message reception had an error */
> pr_warn("error %d in reply\n", msg->h.status);
>@@ -1323,16 +1329,6 @@ static int port_enable(struct vchiq_mmal_instance *instance,
> if (port->enabled)
> return 0;
>
>- /* ensure there are enough buffers queued to cover the buffer headers */
>- if (port->buffer_cb) {
>- hdr_count = 0;
>- list_for_each(buf_head, &port->buffers) {
>- hdr_count++;
>- }
>- if (hdr_count < port->current_buffer.num)
>- return -ENOSPC;
>- }
>-
> ret = port_action_port(instance, port,
> MMAL_MSG_PORT_ACTION_TYPE_ENABLE);
> if (ret)
>@@ -1849,7 +1845,7 @@ int vchiq_mmal_init(struct vchiq_mmal_instance **out_instance)
>
> instance->bulk_scratch = vmalloc(PAGE_SIZE);
>
>- spin_lock_init(&instance->context_map_lock);
>+ mutex_init(&instance->context_map_lock);
> idr_init_base(&instance->context_map, 1);
>
> params.callback_param = instance;
>diff --git a/drivers/staging/vc04_services/bcm2835-camera/mmal-vchiq.h b/drivers/staging/vc04_services/bcm2835-camera/mmal-vchiq.h
>index 22b839ecd5f0..b0ee1716525b 100644
>--- a/drivers/staging/vc04_services/bcm2835-camera/mmal-vchiq.h
>+++ b/drivers/staging/vc04_services/bcm2835-camera/mmal-vchiq.h
>@@ -71,6 +71,9 @@ struct vchiq_mmal_port {
> struct list_head buffers;
> /* lock to serialise adding and removing buffers from list */
> spinlock_t slock;
>+
>+ /* Count of buffers the VPU has yet to return */
>+ atomic_t buffers_with_vpu;
> /* callback on buffer completion */
> vchiq_mmal_buffer_cb buffer_cb;
> /* callback context */
>diff --git a/drivers/staging/vc04_services/interface/vchiq_arm/vchiq_2835_arm.c b/drivers/staging/vc04_services/interface/vchiq_arm/vchiq_2835_arm.c
>index c557c9953724..aa20fcaefa9d 100644
>--- a/drivers/staging/vc04_services/interface/vchiq_arm/vchiq_2835_arm.c
>+++ b/drivers/staging/vc04_services/interface/vchiq_arm/vchiq_2835_arm.c
>@@ -523,7 +523,7 @@ create_pagelist(char __user *buf, size_t count, unsigned short type)
> (g_cache_line_size - 1)))) {
> char *fragments;
>
>- if (down_killable(&g_free_fragments_sema)) {
>+ if (down_interruptible(&g_free_fragments_sema) != 0) {
> cleanup_pagelistinfo(pagelistinfo);
> return NULL;
> }
>diff --git a/drivers/staging/vc04_services/interface/vchiq_arm/vchiq_arm.c b/drivers/staging/vc04_services/interface/vchiq_arm/vchiq_arm.c
>index ab7d6a0ce94c..62d8f599e765 100644
>--- a/drivers/staging/vc04_services/interface/vchiq_arm/vchiq_arm.c
>+++ b/drivers/staging/vc04_services/interface/vchiq_arm/vchiq_arm.c
>@@ -532,7 +532,8 @@ add_completion(VCHIQ_INSTANCE_T instance, VCHIQ_REASON_T reason,
> vchiq_log_trace(vchiq_arm_log_level,
> "%s - completion queue full", __func__);
> DEBUG_COUNT(COMPLETION_QUEUE_FULL_COUNT);
>- if (wait_for_completion_killable(&instance->remove_event)) {
>+ if (wait_for_completion_interruptible(
>+ &instance->remove_event)) {
> vchiq_log_info(vchiq_arm_log_level,
> "service_callback interrupted");
> return VCHIQ_RETRY;
>@@ -643,7 +644,7 @@ service_callback(VCHIQ_REASON_T reason, struct vchiq_header *header,
> }
>
> DEBUG_TRACE(SERVICE_CALLBACK_LINE);
>- if (wait_for_completion_killable(
>+ if (wait_for_completion_interruptible(
> &user_service->remove_event)
> != 0) {
> vchiq_log_info(vchiq_arm_log_level,
>@@ -978,7 +979,7 @@ vchiq_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
> has been closed until the client library calls the
> CLOSE_DELIVERED ioctl, signalling close_event. */
> if (user_service->close_pending &&
>- wait_for_completion_killable(
>+ wait_for_completion_interruptible(
> &user_service->close_event))
> status = VCHIQ_RETRY;
> break;
>@@ -1154,7 +1155,7 @@ vchiq_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
>
> DEBUG_TRACE(AWAIT_COMPLETION_LINE);
> mutex_unlock(&instance->completion_mutex);
>- rc = wait_for_completion_killable(
>+ rc = wait_for_completion_interruptible(
> &instance->insert_event);
> mutex_lock(&instance->completion_mutex);
> if (rc != 0) {
>@@ -1324,7 +1325,7 @@ vchiq_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
> do {
> spin_unlock(&msg_queue_spinlock);
> DEBUG_TRACE(DEQUEUE_MESSAGE_LINE);
>- if (wait_for_completion_killable(
>+ if (wait_for_completion_interruptible(
> &user_service->insert_event)) {
> vchiq_log_info(vchiq_arm_log_level,
> "DEQUEUE_MESSAGE interrupted");
>@@ -2328,7 +2329,7 @@ vchiq_keepalive_thread_func(void *v)
> while (1) {
> long rc = 0, uc = 0;
>
>- if (wait_for_completion_killable(&arm_state->ka_evt)
>+ if (wait_for_completion_interruptible(&arm_state->ka_evt)
> != 0) {
> vchiq_log_error(vchiq_susp_log_level,
> "%s interrupted", __func__);
>@@ -2579,7 +2580,7 @@ block_resume(struct vchiq_arm_state *arm_state)
> write_unlock_bh(&arm_state->susp_res_lock);
> vchiq_log_info(vchiq_susp_log_level, "%s wait for previously "
> "blocked clients", __func__);
>- if (wait_for_completion_killable_timeout(
>+ if (wait_for_completion_interruptible_timeout(
> &arm_state->blocked_blocker, timeout_val)
> <= 0) {
> vchiq_log_error(vchiq_susp_log_level, "%s wait for "
>@@ -2605,7 +2606,7 @@ block_resume(struct vchiq_arm_state *arm_state)
> write_unlock_bh(&arm_state->susp_res_lock);
> vchiq_log_info(vchiq_susp_log_level, "%s wait for resume",
> __func__);
>- if (wait_for_completion_killable_timeout(
>+ if (wait_for_completion_interruptible_timeout(
