linux-kernel - Re: [RFC v2 0/6] Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys support

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Message-ID: <CAE=NcrYz8bT9zDhS_ZcvY84fpeTDxZ-KhJKeQGGyf=o4pG2J-Q@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Thu, 1 Aug 2019 09:36:44 +0300
From:   Janne Karhunen <janne.karhunen@...il.com>
To:     Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@...aro.org>
Cc:     keyrings@...r.kernel.org, linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
        Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@...aro.org>,
        Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>, dhowells@...hat.com,
        jejb@...ux.ibm.com,
        Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>,
        James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
        "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
        Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
        Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>,
        Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson@...aro.org>,
        Linux Doc Mailing List <linux-doc@...r.kernel.org>,
        Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        linux-arm-kernel <linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org>,
        "tee-dev @ lists . linaro . org" <tee-dev@...ts.linaro.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC v2 0/6] Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys support

On Wed, Jul 31, 2019 at 5:23 PM Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@...aro.org> wrote:

> > I guess my wording was wrong, tried to say that physical TEEs in the
> > wild vary massively hardware wise. Generalizing these things is rough.
> >
>
> There are already well defined GlobalPlatform Standards to generalize
> the TEE interface. One of them is GlobalPlatform TEE Client API [1]
> which provides the basis for this TEE interface.

I'm aware of it - I have implemented a large part of the GP TEE APIs
earlier (primarily the crypto functions). Does the TEE you work with
actually support GP properly? Can I take a look at the code?

Normally the TEE implementations are well-guarded secrets and the
state of the implementation is quite random. In many cases keeping
things secret is fine from my point of view, given that it is a RoT
after all. The secrecy is the core business here. So, this is why I
opted the userspace 'secret' route - no secrets in the kernel, but
it's fine for the userspace. Umh was a logical fit to implement it.

--
Janne