linux-kernel - [PATCH 3.16 061/157] xfrm4: Fix header checks in _decode

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Message-ID: <lsq.1565469607.680261960@decadent.org.uk>
Date:   Sat, 10 Aug 2019 21:40:07 +0100
From:   Ben Hutchings <ben@...adent.org.uk>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, stable@...r.kernel.org
CC:     akpm@...ux-foundation.org, Denis Kirjanov <kda@...ux-powerpc.org>,
        "Steffen Klassert" <steffen.klassert@...unet.com>
Subject: [PATCH 3.16 061/157] xfrm4: Fix header checks in _decode_session4.

3.16.72-rc1 review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@...unet.com>

commit 1a14f1e5550a341f76e5c8f596e9b5f8a886dfbc upstream.

We skip the header informations if the data pointer points
already behind the header in question for some protocols.
This is because we call pskb_may_pull with a negative value
converted to unsigened int from pskb_may_pull in this case.
Skipping the header informations can lead to incorrect policy
lookups, so fix it by a check of the data pointer position
before we call pskb_may_pull.

Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@...unet.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@...adent.org.uk>
---
 net/ipv4/xfrm4_policy.c | 15 ++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

--- a/net/ipv4/xfrm4_policy.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/xfrm4_policy.c
@@ -131,7 +131,8 @@ _decode_session4(struct sk_buff *skb, st
 			break;
 
 		case IPPROTO_ICMP:
-			if (pskb_may_pull(skb, xprth + 2 - skb->data)) {
+			if (xprth + 2 < skb->data ||
+			    pskb_may_pull(skb, xprth + 2 - skb->data)) {
 				u8 *icmp = xprth;
 
 				fl4->fl4_icmp_type = icmp[0];
@@ -140,7 +141,8 @@ _decode_session4(struct sk_buff *skb, st
 			break;
 
 		case IPPROTO_ESP:
-			if (pskb_may_pull(skb, xprth + 4 - skb->data)) {
+			if (xprth + 4 < skb->data ||
+			    pskb_may_pull(skb, xprth + 4 - skb->data)) {
 				__be32 *ehdr = (__be32 *)xprth;
 
 				fl4->fl4_ipsec_spi = ehdr[0];
@@ -148,7 +150,8 @@ _decode_session4(struct sk_buff *skb, st
 			break;
 
 		case IPPROTO_AH:
-			if (pskb_may_pull(skb, xprth + 8 - skb->data)) {
+			if (xprth + 8 < skb->data ||
+			    pskb_may_pull(skb, xprth + 8 - skb->data)) {
 				__be32 *ah_hdr = (__be32 *)xprth;
 
 				fl4->fl4_ipsec_spi = ah_hdr[1];
@@ -156,7 +159,8 @@ _decode_session4(struct sk_buff *skb, st
 			break;
 
 		case IPPROTO_COMP:
-			if (pskb_may_pull(skb, xprth + 4 - skb->data)) {
+			if (xprth + 4 < skb->data ||
+			    pskb_may_pull(skb, xprth + 4 - skb->data)) {
 				__be16 *ipcomp_hdr = (__be16 *)xprth;
 
 				fl4->fl4_ipsec_spi = htonl(ntohs(ipcomp_hdr[1]));
@@ -164,7 +168,8 @@ _decode_session4(struct sk_buff *skb, st
 			break;
 
 		case IPPROTO_GRE:
-			if (pskb_may_pull(skb, xprth + 12 - skb->data)) {
+			if (xprth + 12 < skb->data ||
+			    pskb_may_pull(skb, xprth + 12 - skb->data)) {
 				__be16 *greflags = (__be16 *)xprth;
 				__be32 *gre_hdr = (__be32 *)xprth;