> &arm_state->vc_resume_complete, timeout_val)
> <= 0) {
> vchiq_log_error(vchiq_susp_log_level, "%s wait for "
>@@ -2812,7 +2813,7 @@ vchiq_arm_force_suspend(struct vchiq_state *state)
> do {
> write_unlock_bh(&arm_state->susp_res_lock);
>
>- rc = wait_for_completion_killable_timeout(
>+ rc = wait_for_completion_interruptible_timeout(
> &arm_state->vc_suspend_complete,
> msecs_to_jiffies(FORCE_SUSPEND_TIMEOUT_MS));
>
>@@ -2908,7 +2909,7 @@ vchiq_arm_allow_resume(struct vchiq_state *state)
> write_unlock_bh(&arm_state->susp_res_lock);
>
> if (resume) {
>- if (wait_for_completion_killable(
>+ if (wait_for_completion_interruptible(
> &arm_state->vc_resume_complete) < 0) {
> vchiq_log_error(vchiq_susp_log_level,
> "%s interrupted", __func__);
>diff --git a/drivers/staging/vc04_services/interface/vchiq_arm/vchiq_core.c b/drivers/staging/vc04_services/interface/vchiq_arm/vchiq_core.c
>index 0c387b6473a5..44bfa890e0e5 100644
>--- a/drivers/staging/vc04_services/interface/vchiq_arm/vchiq_core.c
>+++ b/drivers/staging/vc04_services/interface/vchiq_arm/vchiq_core.c
>@@ -395,13 +395,21 @@ remote_event_create(wait_queue_head_t *wq, struct remote_event *event)
> init_waitqueue_head(wq);
> }
>
>+/*
>+ * All the event waiting routines in VCHIQ used a custom semaphore
>+ * implementation that filtered most signals. This achieved a behaviour similar
>+ * to the "killable" family of functions. While cleaning up this code all the
>+ * routines where switched to the "interruptible" family of functions, as the
>+ * former was deemed unjustified and the use "killable" set all VCHIQ's
>+ * threads in D state.
>+ */
> static inline int
> remote_event_wait(wait_queue_head_t *wq, struct remote_event *event)
> {
> if (!event->fired) {
> event->armed = 1;
> dsb(sy);
>- if (wait_event_killable(*wq, event->fired)) {
>+ if (wait_event_interruptible(*wq, event->fired)) {
> event->armed = 0;
> return 0;
> }
>@@ -560,7 +568,7 @@ reserve_space(struct vchiq_state *state, size_t space, int is_blocking)
> remote_event_signal(&state->remote->trigger);
>
> if (!is_blocking ||
>- (wait_for_completion_killable(
>+ (wait_for_completion_interruptible(
> &state->slot_available_event)))
> return NULL; /* No space available */
> }
>@@ -830,7 +838,7 @@ queue_message(struct vchiq_state *state, struct vchiq_service *service,
> spin_unlock("a_spinlock);
> mutex_unlock(&state->slot_mutex);
>
>- if (wait_for_completion_killable(
>+ if (wait_for_completion_interruptible(
> &state->data_quota_event))
> return VCHIQ_RETRY;
>
>@@ -861,7 +869,7 @@ queue_message(struct vchiq_state *state, struct vchiq_service *service,
> service_quota->slot_use_count);
> VCHIQ_SERVICE_STATS_INC(service, quota_stalls);
> mutex_unlock(&state->slot_mutex);
>- if (wait_for_completion_killable(
>+ if (wait_for_completion_interruptible(
> &service_quota->quota_event))
> return VCHIQ_RETRY;
> if (service->closing)
>@@ -1710,7 +1718,8 @@ parse_rx_slots(struct vchiq_state *state)
> &service->bulk_rx : &service->bulk_tx;
>
> DEBUG_TRACE(PARSE_LINE);
>- if (mutex_lock_killable(&service->bulk_mutex)) {
>+ if (mutex_lock_killable(
>+ &service->bulk_mutex) != 0) {
> DEBUG_TRACE(PARSE_LINE);
> goto bail_not_ready;
> }
>@@ -2428,7 +2437,7 @@ vchiq_open_service_internal(struct vchiq_service *service, int client_id)
> QMFLAGS_IS_BLOCKING);
> if (status == VCHIQ_SUCCESS) {
> /* Wait for the ACK/NAK */
>- if (wait_for_completion_killable(&service->remove_event)) {
>+ if (wait_for_completion_interruptible(&service->remove_event)) {
> status = VCHIQ_RETRY;
> vchiq_release_service_internal(service);
> } else if ((service->srvstate != VCHIQ_SRVSTATE_OPEN) &&
>@@ -2795,7 +2804,7 @@ vchiq_connect_internal(struct vchiq_state *state, VCHIQ_INSTANCE_T instance)
> }
>
> if (state->conn_state == VCHIQ_CONNSTATE_CONNECTING) {
>- if (wait_for_completion_killable(&state->connect))
>+ if (wait_for_completion_interruptible(&state->connect))
> return VCHIQ_RETRY;
>
> vchiq_set_conn_state(state, VCHIQ_CONNSTATE_CONNECTED);
>@@ -2894,7 +2903,7 @@ vchiq_close_service(VCHIQ_SERVICE_HANDLE_T handle)
> }
>
> while (1) {
>- if (wait_for_completion_killable(&service->remove_event)) {
>+ if (wait_for_completion_interruptible(&service->remove_event)) {
> status = VCHIQ_RETRY;
> break;
> }
>@@ -2955,7 +2964,7 @@ vchiq_remove_service(VCHIQ_SERVICE_HANDLE_T handle)
> request_poll(service->state, service, VCHIQ_POLL_REMOVE);
> }
> while (1) {
>- if (wait_for_completion_killable(&service->remove_event)) {
>+ if (wait_for_completion_interruptible(&service->remove_event)) {
> status = VCHIQ_RETRY;
> break;
> }
>@@ -3038,7 +3047,7 @@ VCHIQ_STATUS_T vchiq_bulk_transfer(VCHIQ_SERVICE_HANDLE_T handle,
> VCHIQ_SERVICE_STATS_INC(service, bulk_stalls);
> do {
> mutex_unlock(&service->bulk_mutex);
>- if (wait_for_completion_killable(
>+ if (wait_for_completion_interruptible(
> &service->bulk_remove_event)) {
> status = VCHIQ_RETRY;
> goto error_exit;
>@@ -3115,7 +3124,7 @@ VCHIQ_STATUS_T vchiq_bulk_transfer(VCHIQ_SERVICE_HANDLE_T handle,
>
> if (bulk_waiter) {
> bulk_waiter->bulk = bulk;
>- if (wait_for_completion_killable(&bulk_waiter->event))
>+ if (wait_for_completion_interruptible(&bulk_waiter->event))
> status = VCHIQ_RETRY;
> else if (bulk_waiter->actual == VCHIQ_BULK_ACTUAL_ABORTED)
