linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v10 4/5] overlayfs: internal getxattr operations without sepolicy checking

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <CAOQ4uxhE77ZvUBv_ZLhSf8fdsWcJJkewjZAQKbgw3BdvgjRUOA@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Thu, 25 Jul 2019 18:51:36 +0300
From:   Amir Goldstein <amir73il@...il.com>
To:     Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@...roid.com>
Cc:     linux-kernel <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        kernel-team@...roid.com, Miklos Szeredi <miklos@...redi.hu>,
        Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
        Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@...hat.com>,
        "Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
        Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>,
        Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>,
        overlayfs <linux-unionfs@...r.kernel.org>,
        linux-doc@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 4/5] overlayfs: internal getxattr operations without
 sepolicy checking

On Thu, Jul 25, 2019 at 5:37 PM Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@...roid.com> wrote:
>
> Thanks for the review.
>
> On 7/25/19 4:00 AM, Amir Goldstein wrote:
> > On Wed, Jul 24, 2019 at 10:57 PM Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@...roid.com> wrote:
> >> Check impure, opaque, origin & meta xattr with no sepolicy audit
> >> (using __vfs_getxattr) since these operations are internal to
> >> overlayfs operations and do not disclose any data.  This became
> >> an issue for credential override off since sys_admin would have
> >> been required by the caller; whereas would have been inherently
> >> present for the creator since it performed the mount.
> >>
> >> This is a change in operations since we do not check in the new
> >> ovl_vfs_getxattr function if the credential override is off or
> >> not.  Reasoning is that the sepolicy check is unnecessary overhead,
> >> especially since the check can be expensive.
> > I don't know that this reasoning suffice to skip the sepolicy checks
> > for overlayfs private xattrs.
> > Can't sepolicy be defined to allow get access to trusted.overlay.*?
>
> Because for override credentials off, _everyone_ would need it (at least
> on Android, the sole user AFAIK, and only on userdebug builds, not user
> builds), and if everyone is special, and possibly including the random
> applications we add from the play store, then no one is ...
>

OK. I am convinced.

One weak argument in favor of the patch:
ecryptfs also uses __vfs_getxattr for private xattrs.

Thanks,
Amir.