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Message-ID: <20190806184227.GB27725@kroah.com>
Date: Tue, 6 Aug 2019 20:42:27 +0200
From: Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
torvalds@...ux-foundation.org, stable@...r.kernel.org
Cc: lwn@....net, Jiri Slaby <jslaby@...e.cz>
Subject: Re: Linux 4.14.137
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
index 25f3b2532198..e05e581af5cf 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
@@ -41,10 +41,11 @@ Related CVEs
The following CVE entries describe Spectre variants:
- ============= ======================= =================
+ ============= ======================= ==========================
CVE-2017-5753 Bounds check bypass Spectre variant 1
CVE-2017-5715 Branch target injection Spectre variant 2
- ============= ======================= =================
+ CVE-2019-1125 Spectre v1 swapgs Spectre variant 1 (swapgs)
+ ============= ======================= ==========================
Problem
-------
@@ -78,6 +79,13 @@ There are some extensions of Spectre variant 1 attacks for reading data
over the network, see :ref:`[12] <spec_ref12>`. However such attacks
are difficult, low bandwidth, fragile, and are considered low risk.
+Note that, despite "Bounds Check Bypass" name, Spectre variant 1 is not
+only about user-controlled array bounds checks. It can affect any
+conditional checks. The kernel entry code interrupt, exception, and NMI
+handlers all have conditional swapgs checks. Those may be problematic
+in the context of Spectre v1, as kernel code can speculatively run with
+a user GS.
+
Spectre variant 2 (Branch Target Injection)
-------------------------------------------
@@ -132,6 +140,9 @@ not cover all possible attack vectors.
1. A user process attacking the kernel
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+Spectre variant 1
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
The attacker passes a parameter to the kernel via a register or
via a known address in memory during a syscall. Such parameter may
be used later by the kernel as an index to an array or to derive
@@ -144,7 +155,40 @@ not cover all possible attack vectors.
potentially be influenced for Spectre attacks, new "nospec" accessor
macros are used to prevent speculative loading of data.
- Spectre variant 2 attacker can :ref:`poison <poison_btb>` the branch
+Spectre variant 1 (swapgs)
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+ An attacker can train the branch predictor to speculatively skip the
+ swapgs path for an interrupt or exception. If they initialize
+ the GS register to a user-space value, if the swapgs is speculatively
+ skipped, subsequent GS-related percpu accesses in the speculation
+ window will be done with the attacker-controlled GS value. This
+ could cause privileged memory to be accessed and leaked.
+
+ For example:
+
+ ::
+
+ if (coming from user space)
+ swapgs
+ mov %gs:<percpu_offset>, %reg
+ mov (%reg), %reg1
+
+ When coming from user space, the CPU can speculatively skip the
+ swapgs, and then do a speculative percpu load using the user GS
+ value. So the user can speculatively force a read of any kernel
+ value. If a gadget exists which uses the percpu value as an address
+ in another load/store, then the contents of the kernel value may
+ become visible via an L1 side channel attack.
+
+ A similar attack exists when coming from kernel space. The CPU can
+ speculatively do the swapgs, causing the user GS to get used for the
+ rest of the speculative window.
+
+Spectre variant 2
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+ A spectre variant 2 attacker can :ref:`poison <poison_btb>` the branch
target buffer (BTB) before issuing syscall to launch an attack.
After entering the kernel, the kernel could use the poisoned branch
target buffer on indirect jump and jump to gadget code in speculative
@@ -280,11 +324,18 @@ The sysfs file showing Spectre variant 1 mitigation status is:
The possible values in this file are:
- ======================================= =================================
- 'Mitigation: __user pointer sanitation' Protection in kernel on a case by
- case base with explicit pointer
- sanitation.
- ======================================= =================================
+ .. list-table::
+
+ * - 'Not affected'
+ - The processor is not vulnerable.
+ * - 'Vulnerable: __user pointer sanitization and usercopy barriers only; no swapgs barriers'
+ - The swapgs protections are disabled; otherwise it has
+ protection in the kernel on a case by case base with explicit
+ pointer sanitation and usercopy LFENCE barriers.
+ * - 'Mitigation: usercopy/swapgs barriers and __user pointer sanitization'
+ - Protection in the kernel on a case by case base with explicit
+ pointer sanitation, usercopy LFENCE barriers, and swapgs LFENCE
+ barriers.
However, the protections are put in place on a case by case basis,
and there is no guarantee that all possible attack vectors for Spectre
@@ -366,12 +417,27 @@ Turning on mitigation for Spectre variant 1 and Spectre variant 2
1. Kernel mitigation
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+Spectre variant 1
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
For the Spectre variant 1, vulnerable kernel code (as determined
by code audit or scanning tools) is annotated on a case by case
basis to use nospec accessor macros for bounds clipping :ref:`[2]
<spec_ref2>` to avoid any usable disclosure gadgets. However, it may
not cover all attack vectors for Spectre variant 1.
+ Copy-from-user code has an LFENCE barrier to prevent the access_ok()
+ check from being mis-speculated. The barrier is done by the
+ barrier_nospec() macro.
+
+ For the swapgs variant of Spectre variant 1, LFENCE barriers are
+ added to interrupt, exception and NMI entry where needed. These
+ barriers are done by the FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY and
+ FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY macros.
+
+Spectre variant 2
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
For Spectre variant 2 mitigation, the compiler turns indirect calls or
jumps in the kernel into equivalent return trampolines (retpolines)
:ref:`[3] <spec_ref3>` :ref:`[9] <spec_ref9>` to go to the target
@@ -473,6 +539,12 @@ Mitigation control on the kernel command line
Spectre variant 2 mitigation can be disabled or force enabled at the
kernel command line.
+ nospectre_v1
+
+ [X86,PPC] Disable mitigations for Spectre Variant 1
+ (bounds check bypass). With this option data leaks are
+ possible in the system.
+
nospectre_v2
[X86] Disable all mitigations for the Spectre variant 2
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index 9240b2caa0b1..13d80111bc1f 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -2401,6 +2401,7 @@
Equivalent to: nopti [X86,PPC]
nospectre_v1 [PPC]
nobp=0 [S390]
+ nospectre_v1 [X86]
nospectre_v2 [X86,PPC,S390]
spectre_v2_user=off [X86]
spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86,PPC]
@@ -2740,9 +2741,9 @@
nosmt=force: Force disable SMT, cannot be undone
via the sysfs control file.
- nospectre_v1 [PPC] Disable mitigations for Spectre Variant 1 (bounds
- check bypass). With this option data leaks are possible
- in the system.
+ nospectre_v1 [X66, PPC] Disable mitigations for Spectre Variant 1
+ (bounds check bypass). With this option data leaks
+ are possible in the system.
nospectre_v2 [X86,PPC_FSL_BOOK3E] Disable all mitigations for the Spectre variant 2
(indirect branch prediction) vulnerability. System may
diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
index a798f4777ae2..ff604059b6a8 100644
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
VERSION = 4
PATCHLEVEL = 14
-SUBLEVEL = 136
+SUBLEVEL = 137
EXTRAVERSION =
NAME = Petit Gorille
@@ -427,6 +427,7 @@ KBUILD_AFLAGS_MODULE := -DMODULE
KBUILD_CFLAGS_MODULE := -DMODULE
KBUILD_LDFLAGS_MODULE := -T $(srctree)/scripts/module-common.lds
GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS :=
+CLANG_FLAGS :=
export ARCH SRCARCH CONFIG_SHELL HOSTCC HOSTCFLAGS CROSS_COMPILE AS LD CC
export CPP AR NM STRIP OBJCOPY OBJDUMP HOSTLDFLAGS HOST_LOADLIBES
@@ -479,7 +480,7 @@ endif
ifeq ($(cc-name),clang)
ifneq ($(CROSS_COMPILE),)
-CLANG_FLAGS := --target=$(notdir $(CROSS_COMPILE:%-=%))
+CLANG_FLAGS += --target=$(notdir $(CROSS_COMPILE:%-=%))
GCC_TOOLCHAIN_DIR := $(dir $(shell which $(CROSS_COMPILE)elfedit))
CLANG_FLAGS += --prefix=$(GCC_TOOLCHAIN_DIR)
GCC_TOOLCHAIN := $(realpath $(GCC_TOOLCHAIN_DIR)/..)
diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/rk3288-veyron-mickey.dts b/arch/arm/boot/dts/rk3288-veyron-mickey.dts
index f0994f0e5774..d6ca67866bc0 100644
--- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/rk3288-veyron-mickey.dts
+++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/rk3288-veyron-mickey.dts
@@ -161,10 +161,6 @@
};
};
-&emmc {
- /delete-property/mmc-hs200-1_8v;
-};
-
&i2c2 {
status = "disabled";
};
diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/rk3288-veyron-minnie.dts b/arch/arm/boot/dts/rk3288-veyron-minnie.dts
index 544de6027aaa..6000dca1cf05 100644
--- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/rk3288-veyron-minnie.dts
+++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/rk3288-veyron-minnie.dts
@@ -125,10 +125,6 @@
power-supply = <&backlight_regulator>;
};
-&emmc {
- /delete-property/mmc-hs200-1_8v;
-};
-
&gpio_keys {
pinctrl-0 = <&pwr_key_l &ap_lid_int_l &volum_down_l &volum_up_l>;
diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/rk3288.dtsi b/arch/arm/boot/dts/rk3288.dtsi
index 5a7888581eea..23907d9ce89a 100644
--- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/rk3288.dtsi
+++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/rk3288.dtsi
@@ -213,6 +213,7 @@
<GIC_PPI 11 (GIC_CPU_MASK_SIMPLE(4) | IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH)>,
<GIC_PPI 10 (GIC_CPU_MASK_SIMPLE(4) | IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH)>;
clock-frequency = <24000000>;
+ arm,no-tick-in-suspend;
};
timer: timer@...10000 {
diff --git a/arch/arm/mach-rpc/dma.c b/arch/arm/mach-rpc/dma.c
index fb48f3141fb4..c4c96661eb89 100644
--- a/arch/arm/mach-rpc/dma.c
+++ b/arch/arm/mach-rpc/dma.c
@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ static irqreturn_t iomd_dma_handle(int irq, void *dev_id)
} while (1);
idma->state = ~DMA_ST_AB;
- disable_irq(irq);
+ disable_irq_nosync(irq);
return IRQ_HANDLED;
}
@@ -174,6 +174,9 @@ static void iomd_enable_dma(unsigned int chan, dma_t *dma)
DMA_FROM_DEVICE : DMA_TO_DEVICE);
}
+ idma->dma_addr = idma->dma.sg->dma_address;
+ idma->dma_len = idma->dma.sg->length;
+
iomd_writeb(DMA_CR_C, dma_base + CR);
idma->state = DMA_ST_AB;
}
diff --git a/arch/mips/lantiq/irq.c b/arch/mips/lantiq/irq.c
index c4ef1c31e0c4..37caeadb2964 100644
--- a/arch/mips/lantiq/irq.c
+++ b/arch/mips/lantiq/irq.c
@@ -156,8 +156,9 @@ static int ltq_eiu_settype(struct irq_data *d, unsigned int type)
if (edge)
irq_set_handler(d->hwirq, handle_edge_irq);
- ltq_eiu_w32(ltq_eiu_r32(LTQ_EIU_EXIN_C) |
- (val << (i * 4)), LTQ_EIU_EXIN_C);
+ ltq_eiu_w32((ltq_eiu_r32(LTQ_EIU_EXIN_C) &
+ (~(7 << (i * 4)))) | (val << (i * 4)),
+ LTQ_EIU_EXIN_C);
}
}
diff --git a/arch/parisc/boot/compressed/vmlinux.lds.S b/arch/parisc/boot/compressed/vmlinux.lds.S
index a4ce3314e78e..b658f77d6369 100644
--- a/arch/parisc/boot/compressed/vmlinux.lds.S
+++ b/arch/parisc/boot/compressed/vmlinux.lds.S
@@ -40,8 +40,8 @@ SECTIONS
#endif
_startcode_end = .;
- /* bootloader code and data starts behind area of extracted kernel */
- . = (SZ_end - SZparisc_kernel_start + KERNEL_BINARY_TEXT_START);
+ /* bootloader code and data starts at least behind area of extracted kernel */
+ . = MAX(ABSOLUTE(.), (SZ_end - SZparisc_kernel_start + KERNEL_BINARY_TEXT_START));
/* align on next page boundary */
. = ALIGN(4096);
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c
index 252fee320816..fb07cfa3f2f9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
#include "error.h"
#include "../string.h"
#include "../voffset.h"
+#include <asm/bootparam_utils.h>
/*
* WARNING!!
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h
index 32d4ec2e0243..5380d45b1c6e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h
@@ -19,7 +19,6 @@
#include <asm/page.h>
#include <asm/boot.h>
#include <asm/bootparam.h>
-#include <asm/bootparam_utils.h>
#define BOOT_BOOT_H
#include "../ctype.h"
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/calling.h b/arch/x86/entry/calling.h
index 5d10b7a85cad..557c1bdda311 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/calling.h
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/calling.h
@@ -332,6 +332,23 @@ For 32-bit we have the following conventions - kernel is built with
#endif
+/*
+ * Mitigate Spectre v1 for conditional swapgs code paths.
+ *
+ * FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY is used in the user entry swapgs code path, to
+ * prevent a speculative swapgs when coming from kernel space.
+ *
+ * FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY is used in the kernel entry non-swapgs code path,
+ * to prevent the swapgs from getting speculatively skipped when coming from
+ * user space.
+ */
+.macro FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY
+ ALTERNATIVE "", "lfence", X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_USER
+.endm
+.macro FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY
+ ALTERNATIVE "", "lfence", X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL
+.endm
+
#endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
index e09ba4bc8b98..5ec66fafde4e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
@@ -531,9 +531,12 @@ END(irq_entries_start)
testb $3, CS-ORIG_RAX(%rsp)
jz 1f
SWAPGS
+ FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY
call switch_to_thread_stack
+ jmp 2f
1:
-
+ FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY
+2:
PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS
ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER
@@ -1113,7 +1116,6 @@ idtentry stack_segment do_stack_segment has_error_code=1
#ifdef CONFIG_XEN
idtentry xennmi do_nmi has_error_code=0
idtentry xendebug do_debug has_error_code=0
-idtentry xenint3 do_int3 has_error_code=0
#endif
idtentry general_protection do_general_protection has_error_code=1
@@ -1147,6 +1149,12 @@ ENTRY(paranoid_entry)
1:
SAVE_AND_SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%rax save_reg=%r14
+ /*
+ * The above SAVE_AND_SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 macro doesn't do an
+ * unconditional CR3 write, even in the PTI case. So do an lfence
+ * to prevent GS speculation, regardless of whether PTI is enabled.
+ */
+ FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY
ret
END(paranoid_entry)
@@ -1196,6 +1204,7 @@ ENTRY(error_entry)
* from user mode due to an IRET fault.
*/
SWAPGS
+ FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY
/* We have user CR3. Change to kernel CR3. */
SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%rax
@@ -1217,6 +1226,8 @@ ENTRY(error_entry)
CALL_enter_from_user_mode
ret
+.Lerror_entry_done_lfence:
+ FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY
.Lerror_entry_done:
TRACE_IRQS_OFF
ret
@@ -1235,7 +1246,7 @@ ENTRY(error_entry)
cmpq %rax, RIP+8(%rsp)
je .Lbstep_iret
cmpq $.Lgs_change, RIP+8(%rsp)
- jne .Lerror_entry_done
+ jne .Lerror_entry_done_lfence
/*
* hack: .Lgs_change can fail with user gsbase. If this happens, fix up
@@ -1243,6 +1254,7 @@ ENTRY(error_entry)
* .Lgs_change's error handler with kernel gsbase.
*/
SWAPGS
+ FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY
SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%rax
jmp .Lerror_entry_done
@@ -1257,6 +1269,7 @@ ENTRY(error_entry)
* gsbase and CR3. Switch to kernel gsbase and CR3:
*/
SWAPGS
+ FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY
SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%rax
/*
@@ -1348,6 +1361,7 @@ ENTRY(nmi)
swapgs
cld
+ FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY
SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%rdx
movq %rsp, %rdx
movq PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_current_top_of_stack), %rsp
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vclock_gettime.c b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vclock_gettime.c
index 9c35dc0a9d64..9f4b1081dee0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vclock_gettime.c
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vclock_gettime.c
@@ -29,12 +29,12 @@ extern int __vdso_gettimeofday(struct timeval *tv, struct timezone *tz);
extern time_t __vdso_time(time_t *t);
#ifdef CONFIG_PARAVIRT_CLOCK
-extern u8 pvclock_page
+extern u8 pvclock_page[PAGE_SIZE]
__attribute__((visibility("hidden")));
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_HYPERV_TSCPAGE
-extern u8 hvclock_page
+extern u8 hvclock_page[PAGE_SIZE]
__attribute__((visibility("hidden")));
#endif
@@ -191,13 +191,24 @@ notrace static inline u64 vgetsns(int *mode)
if (gtod->vclock_mode == VCLOCK_TSC)
cycles = vread_tsc();
+
+ /*
+ * For any memory-mapped vclock type, we need to make sure that gcc
+ * doesn't cleverly hoist a load before the mode check. Otherwise we
+ * might end up touching the memory-mapped page even if the vclock in
+ * question isn't enabled, which will segfault. Hence the barriers.
+ */
#ifdef CONFIG_PARAVIRT_CLOCK
- else if (gtod->vclock_mode == VCLOCK_PVCLOCK)
+ else if (gtod->vclock_mode == VCLOCK_PVCLOCK) {
+ barrier();
cycles = vread_pvclock(mode);
+ }
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_HYPERV_TSCPAGE
- else if (gtod->vclock_mode == VCLOCK_HVCLOCK)
+ else if (gtod->vclock_mode == VCLOCK_HVCLOCK) {
+ barrier();
cycles = vread_hvclock(mode);
+ }
#endif
else
return 0;
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h
index a1ed92aae12a..25a5a5c6ae90 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ static inline void generic_apic_probe(void)
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_LOCAL_APIC
-extern unsigned int apic_verbosity;
+extern int apic_verbosity;
extern int local_apic_timer_c2_ok;
extern int disable_apic;
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h
index 70eddb3922ff..4e2d03135854 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h
@@ -22,8 +22,8 @@ enum cpuid_leafs
CPUID_LNX_3,
CPUID_7_0_EBX,
CPUID_D_1_EAX,
- CPUID_F_0_EDX,
- CPUID_F_1_EDX,
+ CPUID_LNX_4,
+ CPUID_DUMMY,
CPUID_8000_0008_EBX,
CPUID_6_EAX,
CPUID_8000_000A_EDX,
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index 4cb8315c521f..14357354cd28 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -271,13 +271,18 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_XGETBV1 (10*32+ 2) /* XGETBV with ECX = 1 instruction */
#define X86_FEATURE_XSAVES (10*32+ 3) /* XSAVES/XRSTORS instructions */
-/* Intel-defined CPU QoS Sub-leaf, CPUID level 0x0000000F:0 (EDX), word 11 */
-#define X86_FEATURE_CQM_LLC (11*32+ 1) /* LLC QoS if 1 */
-
-/* Intel-defined CPU QoS Sub-leaf, CPUID level 0x0000000F:1 (EDX), word 12 */
-#define X86_FEATURE_CQM_OCCUP_LLC (12*32+ 0) /* LLC occupancy monitoring */
-#define X86_FEATURE_CQM_MBM_TOTAL (12*32+ 1) /* LLC Total MBM monitoring */
-#define X86_FEATURE_CQM_MBM_LOCAL (12*32+ 2) /* LLC Local MBM monitoring */
+/*
+ * Extended auxiliary flags: Linux defined - for features scattered in various
+ * CPUID levels like 0xf, etc.
+ *
+ * Reuse free bits when adding new feature flags!
