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Message-Id: <20190820033406.29796-9-cyphar@cyphar.com>
Date: Tue, 20 Aug 2019 13:34:06 +1000
From: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@...har.com>
To: Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
Jeff Layton <jlayton@...nel.org>,
"J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@...ldses.org>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
Shuah Khan <shuah@...nel.org>,
Shuah Khan <skhan@...uxfoundation.org>
Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@...har.com>,
Eric Biederman <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
Christian Brauner <christian@...uner.io>,
Tycho Andersen <tycho@...ho.ws>,
David Drysdale <drysdale@...gle.com>,
Chanho Min <chanho.min@....com>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>, Aleksa Sarai <asarai@...e.de>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
containers@...ts.linux-foundation.org, linux-alpha@...r.kernel.org,
linux-api@...r.kernel.org, linux-arch@...r.kernel.org,
linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org,
linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, linux-ia64@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org,
linux-m68k@...ts.linux-m68k.org, linux-mips@...r.kernel.org,
linux-parisc@...r.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@...ts.ozlabs.org,
linux-s390@...r.kernel.org, linux-sh@...r.kernel.org,
linux-xtensa@...ux-xtensa.org, sparclinux@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH RESEND v11 8/8] selftests: add openat2(2) selftests
Test all of the various openat2(2) flags, as well as how file
descriptor re-opening works. A small stress-test of a symlink-rename
attack is included to show that the protections against ".."-based
attacks are sufficient.
In addition, the memfd selftest is fixed to no longer depend on the
now-disallowed functionality of upgrading an O_RDONLY descriptor to
O_RDWR.
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@...har.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/Makefile | 1 +
tools/testing/selftests/memfd/memfd_test.c | 7 +-
tools/testing/selftests/openat2/.gitignore | 1 +
tools/testing/selftests/openat2/Makefile | 8 +
tools/testing/selftests/openat2/helpers.c | 162 +++++++
tools/testing/selftests/openat2/helpers.h | 116 +++++
.../testing/selftests/openat2/linkmode_test.c | 333 +++++++++++++++
.../selftests/openat2/rename_attack_test.c | 127 ++++++
.../testing/selftests/openat2/resolve_test.c | 402 ++++++++++++++++++
9 files changed, 1155 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/openat2/.gitignore
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/openat2/Makefile
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/openat2/helpers.c
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/openat2/helpers.h
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/openat2/linkmode_test.c
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/openat2/rename_attack_test.c
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/openat2/resolve_test.c
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/Makefile b/tools/testing/selftests/Makefile
index 25b43a8c2b15..13c02e0d0efc 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/Makefile
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/Makefile
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ TARGETS += powerpc
TARGETS += proc
TARGETS += pstore
TARGETS += ptrace
+TARGETS += openat2
TARGETS += rseq
TARGETS += rtc
TARGETS += seccomp
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/memfd/memfd_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/memfd/memfd_test.c
index c67d32eeb668..e71df3d3e55d 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/memfd/memfd_test.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/memfd/memfd_test.c
@@ -925,7 +925,7 @@ static void test_share_mmap(char *banner, char *b_suffix)
*/
static void test_share_open(char *banner, char *b_suffix)
{
- int fd, fd2;
+ int procfd, fd, fd2;
printf("%s %s %s\n", memfd_str, banner, b_suffix);
@@ -950,13 +950,16 @@ static void test_share_open(char *banner, char *b_suffix)
mfd_assert_has_seals(fd, F_SEAL_WRITE | F_SEAL_SHRINK);
mfd_assert_has_seals(fd2, F_SEAL_WRITE | F_SEAL_SHRINK);
+ /* We cannot do a MAY_WRITE re-open of an O_RDONLY fd. */
+ procfd = mfd_assert_open(fd2, O_PATH, 0);
close(fd2);
- fd2 = mfd_assert_open(fd, O_RDWR, 0);
+ fd2 = mfd_assert_open(procfd, O_WRONLY, 0);
mfd_assert_add_seals(fd2, F_SEAL_SEAL);
mfd_assert_has_seals(fd, F_SEAL_WRITE | F_SEAL_SHRINK | F_SEAL_SEAL);
mfd_assert_has_seals(fd2, F_SEAL_WRITE | F_SEAL_SHRINK | F_SEAL_SEAL);
+ close(procfd);
close(fd2);
close(fd);
}
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/openat2/.gitignore b/tools/testing/selftests/openat2/.gitignore
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..bd68f6c3fd07
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/openat2/.gitignore
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+/*_test
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/openat2/Makefile b/tools/testing/selftests/openat2/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..a0c1b53fd268
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/openat2/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+CFLAGS += -Wall -O2 -g
+TEST_GEN_PROGS := linkmode_test resolve_test rename_attack_test
+
+include ../lib.mk
+
+$(TEST_GEN_PROGS): helpers.c
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/openat2/helpers.c b/tools/testing/selftests/openat2/helpers.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..b9b7c7fc7a99
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/openat2/helpers.c
@@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/*
+ * Author: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@...har.com>
+ * Copyright (C) 2018-2019 SUSE LLC.
