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Date:   Wed, 24 Jul 2019 18:49:09 +0000
From:   "Lendacky, Thomas" <Thomas.Lendacky@....com>
To:     "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@...temov.name>
CC:     Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@....com>,
        "iommu@...ts.linux-foundation.org" <iommu@...ts.linux-foundation.org>,
        "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        "x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>, Christoph Hellwig <hch@....de>,
        Marek Szyprowski <m.szyprowski@...sung.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Lianbo Jiang <lijiang@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] dma-direct: Force unencrypted DMA under SME for certain
 DMA masks

On 7/24/19 1:40 PM, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> On Wed, Jul 24, 2019 at 06:30:21PM +0000, Lendacky, Thomas wrote:
>> On 7/24/19 1:11 PM, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
>>> On Wed, Jul 24, 2019 at 05:34:26PM +0000, Lendacky, Thomas wrote:
>>>> On 7/24/19 12:06 PM, Robin Murphy wrote:
>>>>> On 24/07/2019 17:42, Lendacky, Thomas wrote:
>>>>>> On 7/24/19 10:55 AM, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
>>>>>>> On Wed, Jul 10, 2019 at 07:01:19PM +0000, Lendacky, Thomas wrote:
>>>>>>>> @@ -351,6 +355,32 @@ bool sev_active(void)
>>>>>>>>   }
>>>>>>>>   EXPORT_SYMBOL(sev_active);
>>>>>>>>   +/* Override for DMA direct allocation check -
>>>>>>>> ARCH_HAS_FORCE_DMA_UNENCRYPTED */
>>>>>>>> +bool force_dma_unencrypted(struct device *dev)
>>>>>>>> +{
>>>>>>>> +    /*
>>>>>>>> +     * For SEV, all DMA must be to unencrypted addresses.
>>>>>>>> +     */
>>>>>>>> +    if (sev_active())
>>>>>>>> +        return true;
>>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>>> +    /*
>>>>>>>> +     * For SME, all DMA must be to unencrypted addresses if the
>>>>>>>> +     * device does not support DMA to addresses that include the
>>>>>>>> +     * encryption mask.
>>>>>>>> +     */
>>>>>>>> +    if (sme_active()) {
>>>>>>>> +        u64 dma_enc_mask = DMA_BIT_MASK(__ffs64(sme_me_mask));
>>>>>>>> +        u64 dma_dev_mask = min_not_zero(dev->coherent_dma_mask,
>>>>>>>> +                        dev->bus_dma_mask);
>>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>>> +        if (dma_dev_mask <= dma_enc_mask)
>>>>>>>> +            return true;
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Hm. What is wrong with the dev mask being equal to enc mask? IIUC, it
>>>>>>> means that device mask is wide enough to cover encryption bit, doesn't it?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Not really...  it's the way DMA_BIT_MASK works vs bit numbering. Let's say
>>>>>> that sme_me_mask has bit 47 set. __ffs64 returns 47 and DMA_BIT_MASK(47)
>>>>>> will generate a mask without bit 47 set (0x7fffffffffff). So the check
>>>>>> will catch anything that does not support at least 48-bit DMA.
>>>>>
>>>>> Couldn't that be expressed as just:
>>>>>
>>>>>     if (sme_me_mask & dma_dev_mask == sme_me_mask)
>>>>
>>>> Actually !=, but yes, it could have been done like that, I just didn't
>>>> think of it.
>>>
>>> I'm looking into generalizing the check to cover MKTME.
>>>
>>> Leaving	off the Kconfig changes and moving the check to other file, doest
>>> the change below look reasonable to you. It's only build tested so far.
>>>
>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
>>> index fece30ca8b0c..6c86adcd02da 100644
>>> --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
>>> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
>>> @@ -355,6 +355,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(sev_active);
>>>  /* Override for DMA direct allocation check - ARCH_HAS_FORCE_DMA_UNENCRYPTED */
>>>  bool force_dma_unencrypted(struct device *dev)
>>>  {
>>> +	u64 dma_enc_mask;
>>> +
>>>  	/*
>>>  	 * For SEV, all DMA must be to unencrypted addresses.
>>>  	 */
>>> @@ -362,18 +364,20 @@ bool force_dma_unencrypted(struct device *dev)
>>>  		return true;
>>>  
>>>  	/*
>>> -	 * For SME, all DMA must be to unencrypted addresses if the
>>> -	 * device does not support DMA to addresses that include the
>>> -	 * encryption mask.
>>> +	 * For SME and MKTME, all DMA must be to unencrypted addresses if the
>>> +	 * device does not support DMA to addresses that include the encryption
>>> +	 * mask.
>>>  	 */
>>> -	if (sme_active()) {
>>> -		u64 dma_enc_mask = DMA_BIT_MASK(__ffs64(sme_me_mask));
>>> -		u64 dma_dev_mask = min_not_zero(dev->coherent_dma_mask,
>>> -						dev->bus_dma_mask);
>>> +	if (!sme_active() && !mktme_enabled())
>>> +		return false;
>>>  
>>> -		if (dma_dev_mask <= dma_enc_mask)
>>> -			return true;
>>> -	}
>>> +	dma_enc_mask = sme_me_mask | mktme_keyid_mask();
>>> +
>>> +	if (dev->coherent_dma_mask && (dev->coherent_dma_mask & dma_enc_mask) != dma_enc_mask)
>>> +		return true;
>>> +
>>> +	if (dev->bus_dma_mask && (dev->bus_dma_mask & dma_enc_mask) != dma_enc_mask)
>>> +		return true;
>>
>> Do you want to err on the side of caution and return true if both masks
>> are zero? You could do the min_not_zero step and then return true if the
>> result is zero. Then just make the one comparison against dma_enc_mask.
> 
> Something like this?

Yup, looks good.

Thanks,
Tom

> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
> index fece30ca8b0c..173d68b08c55 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
> @@ -355,6 +355,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(sev_active);
>  /* Override for DMA direct allocation check - ARCH_HAS_FORCE_DMA_UNENCRYPTED */
>  bool force_dma_unencrypted(struct device *dev)
>  {
> +	u64 dma_enc_mask, dma_dev_mask;
> +
>  	/*
>  	 * For SEV, all DMA must be to unencrypted addresses.
>  	 */
> @@ -362,20 +364,17 @@ bool force_dma_unencrypted(struct device *dev)
>  		return true;
>  
>  	/*
> -	 * For SME, all DMA must be to unencrypted addresses if the
> -	 * device does not support DMA to addresses that include the
> -	 * encryption mask.
> +	 * For SME and MKTME, all DMA must be to unencrypted addresses if the
> +	 * device does not support DMA to addresses that include the encryption
> +	 * mask.
>  	 */
> -	if (sme_active()) {
> -		u64 dma_enc_mask = DMA_BIT_MASK(__ffs64(sme_me_mask));
> -		u64 dma_dev_mask = min_not_zero(dev->coherent_dma_mask,
> -						dev->bus_dma_mask);
> +	if (!sme_active() && !mktme_enabled())
> +		return false;
>  
> -		if (dma_dev_mask <= dma_enc_mask)
> -			return true;
> -	}
> +	dma_enc_mask = sme_me_mask | mktme_keyid_mask();
> +	dma_dev_mask = min_not_zero(dev->coherent_dma_mask, dev->bus_dma_mask);
>  
> -	return false;
> +	return (dma_dev_mask & dma_enc_mask) != dma_enc_mask;
>  }
>  
>  /* Architecture __weak replacement functions */
> 

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