+ */
+#define X86_FEATURE_CQM_LLC (11*32+ 0) /* LLC QoS if 1 */
+#define X86_FEATURE_CQM_OCCUP_LLC (11*32+ 1) /* LLC occupancy monitoring */
+#define X86_FEATURE_CQM_MBM_TOTAL (11*32+ 2) /* LLC Total MBM monitoring */
+#define X86_FEATURE_CQM_MBM_LOCAL (11*32+ 3) /* LLC Local MBM monitoring */
+#define X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_USER (11*32+ 4) /* "" LFENCE in user entry SWAPGS path */
+#define X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL (11*32+ 5) /* "" LFENCE in kernel entry SWAPGS path */
/* AMD-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x80000008 (EBX), word 13 */
#define X86_FEATURE_CLZERO (13*32+ 0) /* CLZERO instruction */
@@ -382,5 +387,6 @@
#define X86_BUG_L1TF X86_BUG(18) /* CPU is affected by L1 Terminal Fault */
#define X86_BUG_MDS X86_BUG(19) /* CPU is affected by Microarchitectural data sampling */
#define X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY X86_BUG(20) /* CPU is only affected by the MSDBS variant of BUG_MDS */
+#define X86_BUG_SWAPGS X86_BUG(21) /* CPU is affected by speculation through SWAPGS */
#endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index f9a4b85d7309..9f3eb334c818 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -1353,25 +1353,29 @@ enum {
#define kvm_arch_vcpu_memslots_id(vcpu) ((vcpu)->arch.hflags & HF_SMM_MASK ? 1 : 0)
#define kvm_memslots_for_spte_role(kvm, role) __kvm_memslots(kvm, (role).smm)
+asmlinkage void __noreturn kvm_spurious_fault(void);
+
/*
* Hardware virtualization extension instructions may fault if a
* reboot turns off virtualization while processes are running.
- * Trap the fault and ignore the instruction if that happens.
+ * Usually after catching the fault we just panic; during reboot
+ * instead the instruction is ignored.
*/
-asmlinkage void kvm_spurious_fault(void);
-
-#define ____kvm_handle_fault_on_reboot(insn, cleanup_insn) \
- "666: " insn "\n\t" \
- "668: \n\t" \
- ".pushsection .fixup, \"ax\" \n" \
- "667: \n\t" \
- cleanup_insn "\n\t" \
- "cmpb $0, kvm_rebooting \n\t" \
- "jne 668b \n\t" \
- __ASM_SIZE(push) " $666b \n\t" \
- "jmp kvm_spurious_fault \n\t" \
- ".popsection \n\t" \
- _ASM_EXTABLE(666b, 667b)
+#define ____kvm_handle_fault_on_reboot(insn, cleanup_insn) \
+ "666: \n\t" \
+ insn "\n\t" \
+ "jmp 668f \n\t" \
+ "667: \n\t" \
+ "call kvm_spurious_fault \n\t" \
+ "668: \n\t" \
+ ".pushsection .fixup, \"ax\" \n\t" \
+ "700: \n\t" \
+ cleanup_insn "\n\t" \
+ "cmpb $0, kvm_rebooting\n\t" \
+ "je 667b \n\t" \
+ "jmp 668b \n\t" \
+ ".popsection \n\t" \
+ _ASM_EXTABLE(666b, 700b)
#define __kvm_handle_fault_on_reboot(insn) \
____kvm_handle_fault_on_reboot(insn, "")
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h
index c83a2f418cea..4471f0da6ed7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h
@@ -758,6 +758,7 @@ static __always_inline bool pv_vcpu_is_preempted(long cpu)
PV_RESTORE_ALL_CALLER_REGS \
FRAME_END \
"ret;" \
+ ".size " PV_THUNK_NAME(func) ", .-" PV_THUNK_NAME(func) ";" \
".popsection")
/* Get a reference to a callee-save function */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h
index afbc87206886..b771bb3d159b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ asmlinkage void simd_coprocessor_error(void);
asmlinkage void xen_divide_error(void);
asmlinkage void xen_xennmi(void);
asmlinkage void xen_xendebug(void);
-asmlinkage void xen_xenint3(void);
+asmlinkage void xen_int3(void);
asmlinkage void xen_overflow(void);
asmlinkage void xen_bounds(void);
asmlinkage void xen_invalid_op(void);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c
index 2e64178f284d..ae410f7585f1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c
@@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(local_apic_timer_c2_ok);
/*
* Debug level, exported for io_apic.c
*/
-unsigned int apic_verbosity;
+int apic_verbosity;
int pic_mode;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 64b6180ce162..8bf21bc7a190 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
#include <asm/intel-family.h>
#include <asm/e820/api.h>
+static void __init spectre_v1_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init ssb_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void);
@@ -96,17 +97,11 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP))
x86_spec_ctrl_mask |= SPEC_CTRL_STIBP;
- /* Select the proper spectre mitigation before patching alternatives */
+ /* Select the proper CPU mitigations before patching alternatives: */
+ spectre_v1_select_mitigation();
spectre_v2_select_mitigation();
-
- /*
- * Select proper mitigation for any exposure to the Speculative Store
- * Bypass vulnerability.
- */
ssb_select_mitigation();
-
l1tf_select_mitigation();
-
mds_select_mitigation();
arch_smt_update();
@@ -271,6 +266,98 @@ static int __init mds_cmdline(char *str)
}
early_param("mds", mds_cmdline);
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "Spectre V1 : " fmt
+
+enum spectre_v1_mitigation {
+ SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_NONE,
+ SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_AUTO,
+};
+
+static enum spectre_v1_mitigation spectre_v1_mitigation __ro_after_init =
+ SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_AUTO;
+
+static const char * const spectre_v1_strings[] = {
+ [SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_NONE] = "Vulnerable: __user pointer sanitization and usercopy barriers only; no swapgs barriers",
+ [SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_AUTO] = "Mitigation: usercopy/swapgs barriers and __user pointer sanitization",
+};
+
+/*
+ * Does SMAP provide full mitigation against speculative kernel access to
+ * userspace?
+ */
+static bool smap_works_speculatively(void)
+{
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SMAP))
+ return false;
+
+ /*
+ * On CPUs which are vulnerable to Meltdown, SMAP does not
+ * prevent speculative access to user data in the L1 cache.
+ * Consider SMAP to be non-functional as a mitigation on these
+ * CPUs.
+ */
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN))
+ return false;
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+static void __init spectre_v1_select_mitigation(void)
+{
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1) || cpu_mitigations_off()) {
+ spectre_v1_mitigation = SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_NONE;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (spectre_v1_mitigation == SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_AUTO) {
+ /*
+ * With Spectre v1, a user can speculatively control either
+ * path of a conditional swapgs with a user-controlled GS
+ * value. The mitigation is to add lfences to both code paths.
+ *
+ * If FSGSBASE is enabled, the user can put a kernel address in
+ * GS, in which case SMAP provides no protection.
+ *
+ * [ NOTE: Don't check for X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE until the
+ * FSGSBASE enablement patches have been merged. ]
+ *
+ * If FSGSBASE is disabled, the user can only put a user space
+ * address in GS. That makes an attack harder, but still
+ * possible if there's no SMAP protection.
+ */
+ if (!smap_works_speculatively()) {
+ /*
+ * Mitigation can be provided from SWAPGS itself or
+ * PTI as the CR3 write in the Meltdown mitigation
+ * is serializing.
+ *
+ * If neither is there, mitigate with an LFENCE to
+ * stop speculation through swapgs.
+ */
+ if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SWAPGS) &&
+ !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI))
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_USER);
+
+ /*
+ * Enable lfences in the kernel entry (non-swapgs)
+ * paths, to prevent user entry from speculatively
+ * skipping swapgs.
+ */
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL);
+ }
+ }
+
+ pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v1_strings[spectre_v1_mitigation]);
+}
+
+static int __init nospectre_v1_cmdline(char *str)
+{
+ spectre_v1_mitigation = SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_NONE;
+ return 0;
+}
+early_param("nospectre_v1", nospectre_v1_cmdline);
+
#undef pr_fmt
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "Spectre V2 : " fmt
@@ -1255,7 +1342,7 @@ static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr
break;
case X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1:
- return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization\n");
+ return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", spectre_v1_strings[spectre_v1_mitigation]);
case X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2:
return sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s%s%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled],
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index ebe547b1ffce..551c6bed7c8c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -768,6 +768,30 @@ static void init_speculation_control(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
}
}
+static void init_cqm(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_CQM_LLC)) {
+ c->x86_cache_max_rmid = -1;
+ c->x86_cache_occ_scale = -1;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* will be overridden if occupancy monitoring exists */
+ c->x86_cache_max_rmid = cpuid_ebx(0xf);
+
+ if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_CQM_OCCUP_LLC) ||
+ cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_CQM_MBM_TOTAL) ||
+ cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_CQM_MBM_LOCAL)) {
+ u32 eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
+
+ /* QoS sub-leaf, EAX=0Fh, ECX=1 */
+ cpuid_count(0xf, 1, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
+
+ c->x86_cache_max_rmid = ecx;
+ c->x86_cache_occ_scale = ebx;
+ }
+}
+
void get_cpu_cap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
u32 eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
@@ -799,33 +823,6 @@ void get_cpu_cap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
c->x86_capability[CPUID_D_1_EAX] = eax;
}
- /* Additional Intel-defined flags: level 0x0000000F */
- if (c->cpuid_level >= 0x0000000F) {
-
- /* QoS sub-leaf, EAX=0Fh, ECX=0 */
- cpuid_count(0x0000000F, 0, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
- c->x86_capability[CPUID_F_0_EDX] = edx;
-
- if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_CQM_LLC)) {
- /* will be overridden if occupancy monitoring exists */
- c->x86_cache_max_rmid = ebx;
-
- /* QoS sub-leaf, EAX=0Fh, ECX=1 */
- cpuid_count(0x0000000F, 1, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
- c->x86_capability[CPUID_F_1_EDX] = edx;
-
- if ((cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_CQM_OCCUP_LLC)) ||
- ((cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_CQM_MBM_TOTAL)) ||
- (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_CQM_MBM_LOCAL)))) {
- c->x86_cache_max_rmid = ecx;
- c->x86_cache_occ_scale = ebx;
- }
- } else {
- c->x86_cache_max_rmid = -1;
- c->x86_cache_occ_scale = -1;
- }
- }
-
/* AMD-defined flags: level 0x80000001 */
eax = cpuid_eax(0x80000000);
c->extended_cpuid_level = eax;
@@ -863,6 +860,7 @@ void get_cpu_cap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
init_scattered_cpuid_features(c);
init_speculation_control(c);
+ init_cqm(c);
/*
* Clear/Set all flags overridden by options, after probe.
