[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <20190817084410.GA15364@zn.tnic>
Date: Sat, 17 Aug 2019 10:44:10 +0200
From: Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
To: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@...rix.com>
Cc: "Lendacky, Thomas" <Thomas.Lendacky@....com>,
"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"linux-doc@...r.kernel.org" <linux-doc@...r.kernel.org>,
"linux-pm@...r.kernel.org" <linux-pm@...r.kernel.org>,
"x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
"Rafael J . Wysocki" <rjw@...ysocki.net>,
Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>, Chen Yu <yu.c.chen@...el.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86/CPU/AMD: Clear RDRAND CPUID bit on AMD family 15h/16h
On Thu, Aug 15, 2019 at 10:25:24PM +0100, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> I'm afraid that a number of hypervisors do write-discard, given the
> propensity of OSes (certainly traditionally) to go poking at bits like
> this without wrmsr_safe().
>
> You either need to read the MSR back and observe that the bit has really
> changed, or in this case as Thomas suggests, look at CPUID again (which
> will likely be the faster option for the non-virtualised case).
One thing I didn't think of when we talked about this: this happens only
after you resume the hypervisor. And the words "resume the hypervisor"
already means an improbable use case. Yeah, yeah, one can close the
laptop lid of her/his F15h or F16h machine while guests are running and
when the HV resumes, those guests won't get randomness but I can't seem
to find it in myself to say, uuh, that's an important use case...
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
Good mailing practices for 400: avoid top-posting and trim the reply.
Powered by blists - more mailing lists