+ */
+
+#define _GNU_SOURCE
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <syscall.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+
+#include "helpers.h"
+
+int sys_openat2(int dfd, const char *path, const struct open_how *how)
+{
+ int ret = syscall(__NR_openat2, dfd, path, how);
+ return ret >= 0 ? ret : -errno;
+}
+
+int sys_openat(int dfd, const char *path, const struct open_how *how)
+{
+ int ret = openat(dfd, path, how->flags, how->mode);
+ return ret >= 0 ? ret : -errno;
+}
+
+int sys_renameat2(int olddirfd, const char *oldpath,
+ int newdirfd, const char *newpath, unsigned int flags)
+{
+ int ret = syscall(__NR_renameat2, olddirfd, oldpath,
+ newdirfd, newpath, flags);
+ return ret >= 0 ? ret : -errno;
+}
+
+char *openat_flags(unsigned int flags)
+{
+ char *flagset, *accmode = "(none)";
+
+ switch (flags & 0x03) {
+ case O_RDWR:
+ accmode = "O_RDWR";
+ break;
+ case O_RDONLY:
+ accmode = "O_RDONLY";
+ break;
+ case O_WRONLY:
+ accmode = "O_WRONLY";
+ break;
+ }
+
+ E_asprintf(&flagset, "%s%s%s",
+ (flags & O_PATH) ? "O_PATH|" : "",
+ (flags & O_CREAT) ? "O_CREAT|" : "",
+ accmode);
+
+ return flagset;
+}
+
+char *openat2_flags(const struct open_how *how)
+{
+ char *p;
+ char *flags_set, *resolve_set, *acc_set, *set;
+
+ flags_set = openat_flags(how->flags);
+
+ E_asprintf(&resolve_set, "%s%s%s%s%s0",
+ (how->resolve & RESOLVE_NO_XDEV) ? "RESOLVE_NO_XDEV|" : "",
+ (how->resolve & RESOLVE_NO_MAGICLINKS) ? "RESOLVE_NO_MAGICLINKS|" : "",
+ (how->resolve & RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS) ? "RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS|" : "",
+ (how->resolve & RESOLVE_BENEATH) ? "RESOLVE_BENEATH|" : "",
+ (how->resolve & RESOLVE_IN_ROOT) ? "RESOLVE_IN_ROOT|" : "");
+
+ /* Remove trailing "|0". */
+ p = strstr(resolve_set, "|0");
+ if (p)
+ *p = '\0';
+
+ if (how->flags & O_PATH)
+ E_asprintf(&acc_set, ", upgrade_mask=%s%s0",
+ (how->upgrade_mask & UPGRADE_NOREAD) ? "UPGRADE_NOREAD|" : "",
+ (how->upgrade_mask & UPGRADE_NOWRITE) ? "UPGRADE_NOWRITE|" : "");
+ else if (how->flags & O_CREAT)
+ E_asprintf(&acc_set, ", mode=0%o", how->mode);
+ else
+ acc_set = strdup("");
+
+ /* Remove trailing "|0". */
+ p = strstr(acc_set, "|0");
+ if (p)
+ *p = '\0';
+
+ /* And now generate our flagset. */
+ E_asprintf(&set, "[flags=%s, resolve=%s%s]",
+ flags_set, resolve_set, acc_set);
+
+ free(flags_set);
+ free(resolve_set);
+ free(acc_set);
+ return set;
+}
+
+int touchat(int dfd, const char *path)
+{
+ int fd = openat(dfd, path, O_CREAT);
+ if (fd >= 0)
+ close(fd);
+ return fd;
+}
+
+char *fdreadlink(int fd)
+{
+ char *target, *tmp;
+
+ E_asprintf(&tmp, "/proc/self/fd/%d", fd);
+
+ target = malloc(PATH_MAX);
+ if (!target)
+ ksft_exit_fail_msg("fdreadlink: malloc failed\n");
+ memset(target, 0, PATH_MAX);
+
+ E_readlink(tmp, target, PATH_MAX);
+ free(tmp);
+ return target;
+}
+
+bool fdequal(int fd, int dfd, const char *path)
+{
+ char *fdpath, *dfdpath, *other;
+ bool cmp;
+
+ fdpath = fdreadlink(fd);
+ dfdpath = fdreadlink(dfd);
+
+ if (!path)
+ E_asprintf(&other, "%s", dfdpath);
+ else if (*path == '/')
+ E_asprintf(&other, "%s", path);
+ else
+ E_asprintf(&other, "%s/%s", dfdpath, path);
+
+ cmp = !strcmp(fdpath, other);
+ if (!cmp)
+ ksft_print_msg("fdequal: expected '%s' but got '%s'\n", other, fdpath);
+
+ free(fdpath);
+ free(dfdpath);
+ free(other);
+ return cmp;
+}
+
+void test_openat2_supported(void)
+{
+ struct open_how how = {};
+ int fd = sys_openat2(AT_FDCWD, ".", &how);
+ if (fd == -ENOSYS)
+ ksft_exit_skip("openat2(2) unsupported on this kernel\n");
+ if (fd < 0)
+ ksft_exit_fail_msg("openat2(2) supported check failed: %s\n", strerror(-fd));
+ close(fd);
+}
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/openat2/helpers.h b/tools/testing/selftests/openat2/helpers.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..43fa7835950f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/openat2/helpers.h
@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/*
+ * Author: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@...har.com>
+ * Copyright (C) 2018-2019 SUSE LLC.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __RESOLVEAT_H__
+#define __RESOLVEAT_H__
+
+#define _GNU_SOURCE
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include "../kselftest.h"
+
+#define ARRAY_LEN(X) (sizeof (X) / sizeof (*(X)))
+#define BUILD_BUG_ON(e) ((void)(sizeof(struct { int:(-!!(e)); })))
+
+#ifndef SYS_openat2
+#ifndef __NR_openat2
+#define __NR_openat2 437
+#endif /* __NR_openat2 */
+#define SYS_openat2 __NR_openat2
+#endif /* SYS_openat2 */
+
+/**
+ * Arguments for how openat2(2) should open the target path. If @extra is zero,
+ * then openat2 is identical to openat(2). Only one of @mode or @upgrade_mask
+ * may be set at any given time.