@@ -905,6 +903,7 @@ static void identify_cpu_without_cpuid(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
#define NO_L1TF BIT(3)
#define NO_MDS BIT(4)
#define MSBDS_ONLY BIT(5)
+#define NO_SWAPGS BIT(6)
#define VULNWL(_vendor, _family, _model, _whitelist) \
{ X86_VENDOR_##_vendor, _family, _model, X86_FEATURE_ANY, _whitelist }
@@ -928,29 +927,37 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = {
VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_BONNELL, NO_SPECULATION),
VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_BONNELL_MID, NO_SPECULATION),
- VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY),
- VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT_X, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY),
- VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT_MID, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY),
- VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_AIRMONT, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY),
- VULNWL_INTEL(XEON_PHI_KNL, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY),
- VULNWL_INTEL(XEON_PHI_KNM, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT_X, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT_MID, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_AIRMONT, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(XEON_PHI_KNL, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(XEON_PHI_KNM, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS),
VULNWL_INTEL(CORE_YONAH, NO_SSB),
- VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_AIRMONT_MID, NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_AIRMONT_MID, NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS),
- VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT, NO_MDS | NO_L1TF),
- VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_X, NO_MDS | NO_L1TF),
- VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS, NO_MDS | NO_L1TF),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT, NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_X, NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS, NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS),
+
+ /*
+ * Technically, swapgs isn't serializing on AMD (despite it previously
+ * being documented as such in the APM). But according to AMD, %gs is
+ * updated non-speculatively, and the issuing of %gs-relative memory
+ * operands will be blocked until the %gs update completes, which is
+ * good enough for our purposes.
+ */
/* AMD Family 0xf - 0x12 */
- VULNWL_AMD(0x0f, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS),
- VULNWL_AMD(0x10, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS),
- VULNWL_AMD(0x11, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS),
- VULNWL_AMD(0x12, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS),
+ VULNWL_AMD(0x0f, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS),
+ VULNWL_AMD(0x10, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS),
+ VULNWL_AMD(0x11, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS),
+ VULNWL_AMD(0x12, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS),
/* FAMILY_ANY must be last, otherwise 0x0f - 0x12 matches won't work */
- VULNWL_AMD(X86_FAMILY_ANY, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS),
+ VULNWL_AMD(X86_FAMILY_ANY, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS),
{}
};
@@ -987,6 +994,9 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY);
}
+ if (!cpu_matches(NO_SWAPGS))
+ setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SWAPGS);
+
if (cpu_matches(NO_MELTDOWN))
return;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c
index 904b0a3c4e53..4c9fc6a4d1ea 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c
@@ -59,6 +59,9 @@ const static struct cpuid_dep cpuid_deps[] = {
{ X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4VNNIW, X86_FEATURE_AVX512F },
{ X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4FMAPS, X86_FEATURE_AVX512F },
{ X86_FEATURE_AVX512_VPOPCNTDQ, X86_FEATURE_AVX512F },
+ { X86_FEATURE_CQM_OCCUP_LLC, X86_FEATURE_CQM_LLC },
+ { X86_FEATURE_CQM_MBM_TOTAL, X86_FEATURE_CQM_LLC },
+ { X86_FEATURE_CQM_MBM_LOCAL, X86_FEATURE_CQM_LLC },
{}
};
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c
index df11f5d604be..ed7ce5184a77 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c
@@ -21,6 +21,10 @@ struct cpuid_bit {
static const struct cpuid_bit cpuid_bits[] = {
{ X86_FEATURE_APERFMPERF, CPUID_ECX, 0, 0x00000006, 0 },
{ X86_FEATURE_EPB, CPUID_ECX, 3, 0x00000006, 0 },
+ { X86_FEATURE_CQM_LLC, CPUID_EDX, 1, 0x0000000f, 0 },
+ { X86_FEATURE_CQM_OCCUP_LLC, CPUID_EDX, 0, 0x0000000f, 1 },
+ { X86_FEATURE_CQM_MBM_TOTAL, CPUID_EDX, 1, 0x0000000f, 1 },
+ { X86_FEATURE_CQM_MBM_LOCAL, CPUID_EDX, 2, 0x0000000f, 1 },
{ X86_FEATURE_CAT_L3, CPUID_EBX, 1, 0x00000010, 0 },
{ X86_FEATURE_CAT_L2, CPUID_EBX, 2, 0x00000010, 0 },
{ X86_FEATURE_CDP_L3, CPUID_ECX, 2, 0x00000010, 1 },
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c
index 652bdd867782..5853eb50138e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c
@@ -631,6 +631,7 @@ asm(
"cmpb $0, " __stringify(KVM_STEAL_TIME_preempted) "+steal_time(%rax);"
"setne %al;"
"ret;"
+".size __raw_callee_save___kvm_vcpu_is_preempted, .-__raw_callee_save___kvm_vcpu_is_preempted;"
".popsection");
#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h
index 9a327d5b6d1f..d78a61408243 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h
@@ -47,8 +47,6 @@ static const struct cpuid_reg reverse_cpuid[] = {
[CPUID_8000_0001_ECX] = {0x80000001, 0, CPUID_ECX},
[CPUID_7_0_EBX] = { 7, 0, CPUID_EBX},
[CPUID_D_1_EAX] = { 0xd, 1, CPUID_EAX},
- [CPUID_F_0_EDX] = { 0xf, 0, CPUID_EDX},
- [CPUID_F_1_EDX] = { 0xf, 1, CPUID_EDX},
[CPUID_8000_0008_EBX] = {0x80000008, 0, CPUID_EBX},
[CPUID_6_EAX] = { 6, 0, CPUID_EAX},
[CPUID_8000_000A_EDX] = {0x8000000a, 0, CPUID_EDX},
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c
index f97b533bc6e6..87a0601b1c20 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c
@@ -4313,11 +4313,11 @@ static void update_permission_bitmask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
*/
/* Faults from writes to non-writable pages */
- u8 wf = (pfec & PFERR_WRITE_MASK) ? ~w : 0;
+ u8 wf = (pfec & PFERR_WRITE_MASK) ? (u8)~w : 0;
/* Faults from user mode accesses to supervisor pages */
- u8 uf = (pfec & PFERR_USER_MASK) ? ~u : 0;
+ u8 uf = (pfec & PFERR_USER_MASK) ? (u8)~u : 0;
/* Faults from fetches of non-executable pages*/
- u8 ff = (pfec & PFERR_FETCH_MASK) ? ~x : 0;
+ u8 ff = (pfec & PFERR_FETCH_MASK) ? (u8)~x : 0;
/* Faults from kernel mode fetches of user pages */
u8 smepf = 0;
/* Faults from kernel mode accesses of user pages */
diff --git a/arch/x86/math-emu/fpu_emu.h b/arch/x86/math-emu/fpu_emu.h
index a5a41ec58072..0c122226ca56 100644
--- a/arch/x86/math-emu/fpu_emu.h
+++ b/arch/x86/math-emu/fpu_emu.h
@@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ static inline void reg_copy(FPU_REG const *x, FPU_REG *y)
#define setexponentpos(x,y) { (*(short *)&((x)->exp)) = \
((y) + EXTENDED_Ebias) & 0x7fff; }
#define exponent16(x) (*(short *)&((x)->exp))
-#define setexponent16(x,y) { (*(short *)&((x)->exp)) = (y); }
+#define setexponent16(x,y) { (*(short *)&((x)->exp)) = (u16)(y); }
#define addexponent(x,y) { (*(short *)&((x)->exp)) += (y); }
#define stdexp(x) { (*(short *)&((x)->exp)) += EXTENDED_Ebias; }
diff --git a/arch/x86/math-emu/reg_constant.c b/arch/x86/math-emu/reg_constant.c
index 8dc9095bab22..742619e94bdf 100644
--- a/arch/x86/math-emu/reg_constant.c
+++ b/arch/x86/math-emu/reg_constant.c
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
#include "control_w.h"
#define MAKE_REG(s, e, l, h) { l, h, \
- ((EXTENDED_Ebias+(e)) | ((SIGN_##s != 0)*0x8000)) }
+ (u16)((EXTENDED_Ebias+(e)) | ((SIGN_##s != 0)*0x8000)) }
FPU_REG const CONST_1 = MAKE_REG(POS, 0, 0x00000000, 0x80000000);
#if 0
diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c
index 481d7920ea24..f79a0cdc6b4e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c
@@ -598,12 +598,12 @@ struct trap_array_entry {
static struct trap_array_entry trap_array[] = {
{ debug, xen_xendebug, true },
- { int3, xen_xenint3, true },
{ double_fault, xen_double_fault, true },
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_MCE
{ machine_check, xen_machine_check, true },
#endif
{ nmi, xen_xennmi, true },
+ { int3, xen_int3, false },
{ overflow, xen_overflow, false },
#ifdef CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION
{ entry_INT80_compat, xen_entry_INT80_compat, false },
diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/xen-asm_64.S b/arch/x86/xen/xen-asm_64.S
index 417b339e5c8e..3a6feed76dfc 100644
--- a/arch/x86/xen/xen-asm_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/xen-asm_64.S
@@ -30,7 +30,6 @@ xen_pv_trap divide_error
xen_pv_trap debug
xen_pv_trap xendebug
xen_pv_trap int3
-xen_pv_trap xenint3
xen_pv_trap xennmi
xen_pv_trap overflow
xen_pv_trap bounds
diff --git a/drivers/acpi/blacklist.c b/drivers/acpi/blacklist.c
index 995c4d8922b1..761f0c19a451 100644
--- a/drivers/acpi/blacklist.c
+++ b/drivers/acpi/blacklist.c
@@ -30,7 +30,9 @@
#include "internal.h"
+#ifdef CONFIG_DMI
static const struct dmi_system_id acpi_rev_dmi_table[] __initconst;
+#endif
/*
* POLICY: If *anything* doesn't work, put it on the blacklist.
