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Message-Id: <20190802092246.560585727@linuxfoundation.org>
Date: Fri, 2 Aug 2019 11:35:38 +0200
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
stable@...r.kernel.org, Horia Geanta <horia.geanta@....com>,
Iuliana Prodan <iuliana.prodan@....com>,
Sascha Hauer <s.hauer@...gutronix.de>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>,
Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>
Subject: [PATCH 4.9 113/223] crypto: caam - limit output IV to CBC to work around CTR mode DMA issue
From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>
commit ed527b13d800dd515a9e6c582f0a73eca65b2e1b upstream.
The CAAM driver currently violates an undocumented and slightly
controversial requirement imposed by the crypto stack that a buffer
referred to by the request structure via its virtual address may not
be modified while any scatterlists passed via the same request
structure are mapped for inbound DMA.
This may result in errors like
alg: aead: decryption failed on test 1 for gcm_base(ctr-aes-caam,ghash-generic): ret=74
alg: aead: Failed to load transform for gcm(aes): -2
on non-cache coherent systems, due to the fact that the GCM driver
passes an IV buffer by virtual address which shares a cacheline with
the auth_tag buffer passed via a scatterlist, resulting in corruption
of the auth_tag when the IV is updated while the DMA mapping is live.
Since the IV that is returned to the caller is only valid for CBC mode,
and given that the in-kernel users of CBC (such as CTS) don't trigger the
same issue as the GCM driver, let's just disable the output IV generation
for all modes except CBC for the time being.
Fixes: 854b06f76879 ("crypto: caam - properly set IV after {en,de}crypt")
Cc: Horia Geanta <horia.geanta@....com>
Cc: Iuliana Prodan <iuliana.prodan@....com>
Reported-by: Sascha Hauer <s.hauer@...gutronix.de>
Cc: <stable@...r.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>
Reviewed-by: Horia Geanta <horia.geanta@....com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>
[ Horia: backported to 4.9 ]
Signed-off-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@....com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg.c | 16 ++++++++++------
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg.c
@@ -2015,6 +2015,7 @@ static void ablkcipher_encrypt_done(stru
struct ablkcipher_request *req = context;
struct ablkcipher_edesc *edesc;
struct crypto_ablkcipher *ablkcipher = crypto_ablkcipher_reqtfm(req);
+ struct caam_ctx *ctx = crypto_ablkcipher_ctx(ablkcipher);
int ivsize = crypto_ablkcipher_ivsize(ablkcipher);
#ifdef DEBUG
@@ -2040,10 +2041,11 @@ static void ablkcipher_encrypt_done(stru
/*
* The crypto API expects us to set the IV (req->info) to the last
- * ciphertext block. This is used e.g. by the CTS mode.
+ * ciphertext block when running in CBC mode.
*/
- scatterwalk_map_and_copy(req->info, req->dst, req->nbytes - ivsize,
- ivsize, 0);
+ if ((ctx->class1_alg_type & OP_ALG_AAI_MASK) == OP_ALG_AAI_CBC)
+ scatterwalk_map_and_copy(req->info, req->dst, req->nbytes -
+ ivsize, ivsize, 0);
kfree(edesc);
@@ -2056,6 +2058,7 @@ static void ablkcipher_decrypt_done(stru
struct ablkcipher_request *req = context;
struct ablkcipher_edesc *edesc;
struct crypto_ablkcipher *ablkcipher = crypto_ablkcipher_reqtfm(req);
+ struct caam_ctx *ctx = crypto_ablkcipher_ctx(ablkcipher);
int ivsize = crypto_ablkcipher_ivsize(ablkcipher);
#ifdef DEBUG
@@ -2080,10 +2083,11 @@ static void ablkcipher_decrypt_done(stru
/*
* The crypto API expects us to set the IV (req->info) to the last
- * ciphertext block.
+ * ciphertext block when running in CBC mode.
*/
- scatterwalk_map_and_copy(req->info, req->src, req->nbytes - ivsize,
- ivsize, 0);
+ if ((ctx->class1_alg_type & OP_ALG_AAI_MASK) == OP_ALG_AAI_CBC)
+ scatterwalk_map_and_copy(req->info, req->src, req->nbytes -
+ ivsize, ivsize, 0);
kfree(edesc);
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