linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v6 7/8] KVM: x86: Load Guest fpu state when accessing MSRs managed by XSAVES

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Message-ID: <20190813060529.GD2432@local-michael-cet-test>
Date:   Tue, 13 Aug 2019 14:05:29 +0800
From:   Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@...el.com>
To:     Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>
Cc:     Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@...el.com>, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, pbonzini@...hat.com, mst@...hat.com,
        rkrcmar@...hat.com, jmattson@...gle.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 7/8] KVM: x86: Load Guest fpu state when accessing
 MSRs managed by XSAVES

On Mon, Aug 12, 2019 at 04:02:03PM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> On Thu, Jul 25, 2019 at 11:12:45AM +0800, Yang Weijiang wrote:
> > From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>
> > 
> > A handful of CET MSRs are not context switched through "traditional"
> > methods, e.g. VMCS or manual switching, but rather are passed through
> > to the guest and are saved and restored by XSAVES/XRSTORS, i.e. the
> > guest's FPU state.
> > 
> > Load the guest's FPU state if userspace is accessing MSRs whose values
> > are managed by XSAVES so that the MSR helper, e.g. vmx_{get,set}_msr(),
> > can simply do {RD,WR}MSR to access the guest's value.
> > 
> > Note that guest_cpuid_has() is not queried as host userspace is allowed
> > to access MSRs that have not been exposed to the guest, e.g. it might do
> > KVM_SET_MSRS prior to KVM_SET_CPUID2.
> > 
> > Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>
> > Co-developed-by: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@...el.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@...el.com>
> > ---
> >  arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
> >  1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> > 
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> > index fafd81d2c9ea..c657e6a56527 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> > @@ -102,6 +102,8 @@ static void enter_smm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
> >  static void __kvm_set_rflags(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long rflags);
> >  static void store_regs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
> >  static int sync_regs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
> > +static void kvm_load_guest_fpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
> > +static void kvm_put_guest_fpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
> >  
> >  struct kvm_x86_ops *kvm_x86_ops __read_mostly;
> >  EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_x86_ops);
> > @@ -2959,6 +2961,12 @@ int kvm_get_msr_common(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
> >  }
> >  EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_get_msr_common);
> >  
> > +static bool is_xsaves_msr(u32 index)
> > +{
> > +	return index == MSR_IA32_U_CET ||
> > +	       (index >= MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP && index <= MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP);
> > +}
> > +
> >  /*
> >   * Read or write a bunch of msrs. All parameters are kernel addresses.
> >   *
> > @@ -2969,11 +2977,30 @@ static int __msr_io(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_msrs *msrs,
> >  		    int (*do_msr)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> >  				  unsigned index, u64 *data))
> >  {
> > +	bool fpu_loaded = false;
> >  	int i;
> > +	u64 cet_bits = XFEATURE_MASK_CET_USER | XFEATURE_MASK_CET_KERNEL;
> 
> Dunno if the compiler will actually generate different code, but this can be a
> const.
>
OK, will add it.
> > +	u64 host_xss = 0;
> > +
> > +	for (i = 0; i < msrs->nmsrs; ++i) {
> > +		if (!fpu_loaded && is_xsaves_msr(entries[i].index)) {
> > +			if (!kvm_x86_ops->xsaves_supported() ||
> > +			    !kvm_x86_ops->supported_xss())
> 
> The "!kvm_x86_ops->supported_xss()" is redundant with the host_xss check
> below.
> 
> > +				continue;
> 
> Hmm, vmx_set_msr() should be checking host_xss, arguably we should call
> do_msr() and let it handle the bad MSR access.  I don't have a strong
> opinion either way, practically speaking the end result will be the same.
> 
> If we do want to handle a misbehaving userspace here, this should be
> 'break' instead of 'continue'.
> 
> > +
> > +			host_xss = kvm_x86_ops->supported_xss();
> >  
> > -	for (i = 0; i < msrs->nmsrs; ++i)
> > +			if ((host_xss & cet_bits) != cet_bits)
> 
> I'm pretty sure this should check for either CET bit being set, not both,
> e.g. I assume it's possible to enable and expose XFEATURE_MASK_CET_USER
> but not XFEATURE_MASK_CET_KERNEL.
> 
> So something like
> 
> 	const u64 cet_bits = XFEATURE_MASK_CET_USER | XFEATURE_MASK_CET_KERNEL;
> 	const bool cet_supported = kvm_x86_ops->xsaves_supported() &&
> 				   (kvm_x86_ops->supported_xss() & cet_bits);
> 
> 	for (i = 0; i < msrs->nmsrs; ++i) {
> 		if (!fpu_loaded && cet_supported &&
> 		    is_xsaves_msr(entries[i].index)) {
> 			kvm_load_guest_fpu(vcpu);
> 			fpu_loaded = true;
> 		}
> 		if (do_msr(vcpu, entries[i].index, &entries[i].data))
> 			break;	
> 	}
> 
thanks, will modify the patch.
> or
> 
> 	const u64 cet_bits = XFEATURE_MASK_CET_USER | XFEATURE_MASK_CET_KERNEL;
> 
> 	for (i = 0; i < msrs->nmsrs; ++i) {
> 		if (!fpu_loaded && is_xsaves_msr(entries[i].index)) {
> 			if (!kvm_x86_ops->supported_xss() ||
> 			    !(kvm_x86_ops->supported_xss() & cet_bits))
> 				break;
> 			kvm_load_guest_fpu(vcpu);
> 			fpu_loaded = true;
> 		}
> 		if (do_msr(vcpu, entries[i].index, &entries[i].data))
> 			break;	
> 	}
> 
> 
> > +				continue;
> > +
> > +			kvm_load_guest_fpu(vcpu);
> > +			fpu_loaded = true;
> > +		}
> >  		if (do_msr(vcpu, entries[i].index, &entries[i].data))
> >  			break;
> > +	}
> > +	if (fpu_loaded)
> > +		kvm_put_guest_fpu(vcpu);
> >  
> >  	return i;
> >  }
> > -- 
> > 2.17.2
> >