+ *
+ * @flags: O_* flags (unknown flags ignored).
+ * @mode: O_CREAT file mode (ignored otherwise).
+ * @upgrade_mask: restrict how the O_PATH may be re-opened (ignored otherwise).
+ * @resolve: RESOLVE_* flags (-EINVAL on unknown flags).
+ * @reserved: reserved for future extensions, must be zeroed.
+ */
+struct open_how {
+ uint32_t flags;
+ union {
+ uint16_t mode;
+ uint16_t upgrade_mask;
+ };
+ uint16_t resolve;
+ uint64_t reserved[7]; /* must be zeroed */
+};
+
+#ifndef RESOLVE_INROOT
+/* how->resolve flags for openat2(2). */
+#define RESOLVE_NO_XDEV 0x01 /* Block mount-point crossings
+ (includes bind-mounts). */
+#define RESOLVE_NO_MAGICLINKS 0x02 /* Block traversal through procfs-style
+ "magic-links". */
+#define RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS 0x04 /* Block traversal through all symlinks
+ (implies OEXT_NO_MAGICLINKS) */
+#define RESOLVE_BENEATH 0x08 /* Block "lexical" trickery like
+ "..", symlinks, and absolute
+ paths which escape the dirfd. */
+#define RESOLVE_IN_ROOT 0x10 /* Make all jumps to "/" and ".."
+ be scoped inside the dirfd
+ (similar to chroot(2)). */
+#endif /* RESOLVE_IN_ROOT */
+
+#ifndef UPGRADE_NOREAD
+/* how->upgrade flags for openat2(2). */
+/* First bit is reserved for a future UPGRADE_NOEXEC flag. */
+#define UPGRADE_NOREAD 0x02 /* Block re-opening with MAY_READ. */
+#define UPGRADE_NOWRITE 0x04 /* Block re-opening with MAY_WRITE. */
+#endif /* UPGRADE_NOREAD */
+
+#ifndef O_EMPTYPATH
+#define O_EMPTYPATH 040000000
+#endif /* O_EMPTYPATH */
+
+#define E_func(func, ...) \
+ do { \
+ if (func(__VA_ARGS__) < 0) \
+ ksft_exit_fail_msg("%s:%d %s failed\n", \
+ __FILE__, __LINE__, #func);\
+ } while (0)
+
+#define E_mkdirat(...) E_func(mkdirat, __VA_ARGS__)
+#define E_symlinkat(...) E_func(symlinkat, __VA_ARGS__)
+#define E_touchat(...) E_func(touchat, __VA_ARGS__)
+#define E_readlink(...) E_func(readlink, __VA_ARGS__)
+#define E_fstatat(...) E_func(fstatat, __VA_ARGS__)
+#define E_asprintf(...) E_func(asprintf, __VA_ARGS__)
+#define E_fchdir(...) E_func(fchdir, __VA_ARGS__)
+#define E_mount(...) E_func(mount, __VA_ARGS__)
+#define E_unshare(...) E_func(unshare, __VA_ARGS__)
+#define E_setresuid(...) E_func(setresuid, __VA_ARGS__)
+#define E_chmod(...) E_func(chmod, __VA_ARGS__)
+
+#define E_assert(expr, msg, ...) \
+ do { \
+ if (!(expr)) \
+ ksft_exit_fail_msg("ASSERT(%s:%d) failed (%s): " msg "\n", \
+ __FILE__, __LINE__, #expr, ##__VA_ARGS__); \
+ } while (0)
+
+typedef int (*openfunc_t)(int dfd, const char *path, const struct open_how *how);
+
+int sys_openat2(int dfd, const char *path, const struct open_how *how);
+char *openat2_flags(const struct open_how *how);
+
+int sys_openat(int dfd, const char *path, const struct open_how *how);
+char *openat_flags(unsigned int flags);
+
+int sys_renameat2(int olddirfd, const char *oldpath,
+ int newdirfd, const char *newpath, unsigned int flags);
+
+int touchat(int dfd, const char *path);
+char *fdreadlink(int fd);
+bool fdequal(int fd, int dfd, const char *path);
+
+void test_openat2_supported(void);
+
+#endif /* __RESOLVEAT_H__ */
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/openat2/linkmode_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/openat2/linkmode_test.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..44fcba738686
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/openat2/linkmode_test.c
@@ -0,0 +1,333 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/*
+ * Author: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@...har.com>
+ * Copyright (C) 2018-2019 SUSE LLC.
