linux-kernel - Re: [RFC PATCH] virtio_ring: Use DMA API if guest memory is encrypted

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Date:   Mon, 15 Jul 2019 16:36:11 -0400
From:   "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@...hat.com>
To:     Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@...ux.ibm.com>
Cc:     virtualization@...ts.linux-foundation.org,
        linuxppc-dev@...ts.ozlabs.org, iommu@...ts.linux-foundation.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Jason Wang <jasowang@...hat.com>,
        Christoph Hellwig <hch@....de>,
        David Gibson <david@...son.dropbear.id.au>,
        Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@...ux.ibm.com>,
        Paul Mackerras <paulus@...abs.org>,
        Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@...nel.crashing.org>,
        Ram Pai <linuxram@...ibm.com>,
        Jean-Philippe Brucker <jean-philippe.brucker@....com>,
        Michael Roth <mdroth@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
        Mike Anderson <andmike@...ux.ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH] virtio_ring: Use DMA API if guest memory is encrypted

On Mon, Jul 15, 2019 at 05:29:06PM -0300, Thiago Jung Bauermann wrote:
> 
> Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@...hat.com> writes:
> 
> > On Sun, Jul 14, 2019 at 02:51:18AM -0300, Thiago Jung Bauermann wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >> Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@...hat.com> writes:
> >>
> >> > So this is what I would call this option:
> >> >
> >> > VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM_IDENTITY_ADDRESS
> >> >
> >> > and the explanation should state that all device
> >> > addresses are translated by the platform to identical
> >> > addresses.
> >> >
> >> > In fact this option then becomes more, not less restrictive
> >> > than VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM - it's a promise
> >> > by guest to only create identity mappings,
> >> > and only before driver_ok is set.
> >> > This option then would always be negotiated together with
> >> > VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM.
> >> >
> >> > Host then must verify that
> >> > 1. full 1:1 mappings are created before driver_ok
> >> >     or can we make sure this happens before features_ok?
> >> >     that would be ideal as we could require that features_ok fails
> >> > 2. mappings are not modified between driver_ok and reset
> >> >     i guess attempts to change them will fail -
> >> >     possibly by causing a guest crash
> >> >     or some other kind of platform-specific error
> >>
> >> I think VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM_IDENTITY_ADDRESS is good, but requiring
> >> it to be accompanied by ACCESS_PLATFORM can be a problem. One reason is
> >> SLOF as I mentioned above, another is that we would be requiring all
> >> guests running on the machine (secure guests or not, since we would use
> >> the same configuration for all guests) to support it. But
> >> ACCESS_PLATFORM is relatively recent so it's a bit early for that. For
> >> instance, Ubuntu 16.04 LTS (which is still supported) doesn't know about
> >> it and wouldn't be able to use the device.
> >
> > OK and your target is to enable use with kernel drivers within
> > guests, right?
> 
> Right.
> 
> > My question is, we are defining a new flag here, I guess old guests
> > then do not set it. How does it help old guests? Or maybe it's
> > not designed to ...
> 
> Indeed. The idea is that QEMU can offer the flag, old guests can reject
> it (or even new guests can reject it, if they decide not to convert into
> secure VMs) and the feature negotiation will succeed with the flag
> unset.

OK. And then what does QEMU do? Assume guest is not encrypted I guess?

> --
> Thiago Jung Bauermann
> IBM Linux Technology Center