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Message-ID: <52fa2cfc-f7a6-af6f-0dc2-f9ea0e41ac3c@arm.com>
Date:   Tue, 30 Jul 2019 11:32:09 +0100
From:   Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@....com>
To:     Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@....com>,
        linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-mm@...ck.org, linux-arch@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Szabolcs Nagy <szabolcs.nagy@....com>,
        Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
        Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>,
        Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...gle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 1/2] arm64: Define
 Documentation/arm64/tagged-address-abi.rst

Some more comments. Mostly minor wording issues, except the prctl() exclusion at the end.

On 25/07/2019 14:50, Vincenzo Frascino wrote:
> On arm64 the TCR_EL1.TBI0 bit has been always enabled hence
> the userspace (EL0) is allowed to set a non-zero value in the
> top byte but the resulting pointers are not allowed at the
> user-kernel syscall ABI boundary.
>
> With the relaxed ABI proposed through this document, it is now possible
> to pass tagged pointers to the syscalls, when these pointers are in
> memory ranges obtained by an anonymous (MAP_ANONYMOUS) mmap().
>
> This change in the ABI requires a mechanism to requires the userspace
> to opt-in to such an option.
>
> Specify and document the way in which sysctl and prctl() can be used
> in combination to allow the userspace to opt-in this feature.
>
> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>
> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>
> CC: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...gle.com>
> Signed-off-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@....com>
> Acked-by: Szabolcs Nagy <szabolcs.nagy@....com>
> ---
>   Documentation/arm64/tagged-address-abi.rst | 148 +++++++++++++++++++++
>   1 file changed, 148 insertions(+)
>   create mode 100644 Documentation/arm64/tagged-address-abi.rst
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/arm64/tagged-address-abi.rst b/Documentation/arm64/tagged-address-abi.rst
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..a8ecb991de82
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/Documentation/arm64/tagged-address-abi.rst
> @@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
> +========================
> +ARM64 TAGGED ADDRESS ABI
> +========================
> +
> +Author: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@....com>
> +
> +Date: 25 July 2019
> +
> +This document describes the usage and semantics of the Tagged Address
> +ABI on arm64.
> +
> +1. Introduction
> +---------------
> +
> +On arm64 the TCR_EL1.TBI0 bit has always been enabled on the kernel, hence
> +the userspace (EL0) is entitled to perform a user memory access through a
> +64-bit pointer with a non-zero top byte but the resulting pointers are not
> +allowed at the user-kernel syscall ABI boundary.
> +
> +This document describes a relaxation of the ABI that makes it possible to
> +to pass tagged pointers to the syscalls, when these pointers are in memory

One too many "to" (at the end the previous line).

> +ranges obtained as described in section 2.
> +
> +Since it is not desirable to relax the ABI to allow tagged user addresses
> +into the kernel indiscriminately, arm64 provides a new sysctl interface
> +(/proc/sys/abi/tagged_addr) that is used to prevent the applications from
> +enabling the relaxed ABI and a new prctl() interface that can be used to
> +enable or disable the relaxed ABI.
> +A detailed description of the newly introduced mechanisms will be provided
> +in section 2.
> +
> +2. ARM64 Tagged Address ABI
> +---------------------------
> +
> +From the kernel syscall interface perspective, we define, for the purposes
> +of this document, a "valid tagged pointer" as a pointer that either has a
> +zero value set in the top byte or has a non-zero value, is in memory ranges
> +privately owned by a userspace process and is obtained in one of the
> +following ways:
> +- mmap() done by the process itself, where either:
> +
> +  - flags have **MAP_PRIVATE** and **MAP_ANONYMOUS**
> +  - flags have **MAP_PRIVATE** and the file descriptor refers to a regular
> +    file or **/dev/zero**
> +
> +- brk() system call done by the process itself (i.e. the heap area between
> +  the initial location of the program break at process creation and its
> +  current location).
> +- any memory mapped by the kernel in the process's address space during
> +  creation and with the same restrictions as for mmap() (e.g. data, bss,
> +  stack).
> +
> +The ARM64 Tagged Address ABI is an opt-in feature, and an application can
> +control it using the following:
> +
> +- **/proc/sys/abi/tagged_addr**: a new sysctl interface that can be used to
> +  prevent the applications from enabling the access to the relaxed ABI.
> +  The sysctl supports the following configuration options:
> +
> +  - **0**: Disable the access to the ARM64 Tagged Address ABI for all
> +    the applications.
> +  - **1** (Default): Enable the access to the ARM64 Tagged Address ABI for
> +    all the applications.
> +
> +   If the access to the ARM64 Tagged Address ABI is disabled at a certain
> +   point in time, all the applications that were using tagging before this
> +   event occurs, will continue to use tagging.