+ */
+
+#define _GNU_SOURCE
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "../kselftest.h"
+#include "helpers.h"
+
+static mode_t fdmode(int fd)
+{
+ char *fdpath;
+ struct stat statbuf;
+ mode_t mode;
+
+ E_asprintf(&fdpath, "/proc/self/fd/%d", fd);
+ E_fstatat(AT_FDCWD, fdpath, &statbuf, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW);
+ mode = (statbuf.st_mode & ~S_IFMT);
+ free(fdpath);
+
+ return mode;
+}
+
+static int reopen_proc(int fd, unsigned int flags)
+{
+ int ret, saved_errno;
+ char *fdpath;
+
+ E_asprintf(&fdpath, "/proc/self/fd/%d", fd);
+ ret = open(fdpath, flags);
+ saved_errno = errno;
+ free(fdpath);
+
+ return ret >= 0 ? ret : -saved_errno;
+}
+
+static int reopen_oemptypath(int fd, unsigned int flags)
+{
+ int ret = openat(fd, "", O_EMPTYPATH | flags);
+ return ret >= 0 ? ret : -errno;
+}
+
+struct reopen_test {
+ openfunc_t open;
+ mode_t chmod_mode;
+ struct {
+ struct open_how how;
+ mode_t mode;
+ int err;
+ } orig, new;
+};
+
+static bool reopen(int fd, struct reopen_test *test)
+{
+ int newfd;
+ mode_t proc_mode;
+ bool failed = false;
+
+ /* Check that the proc mode is correct. */
+ proc_mode = fdmode(fd);
+ if (proc_mode != test->orig.mode) {
+ ksft_print_msg("incorrect fdmode (got[%o] != want[%o])\n",
+ proc_mode, test->orig.mode);
+ failed = true;
+ }
+
+ /* Re-open through /proc. */
+ newfd = reopen_proc(fd, test->new.how.flags);
+ if (newfd != test->new.err && (newfd < 0 || test->new.err < 0)) {
+ ksft_print_msg("/proc failure (%d != %d [%s])\n",
+ newfd, test->new.err, strerror(-test->new.err));
+ failed = true;
+ }
+ if (newfd >= 0) {
+ proc_mode = fdmode(newfd);
+ if (proc_mode != test->new.mode) {
+ ksft_print_msg("/proc wrong fdmode (got[%o] != want[%o])\n",
+ proc_mode, test->new.mode);
+ failed = true;
+ }
+ close(newfd);
+ }
+
+ /* Re-open with O_EMPTYPATH. */
+ newfd = reopen_oemptypath(fd, test->new.how.flags);
+ if (newfd != test->new.err && (newfd < 0 || test->new.err < 0)) {
+ ksft_print_msg("O_EMPTYPATH failure (%d != %d [%s])\n",
+ newfd, test->new.err, strerror(-test->new.err));
+ failed = true;
+ }
+ if (newfd >= 0) {
+ proc_mode = fdmode(newfd);
+ if (proc_mode != test->new.mode) {
+ ksft_print_msg("O_EMPTYPATH wrong fdmode (got[%o] != want[%o])\n",
+ proc_mode, test->new.mode);
+ failed = true;
+ }
+ close(newfd);
+ }
+
+ return failed;
+}
+
+#define NUM_REOPEN_TESTS 28
+
+void test_reopen_ordinary(bool privileged)
+{
+ int fd;
+ int err_access = privileged ? 0 : -EACCES;
+ char tmpfile[] = "/tmp/ksft-openat2-reopen-testfile.XXXXXX";
+
+ fd = mkstemp(tmpfile);
+ E_assert(fd >= 0, "mkstemp failed: %m\n");
+ close(fd);
+
+ struct reopen_test tests[] = {
+ /* Re-opening with the same mode should succeed. */
+ { .open = sys_openat, .chmod_mode = 0400,
+ .orig.how.flags = O_RDONLY, .orig.mode = 0500,
+ .new.how.flags = O_RDONLY, .new.mode = 0500 },
+ { .open = sys_openat, .chmod_mode = 0200,
+ .orig.how.flags = O_WRONLY, .orig.mode = 0300,
+ .new.how.flags = O_WRONLY, .new.mode = 0300 },
+ { .open = sys_openat, .chmod_mode = 0600,
+ .orig.how.flags = O_RDWR, .orig.mode = 0700,
+ .new.how.flags = O_RDWR, .new.mode = 0700 },
+ { .open = sys_openat, .chmod_mode = 0600,
+ .orig.how.flags = O_RDWR, .orig.mode = 0700,
+ .new.how.flags = O_RDONLY, .new.mode = 0500 },
+ { .open = sys_openat, .chmod_mode = 0600,
+ .orig.how.flags = O_RDWR, .orig.mode = 0700,
+ .new.how.flags = O_WRONLY, .new.mode = 0300 },
+
+ /*
+ * Re-opening with a different mode will always fail (with an obvious
+ * carve-out for privileged users).
