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Message-ID: <87blx3n0a2.fsf@xmission.com>
Date: Mon, 05 Aug 2019 09:40:21 -0500
From: ebiederm@...ssion.com (Eric W. Biederman)
To: Jiri Kosina <jikos@...nel.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
security@...nel.org, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@...nel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] Documentation/admin-guide: Embargoed hardware security issues
I skimmed this and a couple things jumped out at me.
1) PGP and S/MIME because of their use of long term keys do not provide
forward secrecy. Which can makes it worth while to cryptographically
factor a key or to obtain knowledge of a private key without the key
holders knowledge. As the keys will be used again and again over a
long period of time.
More recent protocol's such as Signal's Double Ratchet Protocol
enable forward secrecy for store and foward communications, and
remove the problem of long term keys.
2) The existence of such a process with encrypted communications to
ensure long term confidentiality is going to make our contact people
the targets of people who want access to knolwedge about hardware
bugs like meltdown, before they become public.
I am just mentioning these things in case they are not immediately
obvious to everyone else involved, so that people can be certain
they are comfortable with the tradeoffs being made.
Eric
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