> status = VCHIQ_ERROR;
>diff --git a/drivers/staging/vc04_services/interface/vchiq_arm/vchiq_util.c b/drivers/staging/vc04_services/interface/vchiq_arm/vchiq_util.c
>index 6c519d8e48cb..8ee85c5e6f77 100644
>--- a/drivers/staging/vc04_services/interface/vchiq_arm/vchiq_util.c
>+++ b/drivers/staging/vc04_services/interface/vchiq_arm/vchiq_util.c
>@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ void vchiu_queue_push(struct vchiu_queue *queue, struct vchiq_header *header)
> return;
>
> while (queue->write == queue->read + queue->size) {
>- if (wait_for_completion_killable(&queue->pop))
>+ if (wait_for_completion_interruptible(&queue->pop))
> flush_signals(current);
> }
>
>@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ void vchiu_queue_push(struct vchiu_queue *queue, struct vchiq_header *header)
> struct vchiq_header *vchiu_queue_peek(struct vchiu_queue *queue)
> {
> while (queue->write == queue->read) {
>- if (wait_for_completion_killable(&queue->push))
>+ if (wait_for_completion_interruptible(&queue->push))
> flush_signals(current);
> }
>
>@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ struct vchiq_header *vchiu_queue_pop(struct vchiu_queue *queue)
> struct vchiq_header *header;
>
> while (queue->write == queue->read) {
>- if (wait_for_completion_killable(&queue->push))
>+ if (wait_for_completion_interruptible(&queue->push))
> flush_signals(current);
> }
>
>diff --git a/drivers/staging/wilc1000/wilc_netdev.c b/drivers/staging/wilc1000/wilc_netdev.c
>index ba78c08a17f1..5338d7d2b248 100644
>--- a/drivers/staging/wilc1000/wilc_netdev.c
>+++ b/drivers/staging/wilc1000/wilc_netdev.c
>@@ -530,17 +530,17 @@ static int wilc_wlan_initialize(struct net_device *dev, struct wilc_vif *vif)
> goto fail_locks;
> }
>
>- if (wl->gpio_irq && init_irq(dev)) {
>- ret = -EIO;
>- goto fail_locks;
>- }
>-
> ret = wlan_initialize_threads(dev);
> if (ret < 0) {
> ret = -EIO;
> goto fail_wilc_wlan;
> }
>
>+ if (wl->gpio_irq && init_irq(dev)) {
>+ ret = -EIO;
>+ goto fail_threads;
>+ }
>+
> if (!wl->dev_irq_num &&
> wl->hif_func->enable_interrupt &&
> wl->hif_func->enable_interrupt(wl)) {
>@@ -596,7 +596,7 @@ static int wilc_wlan_initialize(struct net_device *dev, struct wilc_vif *vif)
> fail_irq_init:
> if (wl->dev_irq_num)
> deinit_irq(dev);
>-
>+fail_threads:
> wlan_deinitialize_threads(dev);
> fail_wilc_wlan:
> wilc_wlan_cleanup(dev);
>diff --git a/drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c b/drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c
>index d2f3310abe54..682300713be4 100644
>--- a/drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c
>+++ b/drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c
>@@ -1869,8 +1869,7 @@ int serial8250_handle_irq(struct uart_port *port, unsigned int iir)
>
> status = serial_port_in(port, UART_LSR);
>
>- if (status & (UART_LSR_DR | UART_LSR_BI) &&
>- iir & UART_IIR_RDI) {
>+ if (status & (UART_LSR_DR | UART_LSR_BI)) {
> if (!up->dma || handle_rx_dma(up, iir))
> status = serial8250_rx_chars(up, status);
> }
>diff --git a/drivers/usb/dwc2/core.c b/drivers/usb/dwc2/core.c
>index 8b499d643461..8e41d70fd298 100644
>--- a/drivers/usb/dwc2/core.c
>+++ b/drivers/usb/dwc2/core.c
>@@ -531,7 +531,7 @@ int dwc2_core_reset(struct dwc2_hsotg *hsotg, bool skip_wait)
> }
>
> /* Wait for AHB master IDLE state */
>- if (dwc2_hsotg_wait_bit_set(hsotg, GRSTCTL, GRSTCTL_AHBIDLE, 50)) {
>+ if (dwc2_hsotg_wait_bit_set(hsotg, GRSTCTL, GRSTCTL_AHBIDLE, 10000)) {
> dev_warn(hsotg->dev, "%s: HANG! AHB Idle timeout GRSTCTL GRSTCTL_AHBIDLE\n",
> __func__);
> return -EBUSY;
>diff --git a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_fs.c b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_fs.c
>index 47be961f1bf3..c7ed90084d1a 100644
>--- a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_fs.c
>+++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_fs.c
>@@ -997,7 +997,6 @@ static ssize_t ffs_epfile_io(struct file *file, struct ffs_io_data *io_data)
> * earlier
> */
> gadget = epfile->ffs->gadget;
>- io_data->use_sg = gadget->sg_supported && data_len > PAGE_SIZE;
>
> spin_lock_irq(&epfile->ffs->eps_lock);
> /* In the meantime, endpoint got disabled or changed. */
>@@ -1012,6 +1011,8 @@ static ssize_t ffs_epfile_io(struct file *file, struct ffs_io_data *io_data)
> */
> if (io_data->read)
> data_len = usb_ep_align_maybe(gadget, ep->ep, data_len);
>+
>+ io_data->use_sg = gadget->sg_supported && data_len > PAGE_SIZE;
> spin_unlock_irq(&epfile->ffs->eps_lock);
>
> data = ffs_alloc_buffer(io_data, data_len);
>diff --git a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/u_ether.c b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/u_ether.c
>index 737bd77a575d..2929bb47a618 100644
>--- a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/u_ether.c
>+++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/u_ether.c
>@@ -186,11 +186,12 @@ rx_submit(struct eth_dev *dev, struct usb_request *req, gfp_t gfp_flags)
> out = dev->port_usb->out_ep;
> else
> out = NULL;
>- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->lock, flags);
>
> if (!out)
>+ {
>+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->lock, flags);
> return -ENOTCONN;
>-
>+ }
>
> /* Padding up to RX_EXTRA handles minor disagreements with host.