+ */
+ { .open = sys_openat, .chmod_mode = 0600,
+ .orig.how.flags = O_RDONLY, .orig.mode = 0500,
+ .new.how.flags = O_WRONLY, .new.mode = 0300, .new.err = err_access },
+ { .open = sys_openat, .chmod_mode = 0600,
+ .orig.how.flags = O_WRONLY, .orig.mode = 0300,
+ .new.how.flags = O_RDONLY, .new.mode = 0500, .new.err = err_access },
+ { .open = sys_openat, .chmod_mode = 0600,
+ .orig.how.flags = O_RDONLY, .orig.mode = 0500,
+ .new.how.flags = O_RDWR, .new.mode = 0700, .new.err = err_access },
+ { .open = sys_openat, .chmod_mode = 0600,
+ .orig.how.flags = O_WRONLY, .orig.mode = 0300,
+ .new.how.flags = O_RDWR, .new.mode = 0700, .new.err = err_access },
+
+ /* Doubly so if they didn't even have permissions at open-time. */
+ { .open = sys_openat, .chmod_mode = 0400,
+ .orig.how.flags = O_RDONLY, .orig.mode = 0500,
+ .new.how.flags = O_WRONLY, .new.mode = 0300, .new.err = err_access },
+ { .open = sys_openat, .chmod_mode = 0200,
+ .orig.how.flags = O_WRONLY, .orig.mode = 0300,
+ .new.how.flags = O_RDONLY, .new.mode = 0500, .new.err = err_access },
+ { .open = sys_openat, .chmod_mode = 0400,
+ .orig.how.flags = O_RDONLY, .orig.mode = 0500,
+ .new.how.flags = O_RDWR, .new.mode = 0700, .new.err = err_access },
+ { .open = sys_openat, .chmod_mode = 0200,
+ .orig.how.flags = O_WRONLY, .orig.mode = 0300,
+ .new.how.flags = O_RDWR, .new.mode = 0700, .new.err = err_access },
+
+ /* O_PATH re-opens (of ordinary files) will always work. */
+ { .open = sys_openat, .chmod_mode = 0000,
+ .orig.how.flags = O_PATH, .orig.mode = 0070,
+ .new.how.flags = O_WRONLY, .new.mode = 0300 },
+ { .open = sys_openat2, .chmod_mode = 0000,
+ .orig.how.flags = O_PATH, .orig.mode = 0070,
+ .new.how.flags = O_WRONLY, .new.mode = 0300 },
+
+ { .open = sys_openat, .chmod_mode = 0000,
+ .orig.how.flags = O_PATH, .orig.mode = 0070,
+ .new.how.flags = O_RDONLY, .new.mode = 0500 },
+ { .open = sys_openat2, .chmod_mode = 0000,
+ .orig.how.flags = O_PATH, .orig.mode = 0070,
+ .new.how.flags = O_RDONLY, .new.mode = 0500 },
+
+ { .open = sys_openat, .chmod_mode = 0000,
+ .orig.how.flags = O_PATH, .orig.mode = 0070,
+ .new.how.flags = O_RDWR, .new.mode = 0700 },
+ { .open = sys_openat2, .chmod_mode = 0000,
+ .orig.how.flags = O_PATH, .orig.mode = 0070,
+ .new.how.flags = O_RDWR, .new.mode = 0700 },
+
+ /*
+ * openat2(2) UPGRADE_NO* flags. In the privileged case, the re-open
+ * will work but the mode will still be scoped to the mode (or'd with
+ * the open acc_mode).
+ */
+ { .open = sys_openat2, .chmod_mode = 0000,
+ .orig.how.flags = O_PATH, .orig.mode = 0010,
+ .orig.how.upgrade_mask = UPGRADE_NOREAD | UPGRADE_NOWRITE,
+ .new.how.flags = O_RDONLY, .new.mode = 0500, .new.err = err_access },
+ { .open = sys_openat2, .chmod_mode = 0000,
+ .orig.how.flags = O_PATH, .orig.mode = 0010,
+ .orig.how.upgrade_mask = UPGRADE_NOREAD | UPGRADE_NOWRITE,
+ .new.how.flags = O_WRONLY, .new.mode = 0300, .new.err = err_access },
+ { .open = sys_openat2, .chmod_mode = 0000,
+ .orig.how.flags = O_PATH, .orig.mode = 0010,
+ .orig.how.upgrade_mask = UPGRADE_NOREAD | UPGRADE_NOWRITE,
+ .new.how.flags = O_RDWR, .new.mode = 0700, .new.err = err_access },
+
+ { .open = sys_openat2, .chmod_mode = 0000,
+ .orig.how.flags = O_PATH, .orig.mode = 0050,
+ .orig.how.upgrade_mask = UPGRADE_NOWRITE,
+ .new.how.flags = O_RDONLY, .new.mode = 0500 },
+
+ { .open = sys_openat2, .chmod_mode = 0000,
+ .orig.how.flags = O_PATH, .orig.mode = 0030,
+ .orig.how.upgrade_mask = UPGRADE_NOREAD,
+ .new.how.flags = O_WRONLY, .new.mode = 0300 },
+
+ { .open = sys_openat2, .chmod_mode = 0000,
+ .orig.how.flags = O_PATH, .orig.mode = 0030,
+ .orig.how.upgrade_mask = UPGRADE_NOREAD,
+ .new.how.flags = O_RDONLY, .new.mode = 0500, .new.err = err_access },
+ { .open = sys_openat2, .chmod_mode = 0000,
+ .orig.how.flags = O_PATH, .orig.mode = 0050,
+ .orig.how.upgrade_mask = UPGRADE_NOWRITE,
+ .new.how.flags = O_WRONLY, .new.mode = 0300, .new.err = err_access },
+ { .open = sys_openat2, .chmod_mode = 0000,
+ .orig.how.flags = O_PATH, .orig.mode = 0030,
+ .orig.how.upgrade_mask = UPGRADE_NOREAD,
+ .new.how.flags = O_RDWR, .new.mode = 0700, .new.err = err_access },
+ { .open = sys_openat2, .chmod_mode = 0000,
+ .orig.how.flags = O_PATH, .orig.mode = 0050,
+ .orig.how.upgrade_mask = UPGRADE_NOWRITE,
+ .new.how.flags = O_RDWR, .new.mode = 0700, .new.err = err_access },
+ };
+
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_LEN(tests) != NUM_REOPEN_TESTS);
+
+ for (int i = 0; i < ARRAY_LEN(tests); i++) {
+ int fd;
+ char *orig_flagset, *new_flagset;
+ struct reopen_test *test = &tests[i];
+ void (*resultfn)(const char *msg, ...) = ksft_test_result_pass;
+
+ E_chmod(tmpfile, test->chmod_mode);
+
+ fd = test->open(AT_FDCWD, tmpfile, &test->orig.how);
+ E_assert(fd >= 0, "open '%s' failed: %m\n", tmpfile);
+
+ /* Make sure that any EACCES we see is not from inode permissions. */
+ E_chmod(tmpfile, 0777);
+
+ if (reopen(fd, test))
+ resultfn = ksft_test_result_fail;
+
+ close(fd);
+
+ new_flagset = openat_flags(test->new.how.flags);
+ if (test->open == sys_openat)
+ orig_flagset = openat_flags(test->orig.how.flags);
+ else if (test->open == sys_openat2)
+ orig_flagset = openat2_flags(&test->orig.how);
+ else
+ ksft_exit_fail_msg("unknown test->open\n");
+
+ resultfn("%sordinary reopen of (orig[%s]=%s, new=%s) chmod=%.3o %s\n",