"tagging" may be misinterpreted here. I would be more explicit by saying that the 
tagged address ABI remains enabled in processes that opted in before the access got 
disabled.

> +- **prctl()s**:
> +
> +  - **PR_SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL**: Invoked by a process, can be used to enable or
> +    disable its access to the ARM64 Tagged Address ABI.

I still find the wording confusing, because "access to the ABI" is not used 
consistently. The "tagged_addr" sysctl enables *access to the ABI*, that's fine. 
However, PR_SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL enables *the ABI itself* (which is only possible if 
access to the ABI is enabled).

> +
> +    The (unsigned int) arg2 argument is a bit mask describing the control mode
> +    used:
> +
> +    - **PR_TAGGED_ADDR_ENABLE**: Enable ARM64 Tagged Address ABI.
> +
> +    The prctl(PR_SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL, ...) will return -EINVAL if the ARM64
> +    Tagged Address ABI is not available.

For clarity, it would be good to mention that one possible reason for the ABI not to 
be available is tagged_addr == 0.

> +
> +    The arguments arg3, arg4, and arg5 are ignored.
> +  - **PR_GET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL**: can be used to check the status of the Tagged
> +    Address ABI.
> +
> +    The arguments arg2, arg3, arg4, and arg5 are ignored.
> +
> +The ABI properties set by the mechanisms described above are inherited by threads
> +of the same application and fork()'ed children but cleared by execve().
> +
> +When a process has successfully opted into the new ABI by invoking
> +PR_SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL prctl(), this guarantees the following behaviours:
> +
> + - Every currently available syscall, except the cases mentioned in section 3, can
> +   accept any valid tagged pointer. The same rule is applicable to any syscall
> +   introduced in the future.

I thought Catalin wanted to drop this guarantee?

> + - If a non valid tagged pointer is passed to a syscall then the behaviour
> +   is undefined.
> + - Every valid tagged pointer is expected to work as an untagged one.
> + - The kernel preserves any valid tagged pointer and returns it to the
> +   userspace unchanged (i.e. on syscall return) in all the cases except the
> +   ones documented in the "Preserving tags" section of tagged-pointers.txt.
> +
> +A definition of the meaning of tagged pointers on arm64 can be found in:
> +Documentation/arm64/tagged-pointers.txt.
> +
> +3. ARM64 Tagged Address ABI Exceptions
> +--------------------------------------
> +
> +The behaviours described in section 2, with particular reference to the
> +acceptance by the syscalls of any valid tagged pointer are not applicable
> +to the following cases:
> +
> + - mmap() addr parameter.
> + - mremap() new_address parameter.
> + - prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_MAP, ...) struct prctl_mm_map fields.
> + - prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_MAP_SIZE, ...) struct prctl_mm_map fields.

All the PR_SET_MM options that specify pointers (PR_SET_MM_START_CODE, 
PR_SET_MM_END_CODE, ...) should be excluded as well. AFAICT (but don't take my word 
for it), that's all of them except PR_SET_MM_EXE_FILE. Conversely, PR_SET_MM_MAP_SIZE 
should not be excluded (it does not pass a prctl_mm_map struct, and the pointer to 
unsigned int can be tagged).

Kevin

> +
> +Any attempt to use non-zero tagged pointers will lead to undefined behaviour.
> +
> +4. Example of correct usage
> +---------------------------
> +.. code-block:: c
> +
> +   void main(void)
> +   {
> +           static int tbi_enabled = 0;
> +           unsigned long tag = 0;
> +
> +           char *ptr = mmap(NULL, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
> +                            MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);
> +
> +           if (prctl(PR_SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL, PR_TAGGED_ADDR_ENABLE,
> +                     0, 0, 0) == 0)
> +                   tbi_enabled = 1;
> +
> +           if (ptr == (void *)-1) /* MAP_FAILED */
> +                   return -1;
> +
> +           if (tbi_enabled)
> +                   tag = rand() & 0xff;
> +
> +           ptr = (char *)((unsigned long)ptr | (tag << TAG_SHIFT));
> +
> +           *ptr = 'a';
> +
> +           ...
> +   }
> +

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