> * Normally we use the USB "terminate on short read" convention;
>@@ -214,6 +215,7 @@ rx_submit(struct eth_dev *dev, struct usb_request *req, gfp_t gfp_flags)
>
> if (dev->port_usb->is_fixed)
> size = max_t(size_t, size, dev->port_usb->fixed_out_len);
>+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->lock, flags);
>
> skb = __netdev_alloc_skb(dev->net, size + NET_IP_ALIGN, gfp_flags);
> if (skb == NULL) {
>diff --git a/drivers/usb/renesas_usbhs/fifo.c b/drivers/usb/renesas_usbhs/fifo.c
>index 39fa2fc1b8b7..6036cbae8c78 100644
>--- a/drivers/usb/renesas_usbhs/fifo.c
>+++ b/drivers/usb/renesas_usbhs/fifo.c
>@@ -802,9 +802,8 @@ static int __usbhsf_dma_map_ctrl(struct usbhs_pkt *pkt, int map)
> }
>
> static void usbhsf_dma_complete(void *arg);
>-static void xfer_work(struct work_struct *work)
>+static void usbhsf_dma_xfer_preparing(struct usbhs_pkt *pkt)
> {
>- struct usbhs_pkt *pkt = container_of(work, struct usbhs_pkt, work);
> struct usbhs_pipe *pipe = pkt->pipe;
> struct usbhs_fifo *fifo;
> struct usbhs_priv *priv = usbhs_pipe_to_priv(pipe);
>@@ -812,12 +811,10 @@ static void xfer_work(struct work_struct *work)
> struct dma_chan *chan;
> struct device *dev = usbhs_priv_to_dev(priv);
> enum dma_transfer_direction dir;
>- unsigned long flags;
>
>- usbhs_lock(priv, flags);
> fifo = usbhs_pipe_to_fifo(pipe);
> if (!fifo)
>- goto xfer_work_end;
>+ return;
>
> chan = usbhsf_dma_chan_get(fifo, pkt);
> dir = usbhs_pipe_is_dir_in(pipe) ? DMA_DEV_TO_MEM : DMA_MEM_TO_DEV;
>@@ -826,7 +823,7 @@ static void xfer_work(struct work_struct *work)
> pkt->trans, dir,
> DMA_PREP_INTERRUPT | DMA_CTRL_ACK);
> if (!desc)
>- goto xfer_work_end;
>+ return;
>
> desc->callback = usbhsf_dma_complete;
> desc->callback_param = pipe;
>@@ -834,7 +831,7 @@ static void xfer_work(struct work_struct *work)
> pkt->cookie = dmaengine_submit(desc);
> if (pkt->cookie < 0) {
> dev_err(dev, "Failed to submit dma descriptor\n");
>- goto xfer_work_end;
>+ return;
> }
>
> dev_dbg(dev, " %s %d (%d/ %d)\n",
>@@ -845,8 +842,17 @@ static void xfer_work(struct work_struct *work)
> dma_async_issue_pending(chan);
> usbhsf_dma_start(pipe, fifo);
> usbhs_pipe_enable(pipe);
>+}
>+
>+static void xfer_work(struct work_struct *work)
>+{
>+ struct usbhs_pkt *pkt = container_of(work, struct usbhs_pkt, work);
>+ struct usbhs_pipe *pipe = pkt->pipe;
>+ struct usbhs_priv *priv = usbhs_pipe_to_priv(pipe);
>+ unsigned long flags;
>
>-xfer_work_end:
>+ usbhs_lock(priv, flags);
>+ usbhsf_dma_xfer_preparing(pkt);
> usbhs_unlock(priv, flags);
> }
>
>@@ -899,8 +905,13 @@ static int usbhsf_dma_prepare_push(struct usbhs_pkt *pkt, int *is_done)
> pkt->trans = len;
>
> usbhsf_tx_irq_ctrl(pipe, 0);
>- INIT_WORK(&pkt->work, xfer_work);
>- schedule_work(&pkt->work);
>+ /* FIXME: Workaound for usb dmac that driver can be used in atomic */
>+ if (usbhs_get_dparam(priv, has_usb_dmac)) {
>+ usbhsf_dma_xfer_preparing(pkt);
>+ } else {
>+ INIT_WORK(&pkt->work, xfer_work);
>+ schedule_work(&pkt->work);
>+ }
>
> return 0;
>
>@@ -1006,8 +1017,7 @@ static int usbhsf_dma_prepare_pop_with_usb_dmac(struct usbhs_pkt *pkt,
>
> pkt->trans = pkt->length;
>
>- INIT_WORK(&pkt->work, xfer_work);
>- schedule_work(&pkt->work);
>+ usbhsf_dma_xfer_preparing(pkt);
>
> return 0;
>
>diff --git a/drivers/usb/serial/ftdi_sio.c b/drivers/usb/serial/ftdi_sio.c
>index 1d8461ae2c34..23669a584bae 100644
>--- a/drivers/usb/serial/ftdi_sio.c
>+++ b/drivers/usb/serial/ftdi_sio.c
>@@ -1029,6 +1029,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id id_table_combined[] = {
> { USB_DEVICE(AIRBUS_DS_VID, AIRBUS_DS_P8GR) },
> /* EZPrototypes devices */
> { USB_DEVICE(EZPROTOTYPES_VID, HJELMSLUND_USB485_ISO_PID) },
>+ { USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_NUMBER(UNJO_VID, UNJO_ISODEBUG_V1_PID, 1) },
> { } /* Terminating entry */
> };
>
>diff --git a/drivers/usb/serial/ftdi_sio_ids.h b/drivers/usb/serial/ftdi_sio_ids.h
>index 5755f0df0025..f12d806220b4 100644
>--- a/drivers/usb/serial/ftdi_sio_ids.h
>+++ b/drivers/usb/serial/ftdi_sio_ids.h
>@@ -1543,3 +1543,9 @@
> #define CHETCO_SEASMART_DISPLAY_PID 0xA5AD /* SeaSmart NMEA2000 Display */
> #define CHETCO_SEASMART_LITE_PID 0xA5AE /* SeaSmart Lite USB Adapter */
> #define CHETCO_SEASMART_ANALOG_PID 0xA5AF /* SeaSmart Analog Adapter */
>+
>+/*
>+ * Unjo AB
>+ */
>+#define UNJO_VID 0x22B7
>+#define UNJO_ISODEBUG_V1_PID 0x150D
>diff --git a/drivers/usb/serial/option.c b/drivers/usb/serial/option.c
>index a0aaf0635359..c1582fbd1150 100644
>--- a/drivers/usb/serial/option.c
>+++ b/drivers/usb/serial/option.c
>@@ -1343,6 +1343,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id option_ids[] = {
> .driver_info = RSVD(4) },
> { USB_DEVICE_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(ZTE_VENDOR_ID, 0x0414, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff) },
> { USB_DEVICE_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(ZTE_VENDOR_ID, 0x0417, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff) },
>+ { USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(ZTE_VENDOR_ID, 0x0601, 0xff) }, /* GosunCn ZTE WeLink ME3630 (RNDIS mode) */
> { USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(ZTE_VENDOR_ID, 0x0602, 0xff) }, /* GosunCn ZTE WeLink ME3630 (MBIM mode) */