+ privileged ? "privileged " : "",
+ test->open == sys_openat ? "openat" : "openat2",
+ orig_flagset, new_flagset, test->chmod_mode,
+ test->new.err < 0 ? strerror(-test->new.err) : "works");
+ fflush(stdout);
+
+ free(new_flagset);
+ free(orig_flagset);
+ }
+
+ unlink(tmpfile);
+}
+
+#define NUM_CLOEXEC_TESTS 1
+
+void test_openat2_cloexec_test(void)
+{
+ void (*resultfn)(const char *msg, ...) = ksft_test_result_pass;
+ struct open_how how = {
+ .flags = O_CLOEXEC | O_PATH | O_DIRECTORY,
+ };
+
+ int fd = sys_openat2(AT_FDCWD, ".", &how);
+ E_assert(fd >= 0, "open '.' failed: %m\n");
+
+ int flags = fcntl(fd, F_GETFD);
+ E_assert(flags >= 0, "F_GETFD failed: %m\n");
+
+ if (!(flags & FD_CLOEXEC))
+ resultfn = ksft_test_result_fail;
+
+ resultfn("openat2(O_CLOEXEC) works as expected\n");
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+ bool privileged;
+
+ ksft_print_header();
+ ksft_set_plan(2 * NUM_REOPEN_TESTS + NUM_CLOEXEC_TESTS);
+ test_openat2_supported();
+
+ /*
+ * Technically we should be checking CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE, but it's easier to
+ * just assume that euid=0 has the full capability set.
+ */
+ privileged = (geteuid() == 0);
+ if (!privileged)
+ ksft_test_result_skip("privileged tests require euid == 0\n");
+ else {
+ test_reopen_ordinary(privileged);
+
+ E_setresuid(65534, 65534, 65534);
+ privileged = (geteuid() == 0);
+ }
+
+ test_reopen_ordinary(privileged);
+ test_openat2_cloexec_test();
+
+ if (ksft_get_fail_cnt() + ksft_get_error_cnt() > 0)
+ ksft_exit_fail();
+ else
+ ksft_exit_pass();
+}
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/openat2/rename_attack_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/openat2/rename_attack_test.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..39b20ea185d5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/openat2/rename_attack_test.c
@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/*
+ * Author: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@...har.com>
+ * Copyright (C) 2018-2019 SUSE LLC.
+ */
+
+#define _GNU_SOURCE
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <sched.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/mount.h>
+#include <sys/mman.h>
+#include <sys/prctl.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <syscall.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "../kselftest.h"
+#include "helpers.h"
+
+/* Construct a test directory with the following structure:
+ *
+ * root/
+ * |-- a/
+ * | `-- c/
+ * `-- b/
+ */
+int setup_testdir(void)
+{
+ int dfd;
+ char dirname[] = "/tmp/ksft-openat2-rename-attack.XXXXXX";
+
+ /* Make the top-level directory. */
+ if (!mkdtemp(dirname))
+ ksft_exit_fail_msg("setup_testdir: failed to create tmpdir\n");
+ dfd = open(dirname, O_PATH | O_DIRECTORY);
+ if (dfd < 0)
+ ksft_exit_fail_msg("setup_testdir: failed to open tmpdir\n");
+
+ E_mkdirat(dfd, "a", 0755);
+ E_mkdirat(dfd, "b", 0755);
+ E_mkdirat(dfd, "a/c", 0755);
+
+ return dfd;
+}
+
+/* Swap @dirfd/@a and @dirfd/@b constantly. Parent must kill this process. */
+pid_t spawn_attack(int dirfd, char *a, char *b)
+{
+ pid_t child = fork();
+ if (child != 0)
+ return child;
+
+ /* If the parent (the test process) dies, kill ourselves too. */
+ prctl(PR_SET_PDEATHSIG, SIGKILL);
+
+ /* Swap @a and @b. */
+ for (;;)
+ renameat2(dirfd, a, dirfd, b, RENAME_EXCHANGE);
+ exit(1);
+}
+
+#define NUM_RENAME_TESTS 1
+#define ROUNDS 400000
+
+void test_rename_attack(void)
+{
+ int dfd, afd, escaped_count = 0;
+ void (*resultfn)(const char *msg, ...) = ksft_test_result_pass;
+ pid_t child;
+
+ dfd = setup_testdir();
+ afd = openat(dfd, "a", O_PATH);
+ if (afd < 0)
+ ksft_exit_fail_msg("test_rename_attack: failed to open 'a'\n");
+
+ child = spawn_attack(dfd, "a/c", "b");
+
+ for (int i = 0; i < ROUNDS; i++) {
+ int fd;
+ bool failed;
+ struct open_how how = {
+ .flags = O_PATH,
+ .resolve = RESOLVE_IN_ROOT,
+ };
+ char *victim_path = "c/../../c/../../c/../../c/../../c/../../c/../../c/../../c/../../c/../../c/../../c/../../c/../../c/../../c/../../c/../../c/../../c/../../c/../../c/../..";
+
+ fd = sys_openat2(afd, victim_path, &how);
+ if (fd < 0)
+ failed = (fd != -EXDEV);
+ else
+ failed = !fdequal(fd, afd, NULL);
+
+ escaped_count += failed;
+ close(fd);
+ }
+
+ if (escaped_count > 0)
+ resultfn = ksft_test_result_fail;
+
+ resultfn("rename attack fails (expected 0 breakouts in %d runs, got %d)\n",
+ ROUNDS, escaped_count);
+
+ /* Should be killed anyway, but might as well make sure. */
+ kill(child, SIGKILL);
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+ ksft_print_header();
+ ksft_set_plan(NUM_RENAME_TESTS);
+ test_openat2_supported();
+
+ test_rename_attack();
+
+ if (ksft_get_fail_cnt() + ksft_get_error_cnt() > 0)
+ ksft_exit_fail();
+ else
+ ksft_exit_pass();
+}
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/openat2/resolve_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/openat2/resolve_test.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..8ef3dbb7edbe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/openat2/resolve_test.c
@@ -0,0 +1,402 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/*
+ * Author: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@...har.com>
+ * Copyright (C) 2018-2019 SUSE LLC.
