linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] erofs: move erofs out of staging

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Message-ID: <1608410274.69654.1566200232285.JavaMail.zimbra@nod.at>
Date:   Mon, 19 Aug 2019 09:37:12 +0200 (CEST)
From:   Richard Weinberger <richard@....at>
To:     Christoph Hellwig <hch@...radead.org>
Cc:     tytso <tytso@....edu>,
        Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        Gao Xiang <hsiangkao@....com>, Jan Kara <jack@...e.cz>,
        Chao Yu <yuchao0@...wei.com>,
        Dave Chinner <david@...morbit.com>,
        David Sterba <dsterba@...e.cz>, Miao Xie <miaoxie@...wei.com>,
        devel <devel@...verdev.osuosl.org>,
        Stephen Rothwell <sfr@...b.auug.org.au>,
        Darrick <darrick.wong@...cle.com>,
        Amir Goldstein <amir73il@...il.com>,
        linux-erofs <linux-erofs@...ts.ozlabs.org>,
        Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
        Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@...nel.org>,
        linux-kernel <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Li Guifu <bluce.liguifu@...wei.com>,
        Fang Wei <fangwei1@...wei.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@...x.de>,
        linux-fsdevel <linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] erofs: move erofs out of staging

----- Ursprüngliche Mail -----
> On Sun, Aug 18, 2019 at 10:29:38AM -0700, Eric Biggers wrote:
>> Not sure what you're even disagreeing with, as I *do* expect new filesystems to
>> be held to a high standard, and to be written with the assumption that the
>> on-disk data may be corrupted or malicious.  We just can't expect the bar to be
>> so high (e.g. no bugs) that it's never been attained by *any* filesystem even
>> after years/decades of active development.  If the developers were careful, the
>> code generally looks robust, and they are willing to address such bugs as they
>> are found, realistically that's as good as we can expect to get...
> 
> Well, the impression I got from Richards quick look and the reply to it is
> that there is very little attempt to validate the ondisk data structure
> and there is absolutely no priority to do so.  Which is very different
> from there is a bug or two here and there.

On the plus side, everything I reported got fixed within hours.

Thanks,
//richard