> { USB_DEVICE_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(ZTE_VENDOR_ID, 0x1008, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff),
> .driver_info = RSVD(4) },
>diff --git a/drivers/usb/typec/tps6598x.c b/drivers/usb/typec/tps6598x.c
>index c674abe3cf99..a38d1409f15b 100644
>--- a/drivers/usb/typec/tps6598x.c
>+++ b/drivers/usb/typec/tps6598x.c
>@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@
> #define TPS_STATUS_VCONN(s) (!!((s) & BIT(7)))
>
> /* TPS_REG_SYSTEM_CONF bits */
>-#define TPS_SYSCONF_PORTINFO(c) ((c) & 3)
>+#define TPS_SYSCONF_PORTINFO(c) ((c) & 7)
>
> enum {
> TPS_PORTINFO_SINK,
>@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ tps6598x_block_read(struct tps6598x *tps, u8 reg, void *val, size_t len)
> }
>
> static int tps6598x_block_write(struct tps6598x *tps, u8 reg,
>- void *val, size_t len)
>+ const void *val, size_t len)
> {
> u8 data[TPS_MAX_LEN + 1];
>
>@@ -173,7 +173,7 @@ static inline int tps6598x_write64(struct tps6598x *tps, u8 reg, u64 val)
> static inline int
> tps6598x_write_4cc(struct tps6598x *tps, u8 reg, const char *val)
> {
>- return tps6598x_block_write(tps, reg, &val, sizeof(u32));
>+ return tps6598x_block_write(tps, reg, val, 4);
> }
>
> static int tps6598x_read_partner_identity(struct tps6598x *tps)
>diff --git a/fs/crypto/policy.c b/fs/crypto/policy.c
>index d536889ac31b..4941fe8471ce 100644
>--- a/fs/crypto/policy.c
>+++ b/fs/crypto/policy.c
>@@ -81,6 +81,8 @@ int fscrypt_ioctl_set_policy(struct file *filp, const void __user *arg)
> if (ret == -ENODATA) {
> if (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
> ret = -ENOTDIR;
>+ else if (IS_DEADDIR(inode))
>+ ret = -ENOENT;
> else if (!inode->i_sb->s_cop->empty_dir(inode))
> ret = -ENOTEMPTY;
> else
>diff --git a/fs/iomap.c b/fs/iomap.c
>index 12654c2e78f8..da961fca3180 100644
>--- a/fs/iomap.c
>+++ b/fs/iomap.c
>@@ -333,7 +333,7 @@ iomap_readpage_actor(struct inode *inode, loff_t pos, loff_t length, void *data,
> if (iop)
> atomic_inc(&iop->read_count);
>
>- if (!ctx->bio || !is_contig || bio_full(ctx->bio)) {
>+ if (!ctx->bio || !is_contig || bio_full(ctx->bio, plen)) {
> gfp_t gfp = mapping_gfp_constraint(page->mapping, GFP_KERNEL);
> int nr_vecs = (length + PAGE_SIZE - 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
>
>diff --git a/fs/udf/inode.c b/fs/udf/inode.c
>index e7276932e433..9bb18311a22f 100644
>--- a/fs/udf/inode.c
>+++ b/fs/udf/inode.c
>@@ -470,13 +470,15 @@ static struct buffer_head *udf_getblk(struct inode *inode, udf_pblk_t block,
> return NULL;
> }
>
>-/* Extend the file by 'blocks' blocks, return the number of extents added */
>+/* Extend the file with new blocks totaling 'new_block_bytes',
>+ * return the number of extents added
>+ */
> static int udf_do_extend_file(struct inode *inode,
> struct extent_position *last_pos,
> struct kernel_long_ad *last_ext,
>- sector_t blocks)
>+ loff_t new_block_bytes)
> {
>- sector_t add;
>+ uint32_t add;
> int count = 0, fake = !(last_ext->extLength & UDF_EXTENT_LENGTH_MASK);
> struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb;
> struct kernel_lb_addr prealloc_loc = {};
>@@ -486,7 +488,7 @@ static int udf_do_extend_file(struct inode *inode,
>
> /* The previous extent is fake and we should not extend by anything
> * - there's nothing to do... */
>- if (!blocks && fake)
>+ if (!new_block_bytes && fake)
> return 0;
>
> iinfo = UDF_I(inode);
>@@ -517,13 +519,12 @@ static int udf_do_extend_file(struct inode *inode,
> /* Can we merge with the previous extent? */
> if ((last_ext->extLength & UDF_EXTENT_FLAG_MASK) ==
> EXT_NOT_RECORDED_NOT_ALLOCATED) {
>- add = ((1 << 30) - sb->s_blocksize -
>- (last_ext->extLength & UDF_EXTENT_LENGTH_MASK)) >>
>- sb->s_blocksize_bits;
>- if (add > blocks)
>- add = blocks;
>- blocks -= add;
>- last_ext->extLength += add << sb->s_blocksize_bits;
>+ add = (1 << 30) - sb->s_blocksize -
>+ (last_ext->extLength & UDF_EXTENT_LENGTH_MASK);
>+ if (add > new_block_bytes)
>+ add = new_block_bytes;
>+ new_block_bytes -= add;
>+ last_ext->extLength += add;
> }
>
> if (fake) {
>@@ -544,28 +545,27 @@ static int udf_do_extend_file(struct inode *inode,
> }
>
> /* Managed to do everything necessary? */
>- if (!blocks)
>+ if (!new_block_bytes)
> goto out;
>
> /* All further extents will be NOT_RECORDED_NOT_ALLOCATED */
> last_ext->extLocation.logicalBlockNum = 0;
> last_ext->extLocation.partitionReferenceNum = 0;
>- add = (1 << (30-sb->s_blocksize_bits)) - 1;
>- last_ext->extLength = EXT_NOT_RECORDED_NOT_ALLOCATED |
>- (add << sb->s_blocksize_bits);
>+ add = (1 << 30) - sb->s_blocksize;
>+ last_ext->extLength = EXT_NOT_RECORDED_NOT_ALLOCATED | add;
>
> /* Create enough extents to cover the whole hole */
>- while (blocks > add) {
>- blocks -= add;
>+ while (new_block_bytes > add) {
>+ new_block_bytes -= add;
> err = udf_add_aext(inode, last_pos, &last_ext->extLocation,
> last_ext->extLength, 1);
> if (err)
> return err;
> count++;
> }
>- if (blocks) {
>+ if (new_block_bytes) {
> last_ext->extLength = EXT_NOT_RECORDED_NOT_ALLOCATED |
>- (blocks << sb->s_blocksize_bits);
>+ new_block_bytes;
> err = udf_add_aext(inode, last_pos, &last_ext->extLocation,
> last_ext->extLength, 1);