@@ -74,7 +76,9 @@ int __init acpi_blacklisted(void)
}
(void)early_acpi_osi_init();
+#ifdef CONFIG_DMI
dmi_check_system(acpi_rev_dmi_table);
+#endif
return blacklisted;
}
diff --git a/drivers/block/nbd.c b/drivers/block/nbd.c
index d32cd943dff2..b77e9281c039 100644
--- a/drivers/block/nbd.c
+++ b/drivers/block/nbd.c
@@ -1207,7 +1207,7 @@ static void nbd_clear_sock_ioctl(struct nbd_device *nbd,
struct block_device *bdev)
{
sock_shutdown(nbd);
- kill_bdev(bdev);
+ __invalidate_device(bdev, true);
nbd_bdev_reset(bdev);
if (test_and_clear_bit(NBD_HAS_CONFIG_REF,
&nbd->config->runtime_flags))
diff --git a/drivers/clk/tegra/clk-tegra210.c b/drivers/clk/tegra/clk-tegra210.c
index b92867814e2d..cb2be154db3b 100644
--- a/drivers/clk/tegra/clk-tegra210.c
+++ b/drivers/clk/tegra/clk-tegra210.c
@@ -2057,9 +2057,9 @@ static struct div_nmp pllu_nmp = {
};
static struct tegra_clk_pll_freq_table pll_u_freq_table[] = {
- { 12000000, 480000000, 40, 1, 0, 0 },
- { 13000000, 480000000, 36, 1, 0, 0 }, /* actual: 468.0 MHz */
- { 38400000, 480000000, 25, 2, 0, 0 },
+ { 12000000, 480000000, 40, 1, 1, 0 },
+ { 13000000, 480000000, 36, 1, 1, 0 }, /* actual: 468.0 MHz */
+ { 38400000, 480000000, 25, 2, 1, 0 },
{ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
};
@@ -2983,6 +2983,7 @@ static struct tegra_clk_init_table init_table[] __initdata = {
{ TEGRA210_CLK_DFLL_REF, TEGRA210_CLK_PLL_P, 51000000, 1 },
{ TEGRA210_CLK_SBC4, TEGRA210_CLK_PLL_P, 12000000, 1 },
{ TEGRA210_CLK_PLL_RE_VCO, TEGRA210_CLK_CLK_MAX, 672000000, 1 },
+ { TEGRA210_CLK_PLL_U_OUT1, TEGRA210_CLK_CLK_MAX, 48000000, 1 },
{ TEGRA210_CLK_XUSB_GATE, TEGRA210_CLK_CLK_MAX, 0, 1 },
{ TEGRA210_CLK_XUSB_SS_SRC, TEGRA210_CLK_PLL_U_480M, 120000000, 0 },
{ TEGRA210_CLK_XUSB_FS_SRC, TEGRA210_CLK_PLL_U_48M, 48000000, 0 },
@@ -3008,7 +3009,6 @@ static struct tegra_clk_init_table init_table[] __initdata = {
{ TEGRA210_CLK_PLL_DP, TEGRA210_CLK_CLK_MAX, 270000000, 0 },
{ TEGRA210_CLK_SOC_THERM, TEGRA210_CLK_PLL_P, 51000000, 0 },
{ TEGRA210_CLK_CCLK_G, TEGRA210_CLK_CLK_MAX, 0, 1 },
- { TEGRA210_CLK_PLL_U_OUT1, TEGRA210_CLK_CLK_MAX, 48000000, 1 },
{ TEGRA210_CLK_PLL_U_OUT2, TEGRA210_CLK_CLK_MAX, 60000000, 1 },
/* This MUST be the last entry. */
{ TEGRA210_CLK_CLK_MAX, TEGRA210_CLK_CLK_MAX, 0, 0 },
diff --git a/drivers/dma/sh/rcar-dmac.c b/drivers/dma/sh/rcar-dmac.c
index 77b126525dac..19c7433e8309 100644
--- a/drivers/dma/sh/rcar-dmac.c
+++ b/drivers/dma/sh/rcar-dmac.c
@@ -1129,7 +1129,7 @@ rcar_dmac_prep_slave_sg(struct dma_chan *chan, struct scatterlist *sgl,
struct rcar_dmac_chan *rchan = to_rcar_dmac_chan(chan);
/* Someone calling slave DMA on a generic channel? */
- if (rchan->mid_rid < 0 || !sg_len) {
+ if (rchan->mid_rid < 0 || !sg_len || !sg_dma_len(sgl)) {
dev_warn(chan->device->dev,
"%s: bad parameter: len=%d, id=%d\n",
__func__, sg_len, rchan->mid_rid);
diff --git a/drivers/gpio/gpiolib.c b/drivers/gpio/gpiolib.c
index 3db0a9b0d259..25351b6b1e34 100644
--- a/drivers/gpio/gpiolib.c
+++ b/drivers/gpio/gpiolib.c
@@ -835,9 +835,11 @@ static int lineevent_create(struct gpio_device *gdev, void __user *ip)
}
if (eflags & GPIOEVENT_REQUEST_RISING_EDGE)
- irqflags |= IRQF_TRIGGER_RISING;
+ irqflags |= test_bit(FLAG_ACTIVE_LOW, &desc->flags) ?
+ IRQF_TRIGGER_FALLING : IRQF_TRIGGER_RISING;
if (eflags & GPIOEVENT_REQUEST_FALLING_EDGE)
- irqflags |= IRQF_TRIGGER_FALLING;
+ irqflags |= test_bit(FLAG_ACTIVE_LOW, &desc->flags) ?
+ IRQF_TRIGGER_RISING : IRQF_TRIGGER_FALLING;
irqflags |= IRQF_ONESHOT;
irqflags |= IRQF_SHARED;
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_connector.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_connector.c
index 2c6d19683688..4a7d50a96d36 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_connector.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_connector.c
@@ -251,7 +251,7 @@ nouveau_conn_reset(struct drm_connector *connector)
return;
if (connector->state)
- __drm_atomic_helper_connector_destroy_state(connector->state);
+ nouveau_conn_atomic_destroy_state(connector, connector->state);
__drm_atomic_helper_connector_reset(connector, &asyc->state);
asyc->dither.mode = DITHERING_MODE_AUTO;
asyc->dither.depth = DITHERING_DEPTH_AUTO;
diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/hw/hfi1/chip.c b/drivers/infiniband/hw/hfi1/chip.c
index 69a79fdfa23e..9dcdc0a8685e 100644
--- a/drivers/infiniband/hw/hfi1/chip.c
+++ b/drivers/infiniband/hw/hfi1/chip.c
@@ -14566,7 +14566,7 @@ void hfi1_deinit_vnic_rsm(struct hfi1_devdata *dd)
clear_rcvctrl(dd, RCV_CTRL_RCV_RSM_ENABLE_SMASK);
}
-static void init_rxe(struct hfi1_devdata *dd)
+static int init_rxe(struct hfi1_devdata *dd)
{
struct rsm_map_table *rmt;
u64 val;
@@ -14575,6 +14575,9 @@ static void init_rxe(struct hfi1_devdata *dd)
write_csr(dd, RCV_ERR_MASK, ~0ull);
rmt = alloc_rsm_map_table(dd);
+ if (!rmt)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
/* set up QOS, including the QPN map table */
init_qos(dd, rmt);
init_user_fecn_handling(dd, rmt);
@@ -14599,6 +14602,7 @@ static void init_rxe(struct hfi1_devdata *dd)
val = read_csr(dd, RCV_BYPASS);
val |= (4ull << 16);
write_csr(dd, RCV_BYPASS, val);
+ return 0;
}
static void init_other(struct hfi1_devdata *dd)
@@ -15154,7 +15158,10 @@ struct hfi1_devdata *hfi1_init_dd(struct pci_dev *pdev,
goto bail_cleanup;
/* set initial RXE CSRs */
- init_rxe(dd);
+ ret = init_rxe(dd);
+ if (ret)
+ goto bail_cleanup;
+
/* set initial TXE CSRs */
init_txe(dd);
/* set initial non-RXE, non-TXE CSRs */
diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/hw/hfi1/verbs.c b/drivers/infiniband/hw/hfi1/verbs.c
index f4372afa0e81..ad78b471c112 100644
--- a/drivers/infiniband/hw/hfi1/verbs.c
+++ b/drivers/infiniband/hw/hfi1/verbs.c
@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
#include <rdma/opa_addr.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
#include "hfi.h"
#include "common.h"
@@ -1587,6 +1588,7 @@ static int hfi1_check_ah(struct ib_device *ibdev, struct rdma_ah_attr *ah_attr)
sl = rdma_ah_get_sl(ah_attr);
if (sl >= ARRAY_SIZE(ibp->sl_to_sc))
return -EINVAL;
+ sl = array_index_nospec(sl, ARRAY_SIZE(ibp->sl_to_sc));
sc5 = ibp->sl_to_sc[sl];
if (sc_to_vlt(dd, sc5) > num_vls && sc_to_vlt(dd, sc5) != 0xf)
diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/mlx5_ib.h b/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/mlx5_ib.h
index 754103372faa..89c7e391a834 100644
--- a/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/mlx5_ib.h
+++ b/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/mlx5_ib.h
@@ -427,6 +427,7 @@ struct mlx5_umr_wr {
u64 length;
int access_flags;
u32 mkey;
+ u8 ignore_free_state:1;
};
static inline struct mlx5_umr_wr *umr_wr(struct ib_send_wr *wr)
diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/mr.c b/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/mr.c
index e88bb71056cd..cfddca850cb4 100644
--- a/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/mr.c
+++ b/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/mr.c
@@ -538,14 +538,17 @@ void mlx5_mr_cache_free(struct mlx5_ib_dev *dev, struct mlx5_ib_mr *mr)
int c;
c = order2idx(dev, mr->order);
- if (c < 0 || c >= MAX_MR_CACHE_ENTRIES) {
- mlx5_ib_warn(dev, "order %d, cache index %d\n", mr->order, c);
+ WARN_ON(c < 0 || c >= MAX_MR_CACHE_ENTRIES);
+
+ if (unreg_umr(dev, mr)) {
+ mr->allocated_from_cache = false;
+ destroy_mkey(dev, mr);
+ ent = &cache->ent[c];
+ if (ent->cur < ent->limit)
+ queue_work(cache->wq, &ent->work);
return;
}
- if (unreg_umr(dev, mr))
- return;
-
ent = &cache->ent[c];
spin_lock_irq(&ent->lock);
list_add_tail(&mr->list, &ent->head);
@@ -1303,9 +1306,11 @@ static int unreg_umr(struct mlx5_ib_dev *dev, struct mlx5_ib_mr *mr)
return 0;
umrwr.wr.send_flags = MLX5_IB_SEND_UMR_DISABLE_MR |
- MLX5_IB_SEND_UMR_FAIL_IF_FREE;
+ MLX5_IB_SEND_UMR_UPDATE_PD_ACCESS;
umrwr.wr.opcode = MLX5_IB_WR_UMR;
+ umrwr.pd = dev->umrc.pd;
umrwr.mkey = mr->mmkey.key;
+ umrwr.ignore_free_state = 1;
return mlx5_ib_post_send_wait(dev, &umrwr);
}
diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/qp.c b/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/qp.c
index 964c3a0bbf16..5a7dcb5afe6e 100644
--- a/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/qp.c
+++ b/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/qp.c
@@ -1425,7 +1425,6 @@ static int create_rss_raw_qp_tir(struct mlx5_ib_dev *dev, struct mlx5_ib_qp *qp,
}
MLX5_SET(tirc, tirc, rx_hash_fn, MLX5_RX_HASH_FN_TOEPLITZ);
- MLX5_SET(tirc, tirc, rx_hash_symmetric, 1);
memcpy(rss_key, ucmd.rx_hash_key, len);
break;
}
@@ -3265,10 +3264,14 @@ static void set_reg_umr_segment(struct mlx5_wqe_umr_ctrl_seg *umr,
