linux-kernel - Re: Regression in 5.3 for some FS_USERNS_MOUNT (aka user-namespace-mountable) filesystems

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <20190727131717.GQ1131@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Date:   Sat, 27 Jul 2019 14:17:17 +0100
From:   Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>
To:     "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
Cc:     Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Christian Brauner <christian@...uner.io>,
        Linux List Kernel Mailing <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
        Miklos Szeredi <miklos@...redi.hu>,
        linux-fsdevel <linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: Regression in 5.3 for some FS_USERNS_MOUNT (aka
 user-namespace-mountable) filesystems

On Sat, Jul 27, 2019 at 01:37:05PM +0100, Al Viro wrote:

> > So yes I agree the function of interest is always capable in some form,
> > we just need the filesystem specific logic to check to see if we will
> > have capable over the filesystem that will be mounted.
> > 
> > I don't doubt that the new mount api has added a few new complexities.
> 
> So far it looks like *in this particular case* complexities would be
> reduced - with one exception all your ->permission() instances become
> identical.
> 
> Moreover, even in that case we still get the right overall behaviour
> with the same instance...

PS: For the record

	* I obviously agree with your reasoning behind making those checks
fs-dependent (they have to) and with putting them (back then) into
->mount() instances (since that was the first method called)
	* I agree (violently) with not liking them done inside ->mount().
	* in principle I agree that the stuff like "can that thing
be mounted in non-initial userns" might better off as a method rather
than a flag.

However
	* these days filesystem *can* have "which userns should the
capabilities be checked for?" handled outside ->mount().  Setting
fc->user_ns in ->init_fs_context() does just that; the thing is
called first in all cases.
	* with that done we get the same logics for all FS_USERNS_MOUNT
filesystems.  IOW, all your ->permission() methods would either become
NULL (for !FS_USERNS_MOUNT) or, for all non-NULL, identical to each other.
All variability between them is already taken care of when we set fc->user_ns.

The last one is what makes me somewhat dubious re having that method -
it's literally one bit of information encoded into a function pointer.
Do you anticipate any cases where the thing would *NOT* be of the same
form?  I.e. when something is userns-mountable, but the check is not
ns_capable(some userns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)?

While we are at it, kobj_ns_...() look like preparations to something
that has never fully materialized.  What would sysfs mount checks be
supposed to do if we'd ever grown more than one struct kobj_ns_type_operations
instance?  Because that looks like the most plausible case of "we might
need trickier ->permission()"...