> if (err)
>@@ -596,6 +596,24 @@ static int udf_do_extend_file(struct inode *inode,
> return count;
> }
>
>+/* Extend the final block of the file to final_block_len bytes */
>+static void udf_do_extend_final_block(struct inode *inode,
>+ struct extent_position *last_pos,
>+ struct kernel_long_ad *last_ext,
>+ uint32_t final_block_len)
>+{
>+ struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb;
>+ uint32_t added_bytes;
>+
>+ added_bytes = final_block_len -
>+ (last_ext->extLength & (sb->s_blocksize - 1));
>+ last_ext->extLength += added_bytes;
>+ UDF_I(inode)->i_lenExtents += added_bytes;
>+
>+ udf_write_aext(inode, last_pos, &last_ext->extLocation,
>+ last_ext->extLength, 1);
>+}
>+
> static int udf_extend_file(struct inode *inode, loff_t newsize)
> {
>
>@@ -605,10 +623,12 @@ static int udf_extend_file(struct inode *inode, loff_t newsize)
> int8_t etype;
> struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb;
> sector_t first_block = newsize >> sb->s_blocksize_bits, offset;
>+ unsigned long partial_final_block;
> int adsize;
> struct udf_inode_info *iinfo = UDF_I(inode);
> struct kernel_long_ad extent;
>- int err;
>+ int err = 0;
>+ int within_final_block;
>
> if (iinfo->i_alloc_type == ICBTAG_FLAG_AD_SHORT)
> adsize = sizeof(struct short_ad);
>@@ -618,18 +638,8 @@ static int udf_extend_file(struct inode *inode, loff_t newsize)
> BUG();
>
> etype = inode_bmap(inode, first_block, &epos, &eloc, &elen, &offset);
>+ within_final_block = (etype != -1);
>
>- /* File has extent covering the new size (could happen when extending
>- * inside a block)? */
>- if (etype != -1)
>- return 0;
>- if (newsize & (sb->s_blocksize - 1))
>- offset++;
>- /* Extended file just to the boundary of the last file block? */
>- if (offset == 0)
>- return 0;
>-
>- /* Truncate is extending the file by 'offset' blocks */
> if ((!epos.bh && epos.offset == udf_file_entry_alloc_offset(inode)) ||
> (epos.bh && epos.offset == sizeof(struct allocExtDesc))) {
> /* File has no extents at all or has empty last
>@@ -643,7 +653,22 @@ static int udf_extend_file(struct inode *inode, loff_t newsize)
> &extent.extLength, 0);
> extent.extLength |= etype << 30;
> }
>- err = udf_do_extend_file(inode, &epos, &extent, offset);
>+
>+ partial_final_block = newsize & (sb->s_blocksize - 1);
>+
>+ /* File has extent covering the new size (could happen when extending
>+ * inside a block)?
>+ */
>+ if (within_final_block) {
>+ /* Extending file within the last file block */
>+ udf_do_extend_final_block(inode, &epos, &extent,
>+ partial_final_block);
>+ } else {
>+ loff_t add = ((loff_t)offset << sb->s_blocksize_bits) |
>+ partial_final_block;
>+ err = udf_do_extend_file(inode, &epos, &extent, add);
>+ }
>+
> if (err < 0)
> goto out;
> err = 0;
>@@ -745,6 +770,7 @@ static sector_t inode_getblk(struct inode *inode, sector_t block,
> /* Are we beyond EOF? */
> if (etype == -1) {
> int ret;
>+ loff_t hole_len;
> isBeyondEOF = true;
> if (count) {
> if (c)
>@@ -760,7 +786,8 @@ static sector_t inode_getblk(struct inode *inode, sector_t block,
> startnum = (offset > 0);
> }
> /* Create extents for the hole between EOF and offset */
>- ret = udf_do_extend_file(inode, &prev_epos, laarr, offset);
>+ hole_len = (loff_t)offset << inode->i_blkbits;
>+ ret = udf_do_extend_file(inode, &prev_epos, laarr, hole_len);
> if (ret < 0) {
> *err = ret;
> newblock = 0;
>diff --git a/fs/xfs/xfs_aops.c b/fs/xfs/xfs_aops.c
>index 8da5e6637771..11f703d4a605 100644
>--- a/fs/xfs/xfs_aops.c
>+++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_aops.c
>@@ -782,7 +782,7 @@ xfs_add_to_ioend(
> atomic_inc(&iop->write_count);
>
> if (!merged) {
>- if (bio_full(wpc->ioend->io_bio))
>+ if (bio_full(wpc->ioend->io_bio, len))
> xfs_chain_bio(wpc->ioend, wbc, bdev, sector);
> bio_add_page(wpc->ioend->io_bio, page, len, poff);
> }
>diff --git a/include/linux/bio.h b/include/linux/bio.h
>index f87abaa898f0..e36b8fc1b1c3 100644
>--- a/include/linux/bio.h
>+++ b/include/linux/bio.h
>@@ -102,9 +102,23 @@ static inline void *bio_data(struct bio *bio)
> return NULL;
> }
>
>-static inline bool bio_full(struct bio *bio)
>+/**
>+ * bio_full - check if the bio is full
>+ * @bio: bio to check
>+ * @len: length of one segment to be added
>+ *
>+ * Return true if @bio is full and one segment with @len bytes can't be
>+ * added to the bio, otherwise return false
>+ */
>+static inline bool bio_full(struct bio *bio, unsigned len)
> {
>- return bio->bi_vcnt >= bio->bi_max_vecs;
>+ if (bio->bi_vcnt >= bio->bi_max_vecs)
>+ return true;
>+
>+ if (bio->bi_iter.bi_size > UINT_MAX - len)
>+ return true;
>+
>+ return false;
> }
>
> static inline bool bio_next_segment(const struct bio *bio,
>diff --git a/include/linux/vmw_vmci_defs.h b/include/linux/vmw_vmci_defs.h
>index 77ac9c7b9483..762f793e92f6 100644
>--- a/include/linux/vmw_vmci_defs.h
>+++ b/include/linux/vmw_vmci_defs.h
>@@ -62,9 +62,18 @@ enum {
>
> /*
> * A single VMCI device has an upper limit of 128MB on the amount of
>- * memory that can be used for queue pairs.
>+ * memory that can be used for queue pairs. Since each queue pair
>+ * consists of at least two pages, the memory limit also dictates the
>+ * number of queue pairs a guest can create.
