linux-kernel - Re: [Tee-dev] [RFC v2 0/6] Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys support

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Message-ID: <CAFA6WYPt4q+jaJbaoauXKr2qKgBHvtQ663s4t=W3nuPJPe2xpw@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Thu, 1 Aug 2019 13:28:32 +0530
From:   Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@...aro.org>
To:     Janne Karhunen <janne.karhunen@...il.com>
Cc:     Rouven Czerwinski <r.czerwinski@...gutronix.de>,
        "tee-dev @ lists . linaro . org" <tee-dev@...ts.linaro.org>,
        Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson@...aro.org>,
        Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>, jejb@...ux.ibm.com,
        Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>,
        Linux Doc Mailing List <linux-doc@...r.kernel.org>,
        Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        dhowells@...hat.com, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
        keyrings@...r.kernel.org, Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>,
        Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
        linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-arm-kernel <linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org>,
        "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>
Subject: Re: [Tee-dev] [RFC v2 0/6] Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys support

On Thu, 1 Aug 2019 at 13:00, Janne Karhunen <janne.karhunen@...il.com> wrote:
>
> On Thu, Aug 1, 2019 at 9:50 AM Rouven Czerwinski
> <r.czerwinski@...gutronix.de> wrote:
>
> > > I'm aware of it - I have implemented a large part of the GP TEE APIs
> > > earlier (primarily the crypto functions). Does the TEE you work with
> > > actually support GP properly? Can I take a look at the code?
> >
> > AFAIK Sumit is working with the OP-TEE implementation, which can be
> > found on github: https://github.com/op-tee/optee_os
>
> Thanks, I will take a look.

For documentation, refer to: https://optee.readthedocs.io/

> The fundamental problem with these things
> is that there are infinite amount of ways how TEEs and ROTs can be
> done in terms of the hardware and software. I really doubt there are 2
> implementations in existence that are even remotely compatible in real
> life.

I agree with you regarding implementation specific nature of TEE but
having a standardized client interface does solves the problem.

> As such, all things TEE/ROT would logically really belong in the
> userland and thanks to the bpfilter folks now the umh logic really
> makes that possible ... I think. The key implementation I did was just
> an RFC on the concept, what if we start to move the stuff that really
> belongs in the userspace to this pseudo-userland. It's not kernel, but
> it's not commonly accessible userland either. The shared memory would
> also work without any modifications between the umh based TEE/ROT
> driver and the userland if needed.
>
> Anyway, just my .02c. I guess having any new support in the kernel for
> new trust sources is good and improvement from the current state. I
> can certainly make my stuff work with your setup as well, what ever
> people think is the best.

Yes your implementation can very well fit under trusted keys
abstraction framework without creating a new keytype: "ext-trusted".

-Sumit

>
>
> --
> Janne