+ */
+
+#define _GNU_SOURCE
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <sched.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/mount.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "../kselftest.h"
+#include "helpers.h"
+
+/*
+ * Construct a test directory with the following structure:
+ *
+ * root/
+ * |-- procexe -> /proc/self/exe
+ * |-- procroot -> /proc/self/root
+ * |-- root/
+ * |-- mnt/ [mountpoint]
+ * | |-- self -> ../mnt/
+ * | `-- absself -> /mnt/
+ * |-- etc/
+ * | `-- passwd
+ * |-- creatlink -> /newfile3
+ * |-- relsym -> etc/passwd
+ * |-- abssym -> /etc/passwd
+ * |-- abscheeky -> /cheeky
+ * |-- abscheeky -> /cheeky
+ * `-- cheeky/
+ * |-- absself -> /
+ * |-- self -> ../../root/
+ * |-- garbageself -> /../../root/
+ * |-- passwd -> ../cheeky/../cheeky/../etc/../etc/passwd
+ * |-- abspasswd -> /../cheeky/../cheeky/../etc/../etc/passwd
+ * |-- dotdotlink -> ../../../../../../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd
+ * `-- garbagelink -> /../../../../../../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd
+ */
+int setup_testdir(void)
+{
+ int dfd, tmpfd;
+ char dirname[] = "/tmp/ksft-openat2-testdir.XXXXXX";
+
+ /* Unshare and make /tmp a new directory. */
+ E_unshare(CLONE_NEWNS);
+ E_mount("", "/tmp", "", MS_PRIVATE, "");
+
+ /* Make the top-level directory. */
+ if (!mkdtemp(dirname))
+ ksft_exit_fail_msg("setup_testdir: failed to create tmpdir\n");
+ dfd = open(dirname, O_PATH | O_DIRECTORY);
+ if (dfd < 0)
+ ksft_exit_fail_msg("setup_testdir: failed to open tmpdir\n");
+
+ /* A sub-directory which is actually used for tests. */
+ E_mkdirat(dfd, "root", 0755);
+ tmpfd = openat(dfd, "root", O_PATH | O_DIRECTORY);
+ if (tmpfd < 0)
+ ksft_exit_fail_msg("setup_testdir: failed to open tmpdir\n");
+ close(dfd);
+ dfd = tmpfd;
+
+ E_symlinkat("/proc/self/exe", dfd, "procexe");
+ E_symlinkat("/proc/self/root", dfd, "procroot");
+ E_mkdirat(dfd, "root", 0755);
+
+ /* There is no mountat(2), so use chdir. */
+ E_mkdirat(dfd, "mnt", 0755);
+ E_fchdir(dfd);
+ E_mount("tmpfs", "./mnt", "tmpfs", MS_NOSUID | MS_NODEV, "");
+ E_symlinkat("../mnt/", dfd, "mnt/self");
+ E_symlinkat("/mnt/", dfd, "mnt/absself");
+
+ E_mkdirat(dfd, "etc", 0755);
+ E_touchat(dfd, "etc/passwd");
+
+ E_symlinkat("/newfile3", dfd, "creatlink");
+ E_symlinkat("etc/passwd", dfd, "relsym");
+ E_symlinkat("/etc/passwd", dfd, "abssym");
+ E_symlinkat("/cheeky", dfd, "abscheeky");
+
+ E_mkdirat(dfd, "cheeky", 0755);
+
+ E_symlinkat("/", dfd, "cheeky/absself");
+ E_symlinkat("../../root/", dfd, "cheeky/self");
+ E_symlinkat("/../../root/", dfd, "cheeky/garbageself");
+
+ E_symlinkat("../cheeky/../etc/../etc/passwd", dfd, "cheeky/passwd");
+ E_symlinkat("/../cheeky/../etc/../etc/passwd", dfd, "cheeky/abspasswd");
+
+ E_symlinkat("../../../../../../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd",
+ dfd, "cheeky/dotdotlink");
+ E_symlinkat("/../../../../../../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd",
+ dfd, "cheeky/garbagelink");
+
+ return dfd;
+}
+
+struct basic_test {
+ const char *dir;
+ const char *path;
+ struct open_how how;
+ bool pass;
+ union {
+ int err;
+ const char *path;
+ } out;
+};
+
+#define NUM_OPENAT2_OPATH_TESTS 84
+
+void test_openat2_opath_tests(void)
+{
+ int rootfd;
+ char *procselfexe;
+
+ E_asprintf(&procselfexe, "/proc/%d/exe", getpid());
+ rootfd = setup_testdir();
+
+ struct basic_test tests[] = {
+ /** RESOLVE_BENEATH **/
+ /* Attempts to cross dirfd should be blocked. */
+ { .path = "/", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_BENEATH,
+ .out.err = -EXDEV, .pass = false },
+ { .path = "cheeky/absself", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_BENEATH,
+ .out.err = -EXDEV, .pass = false },
+ { .path = "abscheeky/absself", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_BENEATH,
+ .out.err = -EXDEV, .pass = false },
+ { .path = "..", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_BENEATH,
+ .out.err = -EXDEV, .pass = false },
+ { .path = "../root/", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_BENEATH,
+ .out.err = -EXDEV, .pass = false },
+ { .path = "cheeky/self", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_BENEATH,
+ .out.err = -EXDEV, .pass = false },
+ { .path = "abscheeky/self", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_BENEATH,
+ .out.err = -EXDEV, .pass = false },
+ { .path = "cheeky/garbageself", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_BENEATH,