> */
> #define VMCI_MAX_GUEST_QP_MEMORY (128 * 1024 * 1024)
>+#define VMCI_MAX_GUEST_QP_COUNT (VMCI_MAX_GUEST_QP_MEMORY / PAGE_SIZE / 2)
>+
>+/*
>+ * There can be at most PAGE_SIZE doorbells since there is one doorbell
>+ * per byte in the doorbell bitmap page.
>+ */
>+#define VMCI_MAX_GUEST_DOORBELL_COUNT PAGE_SIZE
>
> /*
> * Queues with pre-mapped data pages must be small, so that we don't pin
>diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/usb/audio.h b/include/uapi/linux/usb/audio.h
>index ddc5396800aa..76b7c3f6cd0d 100644
>--- a/include/uapi/linux/usb/audio.h
>+++ b/include/uapi/linux/usb/audio.h
>@@ -450,6 +450,43 @@ static inline __u8 *uac_processing_unit_specific(struct uac_processing_unit_desc
> }
> }
>
>+/*
>+ * Extension Unit (XU) has almost compatible layout with Processing Unit, but
>+ * on UAC2, it has a different bmControls size (bControlSize); it's 1 byte for
>+ * XU while 2 bytes for PU. The last iExtension field is a one-byte index as
>+ * well as iProcessing field of PU.
>+ */
>+static inline __u8 uac_extension_unit_bControlSize(struct uac_processing_unit_descriptor *desc,
>+ int protocol)
>+{
>+ switch (protocol) {
>+ case UAC_VERSION_1:
>+ return desc->baSourceID[desc->bNrInPins + 4];
>+ case UAC_VERSION_2:
>+ return 1; /* in UAC2, this value is constant */
>+ case UAC_VERSION_3:
>+ return 4; /* in UAC3, this value is constant */
>+ default:
>+ return 1;
>+ }
>+}
>+
>+static inline __u8 uac_extension_unit_iExtension(struct uac_processing_unit_descriptor *desc,
>+ int protocol)
>+{
>+ __u8 control_size = uac_extension_unit_bControlSize(desc, protocol);
>+
>+ switch (protocol) {
>+ case UAC_VERSION_1:
>+ case UAC_VERSION_2:
>+ default:
>+ return *(uac_processing_unit_bmControls(desc, protocol)
>+ + control_size);
>+ case UAC_VERSION_3:
>+ return 0; /* UAC3 does not have this field */
>+ }
>+}
>+
> /* 4.5.2 Class-Specific AS Interface Descriptor */
> struct uac1_as_header_descriptor {
> __u8 bLength; /* in bytes: 7 */
>diff --git a/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c b/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c
>index 6f3a35949cdd..f24a757f8239 100644
>--- a/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c
>+++ b/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c
>@@ -3255,6 +3255,7 @@ static void alc256_init(struct hda_codec *codec)
> alc_update_coefex_idx(codec, 0x57, 0x04, 0x0007, 0x4); /* Hight power */
> alc_update_coefex_idx(codec, 0x53, 0x02, 0x8000, 1 << 15); /* Clear bit */
> alc_update_coefex_idx(codec, 0x53, 0x02, 0x8000, 0 << 15);
>+ alc_update_coef_idx(codec, 0x36, 1 << 13, 1 << 5); /* Switch pcbeep path to Line in path*/
> }
>
> static void alc256_shutup(struct hda_codec *codec)
>@@ -7825,7 +7826,6 @@ static int patch_alc269(struct hda_codec *codec)
> spec->shutup = alc256_shutup;
> spec->init_hook = alc256_init;
> spec->gen.mixer_nid = 0; /* ALC256 does not have any loopback mixer path */
>- alc_update_coef_idx(codec, 0x36, 1 << 13, 1 << 5); /* Switch pcbeep path to Line in path*/
> break;
> case 0x10ec0257:
> spec->codec_variant = ALC269_TYPE_ALC257;
>diff --git a/sound/usb/mixer.c b/sound/usb/mixer.c
>index c703f8534b07..7498b5191b68 100644
>--- a/sound/usb/mixer.c
>+++ b/sound/usb/mixer.c
>@@ -2303,7 +2303,7 @@ static struct procunit_info extunits[] = {
> */
> static int build_audio_procunit(struct mixer_build *state, int unitid,
> void *raw_desc, struct procunit_info *list,
>- char *name)
>+ bool extension_unit)
> {
> struct uac_processing_unit_descriptor *desc = raw_desc;
> int num_ins;
>@@ -2320,6 +2320,8 @@ static int build_audio_procunit(struct mixer_build *state, int unitid,
> static struct procunit_info default_info = {
> 0, NULL, default_value_info
> };
>+ const char *name = extension_unit ?
>+ "Extension Unit" : "Processing Unit";
>
> if (desc->bLength < 13) {
> usb_audio_err(state->chip, "invalid %s descriptor (id %d)\n", name, unitid);
>@@ -2433,7 +2435,10 @@ static int build_audio_procunit(struct mixer_build *state, int unitid,
> } else if (info->name) {
> strlcpy(kctl->id.name, info->name, sizeof(kctl->id.name));
> } else {
>- nameid = uac_processing_unit_iProcessing(desc, state->mixer->protocol);
>+ if (extension_unit)
>+ nameid = uac_extension_unit_iExtension(desc, state->mixer->protocol);
>+ else
>+ nameid = uac_processing_unit_iProcessing(desc, state->mixer->protocol);
> len = 0;
> if (nameid)
> len = snd_usb_copy_string_desc(state->chip,
>@@ -2466,10 +2471,10 @@ static int parse_audio_processing_unit(struct mixer_build *state, int unitid,
> case UAC_VERSION_2:
> default:
> return build_audio_procunit(state, unitid, raw_desc,
>- procunits, "Processing Unit");
>+ procunits, false);
> case UAC_VERSION_3:
> return build_audio_procunit(state, unitid, raw_desc,
>- uac3_procunits, "Processing Unit");
>+ uac3_procunits, false);
> }
> }
>
>@@ -2480,8 +2485,7 @@ static int parse_audio_extension_unit(struct mixer_build *state, int unitid,
> * Note that we parse extension units with processing unit descriptors.
> * That's ok as the layout is the same.
> */
>- return build_audio_procunit(state, unitid, raw_desc,
>- extunits, "Extension Unit");
>+ return build_audio_procunit(state, unitid, raw_desc, extunits, true);
> }
>
> /*
>diff --git a/tools/perf/Documentation/intel-pt.txt b/tools/perf/Documentation/intel-pt.txt
>index 115eaacc455f..60d99e5e7921 100644
>--- a/tools/perf/Documentation/intel-pt.txt
>+++ b/tools/perf/Documentation/intel-pt.txt
>@@ -88,16 +88,16 @@ smaller.