memset(umr, 0, sizeof(*umr));
- if (wr->send_flags & MLX5_IB_SEND_UMR_FAIL_IF_FREE)
- umr->flags = MLX5_UMR_CHECK_FREE; /* fail if free */
- else
- umr->flags = MLX5_UMR_CHECK_NOT_FREE; /* fail if not free */
+ if (!umrwr->ignore_free_state) {
+ if (wr->send_flags & MLX5_IB_SEND_UMR_FAIL_IF_FREE)
+ /* fail if free */
+ umr->flags = MLX5_UMR_CHECK_FREE;
+ else
+ /* fail if not free */
+ umr->flags = MLX5_UMR_CHECK_NOT_FREE;
+ }
umr->xlt_octowords = cpu_to_be16(get_xlt_octo(umrwr->xlt_size));
if (wr->send_flags & MLX5_IB_SEND_UMR_UPDATE_XLT) {
diff --git a/drivers/misc/eeprom/at24.c b/drivers/misc/eeprom/at24.c
index 6b58ee2e2a25..f8cfcd063649 100644
--- a/drivers/misc/eeprom/at24.c
+++ b/drivers/misc/eeprom/at24.c
@@ -834,7 +834,7 @@ static int at24_probe(struct i2c_client *client, const struct i2c_device_id *id)
at24->nvmem_config.name = dev_name(&client->dev);
at24->nvmem_config.dev = &client->dev;
at24->nvmem_config.read_only = !writable;
- at24->nvmem_config.root_only = true;
+ at24->nvmem_config.root_only = !(chip.flags & AT24_FLAG_IRUGO);
at24->nvmem_config.owner = THIS_MODULE;
at24->nvmem_config.compat = true;
at24->nvmem_config.base_dev = &client->dev;
diff --git a/drivers/mmc/host/dw_mmc.c b/drivers/mmc/host/dw_mmc.c
index 5252885e5cda..32001d43e453 100644
--- a/drivers/mmc/host/dw_mmc.c
+++ b/drivers/mmc/host/dw_mmc.c
@@ -2046,8 +2046,7 @@ static void dw_mci_tasklet_func(unsigned long priv)
* delayed. Allowing the transfer to take place
* avoids races and keeps things simple.
*/
- if ((err != -ETIMEDOUT) &&
- (cmd->opcode == MMC_SEND_TUNING_BLOCK)) {
+ if (err != -ETIMEDOUT) {
state = STATE_SENDING_DATA;
continue;
}
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/emulex/benet/be_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/emulex/benet/be_main.c
index 39f399741647..cabeb1790db7 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/emulex/benet/be_main.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/emulex/benet/be_main.c
@@ -4600,8 +4600,12 @@ int be_update_queues(struct be_adapter *adapter)
struct net_device *netdev = adapter->netdev;
int status;
- if (netif_running(netdev))
+ if (netif_running(netdev)) {
+ /* device cannot transmit now, avoid dev_watchdog timeouts */
+ netif_carrier_off(netdev);
+
be_close(netdev);
+ }
be_cancel_worker(adapter);
diff --git a/drivers/perf/arm_pmu.c b/drivers/perf/arm_pmu.c
index 5e06917b4cef..22e365fa440c 100644
--- a/drivers/perf/arm_pmu.c
+++ b/drivers/perf/arm_pmu.c
@@ -751,8 +751,8 @@ static int cpu_pm_pmu_notify(struct notifier_block *b, unsigned long cmd,
cpu_pm_pmu_setup(armpmu, cmd);
break;
case CPU_PM_EXIT:
- cpu_pm_pmu_setup(armpmu, cmd);
case CPU_PM_ENTER_FAILED:
+ cpu_pm_pmu_setup(armpmu, cmd);
armpmu->start(armpmu);
break;
default:
diff --git a/drivers/rapidio/devices/rio_mport_cdev.c b/drivers/rapidio/devices/rio_mport_cdev.c
index 76afe1449cab..ecd71efe8ea0 100644
--- a/drivers/rapidio/devices/rio_mport_cdev.c
+++ b/drivers/rapidio/devices/rio_mport_cdev.c
@@ -1742,6 +1742,7 @@ static int rio_mport_add_riodev(struct mport_cdev_priv *priv,
if (copy_from_user(&dev_info, arg, sizeof(dev_info)))
return -EFAULT;
+ dev_info.name[sizeof(dev_info.name) - 1] = '\0';
rmcd_debug(RDEV, "name:%s ct:0x%x did:0x%x hc:0x%x", dev_info.name,
dev_info.comptag, dev_info.destid, dev_info.hopcount);
@@ -1873,6 +1874,7 @@ static int rio_mport_del_riodev(struct mport_cdev_priv *priv, void __user *arg)
if (copy_from_user(&dev_info, arg, sizeof(dev_info)))
return -EFAULT;
+ dev_info.name[sizeof(dev_info.name) - 1] = '\0';
mport = priv->md->mport;
diff --git a/drivers/s390/block/dasd_alias.c b/drivers/s390/block/dasd_alias.c
index 5e963fe0e38d..fd1dff2bed21 100644
--- a/drivers/s390/block/dasd_alias.c
+++ b/drivers/s390/block/dasd_alias.c
@@ -383,6 +383,20 @@ suborder_not_supported(struct dasd_ccw_req *cqr)
char msg_format;
char msg_no;
+ /*
+ * intrc values ENODEV, ENOLINK and EPERM
+ * will be optained from sleep_on to indicate that no
+ * IO operation can be started
+ */
+ if (cqr->intrc == -ENODEV)
+ return 1;
+
+ if (cqr->intrc == -ENOLINK)
+ return 1;
+
+ if (cqr->intrc == -EPERM)
+ return 1;
+
sense = dasd_get_sense(&cqr->irb);
if (!sense)
return 0;
@@ -447,12 +461,8 @@ static int read_unit_address_configuration(struct dasd_device *device,
lcu->flags &= ~NEED_UAC_UPDATE;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&lcu->lock, flags);
- do {
- rc = dasd_sleep_on(cqr);
- if (rc && suborder_not_supported(cqr))
- return -EOPNOTSUPP;
- } while (rc && (cqr->retries > 0));
- if (rc) {
+ rc = dasd_sleep_on(cqr);
+ if (rc && !suborder_not_supported(cqr)) {
spin_lock_irqsave(&lcu->lock, flags);
lcu->flags |= NEED_UAC_UPDATE;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&lcu->lock, flags);
diff --git a/drivers/s390/scsi/zfcp_erp.c b/drivers/s390/scsi/zfcp_erp.c
index 6d5065f679ac..64d70de98cdb 100644
--- a/drivers/s390/scsi/zfcp_erp.c
+++ b/drivers/s390/scsi/zfcp_erp.c
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
#define pr_fmt(fmt) KMSG_COMPONENT ": " fmt
#include <linux/kthread.h>
+#include <linux/bug.h>
#include "zfcp_ext.h"
#include "zfcp_reqlist.h"
@@ -245,6 +246,12 @@ static struct zfcp_erp_action *zfcp_erp_setup_act(int need, u32 act_status,
struct zfcp_erp_action *erp_action;
struct zfcp_scsi_dev *zfcp_sdev;
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(need != ZFCP_ERP_ACTION_REOPEN_LUN &&
+ need != ZFCP_ERP_ACTION_REOPEN_PORT &&
+ need != ZFCP_ERP_ACTION_REOPEN_PORT_FORCED &&
+ need != ZFCP_ERP_ACTION_REOPEN_ADAPTER))
+ return NULL;
+
switch (need) {
case ZFCP_ERP_ACTION_REOPEN_LUN:
zfcp_sdev = sdev_to_zfcp(sdev);
diff --git a/drivers/xen/swiotlb-xen.c b/drivers/xen/swiotlb-xen.c
index 95dbee89b758..021b5e7f4b7a 100644
--- a/drivers/xen/swiotlb-xen.c
+++ b/drivers/xen/swiotlb-xen.c
@@ -371,8 +371,8 @@ xen_swiotlb_free_coherent(struct device *hwdev, size_t size, void *vaddr,
/* Convert the size to actually allocated. */
size = 1UL << (order + XEN_PAGE_SHIFT);
- if (((dev_addr + size - 1 <= dma_mask)) ||
- range_straddles_page_boundary(phys, size))
+ if (!WARN_ON((dev_addr + size - 1 > dma_mask) ||
+ range_straddles_page_boundary(phys, size)))
xen_destroy_contiguous_region(phys, order);
xen_free_coherent_pages(hwdev, size, vaddr, (dma_addr_t)phys, attrs);
diff --git a/fs/adfs/super.c b/fs/adfs/super.c
index c9fdfb112933..e42c30001509 100644
--- a/fs/adfs/super.c
+++ b/fs/adfs/super.c
@@ -368,6 +368,7 @@ static int adfs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
struct buffer_head *bh;
struct object_info root_obj;
unsigned char *b_data;
+ unsigned int blocksize;
struct adfs_sb_info *asb;
struct inode *root;
int ret = -EINVAL;
@@ -419,8 +420,10 @@ static int adfs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
goto error_free_bh;
}
+ blocksize = 1 << dr->log2secsize;
brelse(bh);
- if (sb_set_blocksize(sb, 1 << dr->log2secsize)) {
+
+ if (sb_set_blocksize(sb, blocksize)) {
bh = sb_bread(sb, ADFS_DISCRECORD / sb->s_blocksize);
if (!bh) {
adfs_error(sb, "couldn't read superblock on "
diff --git a/fs/btrfs/send.c b/fs/btrfs/send.c
index 14c4062a6e58..a5905f97b3db 100644
--- a/fs/btrfs/send.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/send.c
@@ -6130,68 +6130,21 @@ static int changed_extent(struct send_ctx *sctx,
{
int ret = 0;
- if (sctx->cur_ino != sctx->cmp_key->objectid) {
-
- if (result == BTRFS_COMPARE_TREE_CHANGED) {
- struct extent_buffer *leaf_l;
- struct extent_buffer *leaf_r;
- struct btrfs_file_extent_item *ei_l;
- struct btrfs_file_extent_item *ei_r;
-
- leaf_l = sctx->left_path->nodes[0];
- leaf_r = sctx->right_path->nodes[0];
- ei_l = btrfs_item_ptr(leaf_l,
- sctx->left_path->slots[0],
- struct btrfs_file_extent_item);
- ei_r = btrfs_item_ptr(leaf_r,
- sctx->right_path->slots[0],
- struct btrfs_file_extent_item);
-
- /*
- * We may have found an extent item that has changed
- * only its disk_bytenr field and the corresponding
- * inode item was not updated. This case happens due to
- * very specific timings during relocation when a leaf
- * that contains file extent items is COWed while
- * relocation is ongoing and its in the stage where it
- * updates data pointers. So when this happens we can
- * safely ignore it since we know it's the same extent,
- * but just at different logical and physical locations
- * (when an extent is fully replaced with a new one, we
- * know the generation number must have changed too,
- * since snapshot creation implies committing the current
- * transaction, and the inode item must have been updated
- * as well).
