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Message-ID: <20190802194015.btthaf5ey4n64tzt@linux.intel.com>
Date: Fri, 2 Aug 2019 22:40:15 +0300
From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>
To: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>
Cc: jejb@...ux.ibm.com, zohar@...ux.ibm.com, jgg@...pe.ca,
linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, keyrings@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, crazyt2019+lml@...il.com,
tyhicks@...onical.com, nayna@...ux.vnet.ibm.com,
silviu.vlasceanu@...wei.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH] KEYS: trusted: allow module init if TPM is inactive or
deactivated
On Fri, Aug 02, 2019 at 10:21:16AM +0200, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> On 8/1/2019 6:32 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > On Mon, Jul 15, 2019 at 06:44:28PM +0200, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> > > According to the bug report at https://bugs.archlinux.org/task/62678,
> > > the trusted module is a dependency of the ecryptfs module. We should
> > > load the trusted module even if the TPM is inactive or deactivated.
> > >
> > > Given that commit 782779b60faa ("tpm: Actually fail on TPM errors during
> > > "get random"") changes the return code of tpm_get_random(), the patch
> > > should be modified to ignore the -EIO error. I will send a new version.
> >
> > Do you have information where this dependency comes from?
>
> ecryptfs retrieves the encryption key from encrypted keys (see
> ecryptfs_get_encrypted_key()).
So... what is preventing removing this requirement "in the source"?
/Jarkko
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