linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH V36 23/29] bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode

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Message-ID: <CACdnJuvFBQCpR4hk1YBQ2HSxJcweB0_XBqYZxn=LpG6NFU7S6w@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Mon, 29 Jul 2019 14:47:03 -0700
From:   Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...gle.com>
To:     James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>
Cc:     LSM List <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
        Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>,
        David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
        Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@...il.com>,
        Network Development <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
        Chun-Yi Lee <jlee@...e.com>,
        Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>
Subject: Re: [PATCH V36 23/29] bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in
 confidentiality mode

On Thu, Jul 18, 2019 at 12:45 PM Matthew Garrett
<matthewgarrett@...gle.com> wrote:
> bpf_read() and bpf_read_str() could potentially be abused to (eg) allow
> private keys in kernel memory to be leaked. Disable them if the kernel
> has been locked down in confidentiality mode.
>
> Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@...il.com>
> Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...gle.com>
> cc: netdev@...r.kernel.org
> cc: Chun-Yi Lee <jlee@...e.com>
> cc: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@...il.com>
> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>

Any further feedback on this?