linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH ghak90 V6 02/10] audit: add container id

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Message-ID: <CAHC9VhT0V+xi_6nAR5TsM2vs34LbgMeO=-W+MS_kqiXRRzneZQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Mon, 15 Jul 2019 17:09:58 -0400
From:   Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>
To:     Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@...hat.com>
Cc:     Tycho Andersen <tycho@...ho.ws>,
        "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
        containers@...ts.linux-foundation.org, linux-api@...r.kernel.org,
        Linux-Audit Mailing List <linux-audit@...hat.com>,
        linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        netdev@...r.kernel.org, netfilter-devel@...r.kernel.org,
        sgrubb@...hat.com, omosnace@...hat.com, dhowells@...hat.com,
        simo@...hat.com, Eric Paris <eparis@...isplace.org>,
        ebiederm@...ssion.com, nhorman@...driver.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH ghak90 V6 02/10] audit: add container id

On Mon, Jul 8, 2019 at 2:12 PM Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@...hat.com> wrote:
> On 2019-05-30 19:26, Paul Moore wrote:

...

> > I like the creativity, but I worry that at some point these
> > limitations are going to be raised (limits have a funny way of doing
> > that over time) and we will be in trouble.  I say "trouble" because I
> > want to be able to quickly do an audit container ID comparison and
> > we're going to pay a penalty for these larger values (we'll need this
> > when we add multiple auditd support and the requisite record routing).
> >
> > Thinking about this makes me also realize we probably need to think a
> > bit longer about audit container ID conflicts between orchestrators.
> > Right now we just take the value that is given to us by the
> > orchestrator, but if we want to allow multiple container orchestrators
> > to work without some form of cooperation in userspace (I think we have
> > to assume the orchestrators will not talk to each other) we likely
> > need to have some way to block reuse of an audit container ID.  We
> > would either need to prevent the orchestrator from explicitly setting
> > an audit container ID to a currently in use value, or instead generate
> > the audit container ID in the kernel upon an event triggered by the
> > orchestrator (e.g. a write to a /proc file).  I suspect we should
> > start looking at the idr code, I think we will need to make use of it.
>
> To address this, I'd suggest that it is enforced to only allow the
> setting of descendants and to maintain a master list of audit container
> identifiers (with a hash table if necessary later) that includes the
> container owner.

We're discussing the audit container ID management policy elsewhere in
this thread so I won't comment on that here, but I did want to say
that we will likely need something better than a simple list of audit
container IDs from the start.  It's common for systems to have
thousands of containers now (or multiple thousands), which tells me
that a list is a poor choice.  You mentioned a hash table, so I would
suggest starting with that over the list for the initial patchset.

-- 
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com