>
> To represent software control flow, "branches" samples are produced. By default
> a branch sample is synthesized for every single branch. To get an idea what
>-data is available you can use the 'perf script' tool with no parameters, which
>-will list all the samples.
>+data is available you can use the 'perf script' tool with all itrace sampling
>+options, which will list all the samples.
>
> perf record -e intel_pt//u ls
>- perf script
>+ perf script --itrace=ibxwpe
>
> An interesting field that is not printed by default is 'flags' which can be
> displayed as follows:
>
>- perf script -Fcomm,tid,pid,time,cpu,event,trace,ip,sym,dso,addr,symoff,flags
>+ perf script --itrace=ibxwpe -F+flags
>
> The flags are "bcrosyiABEx" which stand for branch, call, return, conditional,
> system, asynchronous, interrupt, transaction abort, trace begin, trace end, and
>@@ -713,7 +713,7 @@ Having no option is the same as
>
> which, in turn, is the same as
>
>- --itrace=ibxwpe
>+ --itrace=cepwx
>
> The letters are:
>
>diff --git a/tools/perf/util/auxtrace.c b/tools/perf/util/auxtrace.c
>index 66e82bd0683e..cfdbf65f1e02 100644
>--- a/tools/perf/util/auxtrace.c
>+++ b/tools/perf/util/auxtrace.c
>@@ -1001,7 +1001,8 @@ int itrace_parse_synth_opts(const struct option *opt, const char *str,
> }
>
> if (!str) {
>- itrace_synth_opts__set_default(synth_opts, false);
>+ itrace_synth_opts__set_default(synth_opts,
>+ synth_opts->default_no_sample);
> return 0;
> }
>
>diff --git a/tools/perf/util/header.c b/tools/perf/util/header.c
>index 847ae51a524b..fb0aa661644b 100644
>--- a/tools/perf/util/header.c
>+++ b/tools/perf/util/header.c
>@@ -3602,6 +3602,7 @@ int perf_event__synthesize_features(struct perf_tool *tool,
> return -ENOMEM;
>
> ff.size = sz - sz_hdr;
>+ ff.ph = &session->header;
>
> for_each_set_bit(feat, header->adds_features, HEADER_FEAT_BITS) {
> if (!feat_ops[feat].synthesize) {
>diff --git a/tools/perf/util/intel-pt.c b/tools/perf/util/intel-pt.c
>index d6f1b2a03f9b..f7dd4657535d 100644
>--- a/tools/perf/util/intel-pt.c
>+++ b/tools/perf/util/intel-pt.c
>@@ -2579,7 +2579,8 @@ int intel_pt_process_auxtrace_info(union perf_event *event,
> } else {
> itrace_synth_opts__set_default(&pt->synth_opts,
> session->itrace_synth_opts->default_no_sample);
>- if (use_browser != -1) {
>+ if (!session->itrace_synth_opts->default_no_sample &&
>+ !session->itrace_synth_opts->inject) {
> pt->synth_opts.branches = false;
> pt->synth_opts.callchain = true;
> }
>diff --git a/tools/perf/util/pmu.c b/tools/perf/util/pmu.c
>index e0429f4ef335..faa8eb231e1b 100644
>--- a/tools/perf/util/pmu.c
>+++ b/tools/perf/util/pmu.c
>@@ -709,9 +709,7 @@ static void pmu_add_cpu_aliases(struct list_head *head, struct perf_pmu *pmu)
> {
> int i;
> struct pmu_events_map *map;
>- struct pmu_event *pe;
> const char *name = pmu->name;
>- const char *pname;
>
> map = perf_pmu__find_map(pmu);
> if (!map)
>@@ -722,28 +720,26 @@ static void pmu_add_cpu_aliases(struct list_head *head, struct perf_pmu *pmu)
> */
> i = 0;
> while (1) {
>+ const char *cpu_name = is_arm_pmu_core(name) ? name : "cpu";
>+ struct pmu_event *pe = &map->table[i++];
>+ const char *pname = pe->pmu ? pe->pmu : cpu_name;
>
>- pe = &map->table[i++];
> if (!pe->name) {
> if (pe->metric_group || pe->metric_name)
> continue;
> break;
> }
>
>- if (!is_arm_pmu_core(name)) {
>- pname = pe->pmu ? pe->pmu : "cpu";
>-
>- /*
>- * uncore alias may be from different PMU
>- * with common prefix
>- */
>- if (pmu_is_uncore(name) &&
>- !strncmp(pname, name, strlen(pname)))
>- goto new_alias;
>+ /*
>+ * uncore alias may be from different PMU
>+ * with common prefix
>+ */
>+ if (pmu_is_uncore(name) &&
>+ !strncmp(pname, name, strlen(pname)))
>+ goto new_alias;
>
>- if (strcmp(pname, name))
>- continue;
>- }
>+ if (strcmp(pname, name))
>+ continue;
>
> new_alias:
> /* need type casts to override 'const' */
>diff --git a/tools/perf/util/thread-stack.c b/tools/perf/util/thread-stack.c
>index 4ba9e866b076..60c9d955c4d7 100644
>--- a/tools/perf/util/thread-stack.c
>+++ b/tools/perf/util/thread-stack.c
>@@ -616,6 +616,23 @@ static int thread_stack__bottom(struct thread_stack *ts,
> true, false);
> }
>
>+static int thread_stack__pop_ks(struct thread *thread, struct thread_stack *ts,
>+ struct perf_sample *sample, u64 ref)
>+{
>+ u64 tm = sample->time;
>+ int err;
>+
>+ /* Return to userspace, so pop all kernel addresses */
>+ while (thread_stack__in_kernel(ts)) {
>+ err = thread_stack__call_return(thread, ts, --ts->cnt,
>+ tm, ref, true);
>+ if (err)
>+ return err;
>+ }
>+
>+ return 0;
>+}
>+
> static int thread_stack__no_call_return(struct thread *thread,
> struct thread_stack *ts,
> struct perf_sample *sample,
>@@ -896,7 +913,18 @@ int thread_stack__process(struct thread *thread, struct comm *comm,
> ts->rstate = X86_RETPOLINE_DETECTED;
>
> } else if (sample->flags & PERF_IP_FLAG_RETURN) {
>- if (!sample->ip || !sample->addr)
>+ if (!sample->addr) {
>+ u32 return_from_kernel = PERF_IP_FLAG_SYSCALLRET |
>+ PERF_IP_FLAG_INTERRUPT;
>+
>+ if (!(sample->flags & return_from_kernel))
>+ return 0;
>+
>+ /* Pop kernel stack */
>+ return thread_stack__pop_ks(thread, ts, sample, ref);
>+ }
>+
>+ if (!sample->ip)
> return 0;
>
> /* x86 retpoline 'return' doesn't match the stack */
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