- * This replacement of the disk_bytenr happens at
- * relocation.c:replace_file_extents() through
- * relocation.c:btrfs_reloc_cow_block().
- */
- if (btrfs_file_extent_generation(leaf_l, ei_l) ==
- btrfs_file_extent_generation(leaf_r, ei_r) &&
- btrfs_file_extent_ram_bytes(leaf_l, ei_l) ==
- btrfs_file_extent_ram_bytes(leaf_r, ei_r) &&
- btrfs_file_extent_compression(leaf_l, ei_l) ==
- btrfs_file_extent_compression(leaf_r, ei_r) &&
- btrfs_file_extent_encryption(leaf_l, ei_l) ==
- btrfs_file_extent_encryption(leaf_r, ei_r) &&
- btrfs_file_extent_other_encoding(leaf_l, ei_l) ==
- btrfs_file_extent_other_encoding(leaf_r, ei_r) &&
- btrfs_file_extent_type(leaf_l, ei_l) ==
- btrfs_file_extent_type(leaf_r, ei_r) &&
- btrfs_file_extent_disk_bytenr(leaf_l, ei_l) !=
- btrfs_file_extent_disk_bytenr(leaf_r, ei_r) &&
- btrfs_file_extent_disk_num_bytes(leaf_l, ei_l) ==
- btrfs_file_extent_disk_num_bytes(leaf_r, ei_r) &&
- btrfs_file_extent_offset(leaf_l, ei_l) ==
- btrfs_file_extent_offset(leaf_r, ei_r) &&
- btrfs_file_extent_num_bytes(leaf_l, ei_l) ==
- btrfs_file_extent_num_bytes(leaf_r, ei_r))
- return 0;
- }
-
- inconsistent_snapshot_error(sctx, result, "extent");
- return -EIO;
- }
+ /*
+ * We have found an extent item that changed without the inode item
+ * having changed. This can happen either after relocation (where the
+ * disk_bytenr of an extent item is replaced at
+ * relocation.c:replace_file_extents()) or after deduplication into a
+ * file in both the parent and send snapshots (where an extent item can
+ * get modified or replaced with a new one). Note that deduplication
+ * updates the inode item, but it only changes the iversion (sequence
+ * field in the inode item) of the inode, so if a file is deduplicated
+ * the same amount of times in both the parent and send snapshots, its
+ * iversion becames the same in both snapshots, whence the inode item is
+ * the same on both snapshots.
+ */
+ if (sctx->cur_ino != sctx->cmp_key->objectid)
+ return 0;
if (!sctx->cur_inode_new_gen && !sctx->cur_inode_deleted) {
if (result != BTRFS_COMPARE_TREE_DELETED)
diff --git a/fs/btrfs/transaction.c b/fs/btrfs/transaction.c
index 73c1fbca0c35..fa8f56e6f665 100644
--- a/fs/btrfs/transaction.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/transaction.c
@@ -2052,6 +2052,16 @@ int btrfs_commit_transaction(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans)
}
} else {
spin_unlock(&fs_info->trans_lock);
+ /*
+ * The previous transaction was aborted and was already removed
+ * from the list of transactions at fs_info->trans_list. So we
+ * abort to prevent writing a new superblock that reflects a
+ * corrupt state (pointing to trees with unwritten nodes/leafs).
+ */
+ if (test_bit(BTRFS_FS_STATE_TRANS_ABORTED, &fs_info->fs_state)) {
+ ret = -EROFS;
+ goto cleanup_transaction;
+ }
}
extwriter_counter_dec(cur_trans, trans->type);
diff --git a/fs/btrfs/volumes.c b/fs/btrfs/volumes.c
index 85294fef1051..358e930df4ac 100644
--- a/fs/btrfs/volumes.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/volumes.c
@@ -5019,8 +5019,7 @@ static inline int btrfs_chunk_max_errors(struct map_lookup *map)
if (map->type & (BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_RAID1 |
BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_RAID10 |
- BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_RAID5 |
- BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_DUP)) {
+ BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_RAID5)) {
max_errors = 1;
} else if (map->type & BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_RAID6) {
max_errors = 2;
diff --git a/fs/ceph/super.h b/fs/ceph/super.h
index 3e27a28aa44a..60b70f0985f6 100644
--- a/fs/ceph/super.h
+++ b/fs/ceph/super.h
@@ -517,7 +517,12 @@ static inline void __ceph_dir_set_complete(struct ceph_inode_info *ci,
long long release_count,
long long ordered_count)
{
- smp_mb__before_atomic();
+ /*
+ * Makes sure operations that setup readdir cache (update page
+ * cache and i_size) are strongly ordered w.r.t. the following
+ * atomic64_set() operations.
+ */
+ smp_mb();
atomic64_set(&ci->i_complete_seq[0], release_count);
atomic64_set(&ci->i_complete_seq[1], ordered_count);
}
diff --git a/fs/ceph/xattr.c b/fs/ceph/xattr.c
index e1c4e0b12b4c..0376db8a74f8 100644
--- a/fs/ceph/xattr.c
+++ b/fs/ceph/xattr.c
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ static size_t ceph_vxattrcb_layout(struct ceph_inode_info *ci, char *val,
const char *ns_field = " pool_namespace=";
char buf[128];
size_t len, total_len = 0;
- int ret;
+ ssize_t ret;
pool_ns = ceph_try_get_string(ci->i_layout.pool_ns);
@@ -99,11 +99,8 @@ static size_t ceph_vxattrcb_layout(struct ceph_inode_info *ci, char *val,
if (pool_ns)
total_len += strlen(ns_field) + pool_ns->len;
- if (!size) {
- ret = total_len;
- } else if (total_len > size) {
- ret = -ERANGE;
- } else {
+ ret = total_len;
+ if (size >= total_len) {
memcpy(val, buf, len);
ret = len;
if (pool_name) {
@@ -761,8 +758,11 @@ ssize_t __ceph_getxattr(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *value,
if (err)
return err;
err = -ENODATA;
- if (!(vxattr->exists_cb && !vxattr->exists_cb(ci)))
+ if (!(vxattr->exists_cb && !vxattr->exists_cb(ci))) {
err = vxattr->getxattr_cb(ci, value, size);
+ if (size && size < err)
+ err = -ERANGE;
+ }
return err;
}
diff --git a/fs/cifs/connect.c b/fs/cifs/connect.c
index 33cd844579ae..57c62ff4e8d6 100644
--- a/fs/cifs/connect.c
+++ b/fs/cifs/connect.c
@@ -554,10 +554,10 @@ static bool
server_unresponsive(struct TCP_Server_Info *server)
{
/*
- * We need to wait 2 echo intervals to make sure we handle such
+ * We need to wait 3 echo intervals to make sure we handle such
* situations right:
* 1s client sends a normal SMB request
- * 2s client gets a response
+ * 3s client gets a response
* 30s echo workqueue job pops, and decides we got a response recently
* and don't need to send another
* ...
@@ -566,9 +566,9 @@ server_unresponsive(struct TCP_Server_Info *server)
*/
if ((server->tcpStatus == CifsGood ||
server->tcpStatus == CifsNeedNegotiate) &&
- time_after(jiffies, server->lstrp + 2 * server->echo_interval)) {
+ time_after(jiffies, server->lstrp + 3 * server->echo_interval)) {
cifs_dbg(VFS, "Server %s has not responded in %lu seconds. Reconnecting...\n",
- server->hostname, (2 * server->echo_interval) / HZ);
+ server->hostname, (3 * server->echo_interval) / HZ);
cifs_reconnect(server);
wake_up(&server->response_q);
return true;
diff --git a/fs/coda/psdev.c b/fs/coda/psdev.c
index f40e3953e7fe..a6d9e841a375 100644
--- a/fs/coda/psdev.c
+++ b/fs/coda/psdev.c
@@ -187,8 +187,11 @@ static ssize_t coda_psdev_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
if (req->uc_opcode == CODA_OPEN_BY_FD) {
struct coda_open_by_fd_out *outp =
(struct coda_open_by_fd_out *)req->uc_data;
- if (!outp->oh.result)
+ if (!outp->oh.result) {
outp->fh = fget(outp->fd);
+ if (!outp->fh)
+ return -EBADF;
+ }
}
wake_up(&req->uc_sleep);
diff --git a/include/linux/acpi.h b/include/linux/acpi.h
index 13c105121a18..d7a9700b9333 100644
--- a/include/linux/acpi.h
+++ b/include/linux/acpi.h
@@ -324,7 +324,10 @@ void acpi_set_irq_model(enum acpi_irq_model_id model,
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_IO_APIC
extern int acpi_get_override_irq(u32 gsi, int *trigger, int *polarity);
#else
-#define acpi_get_override_irq(gsi, trigger, polarity) (-1)
+static inline int acpi_get_override_irq(u32 gsi, int *trigger, int *polarity)
+{
+ return -1;
+}
#endif
/*
* This function undoes the effect of one call to acpi_register_gsi().
diff --git a/include/linux/coda.h b/include/linux/coda.h
index d30209b9cef8..0ca0c83fdb1c 100644
--- a/include/linux/coda.h
+++ b/include/linux/coda.h
@@ -58,8 +58,7 @@ Mellon the rights to redistribute these changes without encumbrance.
