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Message-ID: <f889017d-4bd9-8fa2-bbcb-1f836730fbcc@amd.com>
Date: Wed, 24 Jul 2019 18:49:09 +0000
From: "Lendacky, Thomas" <Thomas.Lendacky@....com>
To: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@...temov.name>
CC: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@....com>,
"iommu@...ts.linux-foundation.org" <iommu@...ts.linux-foundation.org>,
"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>, Christoph Hellwig <hch@....de>,
Marek Szyprowski <m.szyprowski@...sung.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Lianbo Jiang <lijiang@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] dma-direct: Force unencrypted DMA under SME for certain
DMA masks
On 7/24/19 1:40 PM, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> On Wed, Jul 24, 2019 at 06:30:21PM +0000, Lendacky, Thomas wrote:
>> On 7/24/19 1:11 PM, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
>>> On Wed, Jul 24, 2019 at 05:34:26PM +0000, Lendacky, Thomas wrote:
>>>> On 7/24/19 12:06 PM, Robin Murphy wrote:
>>>>> On 24/07/2019 17:42, Lendacky, Thomas wrote:
>>>>>> On 7/24/19 10:55 AM, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
>>>>>>> On Wed, Jul 10, 2019 at 07:01:19PM +0000, Lendacky, Thomas wrote:
>>>>>>>> @@ -351,6 +355,32 @@ bool sev_active(void)
>>>>>>>> }
>>>>>>>> EXPORT_SYMBOL(sev_active);
>>>>>>>> +/* Override for DMA direct allocation check -
>>>>>>>> ARCH_HAS_FORCE_DMA_UNENCRYPTED */
>>>>>>>> +bool force_dma_unencrypted(struct device *dev)
>>>>>>>> +{
>>>>>>>> + /*
>>>>>>>> + * For SEV, all DMA must be to unencrypted addresses.
>>>>>>>> + */
>>>>>>>> + if (sev_active())
>>>>>>>> + return true;
>>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>>> + /*
>>>>>>>> + * For SME, all DMA must be to unencrypted addresses if the
>>>>>>>> + * device does not support DMA to addresses that include the
>>>>>>>> + * encryption mask.
>>>>>>>> + */
>>>>>>>> + if (sme_active()) {
>>>>>>>> + u64 dma_enc_mask = DMA_BIT_MASK(__ffs64(sme_me_mask));
>>>>>>>> + u64 dma_dev_mask = min_not_zero(dev->coherent_dma_mask,
>>>>>>>> + dev->bus_dma_mask);
>>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>>> + if (dma_dev_mask <= dma_enc_mask)
>>>>>>>> + return true;
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Hm. What is wrong with the dev mask being equal to enc mask? IIUC, it
>>>>>>> means that device mask is wide enough to cover encryption bit, doesn't it?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Not really... it's the way DMA_BIT_MASK works vs bit numbering. Let's say
>>>>>> that sme_me_mask has bit 47 set. __ffs64 returns 47 and DMA_BIT_MASK(47)
>>>>>> will generate a mask without bit 47 set (0x7fffffffffff). So the check
>>>>>> will catch anything that does not support at least 48-bit DMA.
>>>>>
>>>>> Couldn't that be expressed as just:
>>>>>
>>>>> if (sme_me_mask & dma_dev_mask == sme_me_mask)
>>>>
>>>> Actually !=, but yes, it could have been done like that, I just didn't
>>>> think of it.
>>>
>>> I'm looking into generalizing the check to cover MKTME.
>>>
>>> Leaving off the Kconfig changes and moving the check to other file, doest
>>> the change below look reasonable to you. It's only build tested so far.
>>>
>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
>>> index fece30ca8b0c..6c86adcd02da 100644
>>> --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
>>> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
>>> @@ -355,6 +355,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(sev_active);
>>> /* Override for DMA direct allocation check - ARCH_HAS_FORCE_DMA_UNENCRYPTED */
>>> bool force_dma_unencrypted(struct device *dev)
>>> {
>>> + u64 dma_enc_mask;
>>> +
>>> /*
>>> * For SEV, all DMA must be to unencrypted addresses.
>>> */
>>> @@ -362,18 +364,20 @@ bool force_dma_unencrypted(struct device *dev)
>>> return true;
>>>
>>> /*
>>> - * For SME, all DMA must be to unencrypted addresses if the
>>> - * device does not support DMA to addresses that include the
>>> - * encryption mask.
>>> + * For SME and MKTME, all DMA must be to unencrypted addresses if the
>>> + * device does not support DMA to addresses that include the encryption
>>> + * mask.
>>> */
>>> - if (sme_active()) {
>>> - u64 dma_enc_mask = DMA_BIT_MASK(__ffs64(sme_me_mask));
>>> - u64 dma_dev_mask = min_not_zero(dev->coherent_dma_mask,
>>> - dev->bus_dma_mask);
>>> + if (!sme_active() && !mktme_enabled())
>>> + return false;
>>>
>>> - if (dma_dev_mask <= dma_enc_mask)
>>> - return true;
>>> - }
>>> + dma_enc_mask = sme_me_mask | mktme_keyid_mask();
>>> +
>>> + if (dev->coherent_dma_mask && (dev->coherent_dma_mask & dma_enc_mask) != dma_enc_mask)
>>> + return true;
>>> +
>>> + if (dev->bus_dma_mask && (dev->bus_dma_mask & dma_enc_mask) != dma_enc_mask)
>>> + return true;
>>
>> Do you want to err on the side of caution and return true if both masks
>> are zero? You could do the min_not_zero step and then return true if the
>> result is zero. Then just make the one comparison against dma_enc_mask.
>
> Something like this?
Yup, looks good.
Thanks,
Tom
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
> index fece30ca8b0c..173d68b08c55 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
> @@ -355,6 +355,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(sev_active);
> /* Override for DMA direct allocation check - ARCH_HAS_FORCE_DMA_UNENCRYPTED */
> bool force_dma_unencrypted(struct device *dev)
> {
> + u64 dma_enc_mask, dma_dev_mask;
> +
> /*
> * For SEV, all DMA must be to unencrypted addresses.
> */
> @@ -362,20 +364,17 @@ bool force_dma_unencrypted(struct device *dev)
> return true;
>
> /*
> - * For SME, all DMA must be to unencrypted addresses if the
> - * device does not support DMA to addresses that include the
> - * encryption mask.
> + * For SME and MKTME, all DMA must be to unencrypted addresses if the
> + * device does not support DMA to addresses that include the encryption
> + * mask.
> */
> - if (sme_active()) {
> - u64 dma_enc_mask = DMA_BIT_MASK(__ffs64(sme_me_mask));
> - u64 dma_dev_mask = min_not_zero(dev->coherent_dma_mask,
> - dev->bus_dma_mask);
> + if (!sme_active() && !mktme_enabled())
> + return false;
>
> - if (dma_dev_mask <= dma_enc_mask)
> - return true;
> - }
> + dma_enc_mask = sme_me_mask | mktme_keyid_mask();
> + dma_dev_mask = min_not_zero(dev->coherent_dma_mask, dev->bus_dma_mask);
>
> - return false;
> + return (dma_dev_mask & dma_enc_mask) != dma_enc_mask;
> }
>
> /* Architecture __weak replacement functions */
>
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