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Message-ID: <20190731185457.GA21407@embeddedor>
Date: Wed, 31 Jul 2019 13:54:57 -0500
From: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@...eddedor.com>
To: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@...data.co.jp>,
Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.SAKURA.ne.jp>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
"Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@...eddedor.com>
Subject: [PATCH] tomoyo: common: Fix potential Spectre v1 vulnerability
profile is controlled by user-space via /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/profile,
hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1
vulnerability.
This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
security/tomoyo/common.c:498 tomoyo_assign_profile() warn: potential spectre issue 'ns->profile_ptr' [r] (local cap)
security/tomoyo/common.c:499 tomoyo_assign_profile() warn: possible spectre second half. 'ptr'
security/tomoyo/common.c:505 tomoyo_assign_profile() warn: possible spectre second half. 'ptr'
security/tomoyo/common.c:523 tomoyo_assign_profile() warn: possible spectre second half. 'ptr'
Fix this by sanitizing profile before using it to index ns->profile_ptr
Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20180423164740.GY17484@dhcp22.suse.cz/
Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@...eddedor.com>
---
security/tomoyo/common.c | 5 ++++-
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/common.c b/security/tomoyo/common.c
index dd3d5942e669..45858dbcfdb9 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/common.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/common.c
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
#include "common.h"
/* String table for operation mode. */
@@ -488,13 +489,15 @@ static void tomoyo_print_number_union(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head,
* Returns pointer to "struct tomoyo_profile" on success, NULL otherwise.
*/
static struct tomoyo_profile *tomoyo_assign_profile
-(struct tomoyo_policy_namespace *ns, const unsigned int profile)
+(struct tomoyo_policy_namespace *ns, unsigned int profile)
{
struct tomoyo_profile *ptr;
struct tomoyo_profile *entry;
if (profile >= TOMOYO_MAX_PROFILES)
return NULL;
+ profile = array_index_nospec(profile, TOMOYO_MAX_PROFILES);
+
ptr = ns->profile_ptr[profile];
if (ptr)
return ptr;
--
2.22.0
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