#ifndef _CODA_HEADER_
#define _CODA_HEADER_
-#if defined(__linux__)
typedef unsigned long long u_quad_t;
-#endif
+
#include <uapi/linux/coda.h>
#endif
diff --git a/include/linux/coda_psdev.h b/include/linux/coda_psdev.h
index 15170954aa2b..57d2b2faf6a3 100644
--- a/include/linux/coda_psdev.h
+++ b/include/linux/coda_psdev.h
@@ -19,6 +19,17 @@ struct venus_comm {
struct mutex vc_mutex;
};
+/* messages between coda filesystem in kernel and Venus */
+struct upc_req {
+ struct list_head uc_chain;
+ caddr_t uc_data;
+ u_short uc_flags;
+ u_short uc_inSize; /* Size is at most 5000 bytes */
+ u_short uc_outSize;
+ u_short uc_opcode; /* copied from data to save lookup */
+ int uc_unique;
+ wait_queue_head_t uc_sleep; /* process' wait queue */
+};
static inline struct venus_comm *coda_vcp(struct super_block *sb)
{
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/coda_psdev.h b/include/uapi/linux/coda_psdev.h
index aa6623efd2dd..d50d51a57fe4 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/coda_psdev.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/coda_psdev.h
@@ -7,19 +7,6 @@
#define CODA_PSDEV_MAJOR 67
#define MAX_CODADEVS 5 /* how many do we allow */
-
-/* messages between coda filesystem in kernel and Venus */
-struct upc_req {
- struct list_head uc_chain;
- caddr_t uc_data;
- u_short uc_flags;
- u_short uc_inSize; /* Size is at most 5000 bytes */
- u_short uc_outSize;
- u_short uc_opcode; /* copied from data to save lookup */
- int uc_unique;
- wait_queue_head_t uc_sleep; /* process' wait queue */
-};
-
#define CODA_REQ_ASYNC 0x1
#define CODA_REQ_READ 0x2
#define CODA_REQ_WRITE 0x4
diff --git a/ipc/mqueue.c b/ipc/mqueue.c
index 5c0ae912f2f2..dccd4ecb786a 100644
--- a/ipc/mqueue.c
+++ b/ipc/mqueue.c
@@ -372,7 +372,6 @@ static void mqueue_evict_inode(struct inode *inode)
{
struct mqueue_inode_info *info;
struct user_struct *user;
- unsigned long mq_bytes, mq_treesize;
struct ipc_namespace *ipc_ns;
struct msg_msg *msg, *nmsg;
LIST_HEAD(tmp_msg);
@@ -395,16 +394,18 @@ static void mqueue_evict_inode(struct inode *inode)
free_msg(msg);
}
- /* Total amount of bytes accounted for the mqueue */
- mq_treesize = info->attr.mq_maxmsg * sizeof(struct msg_msg) +
- min_t(unsigned int, info->attr.mq_maxmsg, MQ_PRIO_MAX) *
- sizeof(struct posix_msg_tree_node);
-
- mq_bytes = mq_treesize + (info->attr.mq_maxmsg *
- info->attr.mq_msgsize);
-
user = info->user;
if (user) {
+ unsigned long mq_bytes, mq_treesize;
+
+ /* Total amount of bytes accounted for the mqueue */
+ mq_treesize = info->attr.mq_maxmsg * sizeof(struct msg_msg) +
+ min_t(unsigned int, info->attr.mq_maxmsg, MQ_PRIO_MAX) *
+ sizeof(struct posix_msg_tree_node);
+
+ mq_bytes = mq_treesize + (info->attr.mq_maxmsg *
+ info->attr.mq_msgsize);
+
spin_lock(&mq_lock);
user->mq_bytes -= mq_bytes;
/*
diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
index 94528b891027..4b372c14d9a1 100644
--- a/kernel/module.c
+++ b/kernel/module.c
@@ -3391,8 +3391,7 @@ static bool finished_loading(const char *name)
sched_annotate_sleep();
mutex_lock(&module_mutex);
mod = find_module_all(name, strlen(name), true);
- ret = !mod || mod->state == MODULE_STATE_LIVE
- || mod->state == MODULE_STATE_GOING;
+ ret = !mod || mod->state == MODULE_STATE_LIVE;
mutex_unlock(&module_mutex);
return ret;
@@ -3560,8 +3559,7 @@ static int add_unformed_module(struct module *mod)
mutex_lock(&module_mutex);
old = find_module_all(mod->name, strlen(mod->name), true);
if (old != NULL) {
- if (old->state == MODULE_STATE_COMING
- || old->state == MODULE_STATE_UNFORMED) {
+ if (old->state != MODULE_STATE_LIVE) {
/* Wait in case it fails to load. */
mutex_unlock(&module_mutex);
err = wait_event_interruptible(module_wq,
diff --git a/kernel/trace/ftrace.c b/kernel/trace/ftrace.c
index c4a0ad18c859..7420f5f36094 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/ftrace.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/ftrace.c
@@ -1712,6 +1712,11 @@ static bool test_rec_ops_needs_regs(struct dyn_ftrace *rec)
return keep_regs;
}
+static struct ftrace_ops *
+ftrace_find_tramp_ops_any(struct dyn_ftrace *rec);
+static struct ftrace_ops *
+ftrace_find_tramp_ops_next(struct dyn_ftrace *rec, struct ftrace_ops *ops);
+
static bool __ftrace_hash_rec_update(struct ftrace_ops *ops,
int filter_hash,
bool inc)
@@ -1840,15 +1845,17 @@ static bool __ftrace_hash_rec_update(struct ftrace_ops *ops,
}
/*
- * If the rec had TRAMP enabled, then it needs to
- * be cleared. As TRAMP can only be enabled iff
- * there is only a single ops attached to it.
- * In otherwords, always disable it on decrementing.
- * In the future, we may set it if rec count is
- * decremented to one, and the ops that is left
- * has a trampoline.
+ * The TRAMP needs to be set only if rec count
+ * is decremented to one, and the ops that is
+ * left has a trampoline. As TRAMP can only be
+ * enabled if there is only a single ops attached
+ * to it.
*/
- rec->flags &= ~FTRACE_FL_TRAMP;
+ if (ftrace_rec_count(rec) == 1 &&
+ ftrace_find_tramp_ops_any(rec))
+ rec->flags |= FTRACE_FL_TRAMP;
+ else
+ rec->flags &= ~FTRACE_FL_TRAMP;
/*
* flags will be cleared in ftrace_check_record()
@@ -2041,11 +2048,6 @@ static void print_ip_ins(const char *fmt, const unsigned char *p)
printk(KERN_CONT "%s%02x", i ? ":" : "", p[i]);
}
-static struct ftrace_ops *
-ftrace_find_tramp_ops_any(struct dyn_ftrace *rec);
-static struct ftrace_ops *
-ftrace_find_tramp_ops_next(struct dyn_ftrace *rec, struct ftrace_ops *ops);
-
enum ftrace_bug_type ftrace_bug_type;
const void *ftrace_expected;
diff --git a/mm/cma.c b/mm/cma.c
index 56761e40d191..c4a34c813d47 100644
--- a/mm/cma.c
+++ b/mm/cma.c
@@ -277,6 +277,12 @@ int __init cma_declare_contiguous(phys_addr_t base,
*/
alignment = max(alignment, (phys_addr_t)PAGE_SIZE <<
max_t(unsigned long, MAX_ORDER - 1, pageblock_order));
+ if (fixed && base & (alignment - 1)) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ pr_err("Region at %pa must be aligned to %pa bytes\n",
+ &base, &alignment);
+ goto err;
+ }
base = ALIGN(base, alignment);
size = ALIGN(size, alignment);
limit &= ~(alignment - 1);
@@ -307,6 +313,13 @@ int __init cma_declare_contiguous(phys_addr_t base,
if (limit == 0 || limit > memblock_end)
limit = memblock_end;
+ if (base + size > limit) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ pr_err("Size (%pa) of region at %pa exceeds limit (%pa)\n",
+ &size, &base, &limit);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
/* Reserve memory */
if (fixed) {
if (memblock_is_region_reserved(base, size) ||
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
index 524068d71bc1..9d9f6bb1e56e 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
@@ -275,6 +275,8 @@ static int rangetr_cmp(struct hashtab *h, const void *k1, const void *k2)
return v;
}
+static int (*destroy_f[SYM_NUM]) (void *key, void *datum, void *datap);
+
/*
* Initialize a policy database structure.
*/
@@ -322,8 +324,10 @@ static int policydb_init(struct policydb *p)
out:
hashtab_destroy(p->filename_trans);
hashtab_destroy(p->range_tr);
- for (i = 0; i < SYM_NUM; i++)
+ for (i = 0; i < SYM_NUM; i++) {
+ hashtab_map(p->symtab[i].table, destroy_f[i], NULL);
hashtab_destroy(p->symtab[i].table);
+ }
return rc;
}
diff --git a/tools/objtool/elf.c b/tools/objtool/elf.c
index e6cef5a160e7..d089c711355a 100644
--- a/tools/objtool/elf.c
+++ b/tools/objtool/elf.c
@@ -305,7 +305,7 @@ static int read_symbols(struct elf *elf)
if (sym->type != STT_FUNC)
continue;
sym->pfunc = sym->cfunc = sym;
- coldstr = strstr(sym->name, ".cold.");
+ coldstr = strstr(sym->name, ".cold");
if (!coldstr)
continue;
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