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Message-Id: <20190805124939.857760420@linuxfoundation.org>
Date: Mon, 5 Aug 2019 15:03:02 +0200
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
stable@...r.kernel.org,
"Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@...eddedor.com>,
Doug Ledford <dledford@...hat.com>
Subject: [PATCH 4.19 49/74] IB/hfi1: Fix Spectre v1 vulnerability
From: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@...eddedor.com>
commit 6497d0a9c53df6e98b25e2b79f2295d7caa47b6e upstream.
sl is controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential
exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
Fix this by sanitizing sl before using it to index ibp->sl_to_sc.
Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20180423164740.GY17484@dhcp22.suse.cz/
Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@...eddedor.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190731175428.GA16736@embeddedor
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@...hat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/infiniband/hw/hfi1/verbs.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/infiniband/hw/hfi1/verbs.c
+++ b/drivers/infiniband/hw/hfi1/verbs.c
@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
#include <rdma/opa_addr.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
#include "hfi.h"
#include "common.h"
@@ -1596,6 +1597,7 @@ static int hfi1_check_ah(struct ib_devic
sl = rdma_ah_get_sl(ah_attr);
if (sl >= ARRAY_SIZE(ibp->sl_to_sc))
return -EINVAL;
+ sl = array_index_nospec(sl, ARRAY_SIZE(ibp->sl_to_sc));
sc5 = ibp->sl_to_sc[sl];
if (sc_to_vlt(dd, sc5) > num_vls && sc_to_vlt(dd, sc5) != 0xf)
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