+ .out.err = -EXDEV, .pass = false },
+ { .path = "abscheeky/garbageself", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_BENEATH,
+ .out.err = -EXDEV, .pass = false },
+ /* Only relative paths that stay inside dirfd should work. */
+ { .path = "root", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_BENEATH,
+ .out.path = "root", .pass = true },
+ { .path = "etc", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_BENEATH,
+ .out.path = "etc", .pass = true },
+ { .path = "etc/passwd", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_BENEATH,
+ .out.path = "etc/passwd", .pass = true },
+ { .path = "relsym", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_BENEATH,
+ .out.path = "etc/passwd", .pass = true },
+ { .path = "cheeky/passwd", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_BENEATH,
+ .out.path = "etc/passwd", .pass = true },
+ { .path = "abscheeky/passwd", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_BENEATH,
+ .out.err = -EXDEV, .pass = false },
+ { .path = "abssym", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_BENEATH,
+ .out.err = -EXDEV, .pass = false },
+ { .path = "/etc/passwd", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_BENEATH,
+ .out.err = -EXDEV, .pass = false },
+ { .path = "cheeky/abspasswd", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_BENEATH,
+ .out.err = -EXDEV, .pass = false },
+ { .path = "abscheeky/abspasswd", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_BENEATH,
+ .out.err = -EXDEV, .pass = false },
+ /* Tricky paths should fail. */
+ { .path = "cheeky/dotdotlink", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_BENEATH,
+ .out.err = -EXDEV, .pass = false },
+ { .path = "abscheeky/dotdotlink", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_BENEATH,
+ .out.err = -EXDEV, .pass = false },
+ { .path = "cheeky/garbagelink", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_BENEATH,
+ .out.err = -EXDEV, .pass = false },
+ { .path = "abscheeky/garbagelink", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_BENEATH,
+ .out.err = -EXDEV, .pass = false },
+
+ /** RESOLVE_IN_ROOT **/
+ /* All attempts to cross the dirfd will be scoped-to-root. */
+ { .path = "/", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_IN_ROOT,
+ .out.path = NULL, .pass = true },
+ { .path = "cheeky/absself", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_IN_ROOT,
+ .out.path = NULL, .pass = true },
+ { .path = "abscheeky/absself", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_IN_ROOT,
+ .out.path = NULL, .pass = true },
+ { .path = "..", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_IN_ROOT,
+ .out.path = NULL, .pass = true },
+ { .path = "../root/", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_IN_ROOT,
+ .out.path = "root", .pass = true },
+ { .path = "../root/", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_IN_ROOT,
+ .out.path = "root", .pass = true },
+ { .path = "cheeky/self", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_IN_ROOT,
+ .out.path = "root", .pass = true },
+ { .path = "cheeky/garbageself", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_IN_ROOT,
+ .out.path = "root", .pass = true },
+ { .path = "abscheeky/garbageself", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_IN_ROOT,
+ .out.path = "root", .pass = true },
+ { .path = "root", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_IN_ROOT,
+ .out.path = "root", .pass = true },
+ { .path = "etc", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_IN_ROOT,
+ .out.path = "etc", .pass = true },
+ { .path = "etc/passwd", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_IN_ROOT,
+ .out.path = "etc/passwd", .pass = true },
+ { .path = "relsym", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_IN_ROOT,
+ .out.path = "etc/passwd", .pass = true },
+ { .path = "cheeky/passwd", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_IN_ROOT,
+ .out.path = "etc/passwd", .pass = true },
+ { .path = "abscheeky/passwd", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_IN_ROOT,
+ .out.path = "etc/passwd", .pass = true },
+ { .path = "abssym", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_IN_ROOT,
+ .out.path = "etc/passwd", .pass = true },
+ { .path = "/etc/passwd", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_IN_ROOT,
+ .out.path = "etc/passwd", .pass = true },
+ { .path = "cheeky/abspasswd", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_IN_ROOT,
+ .out.path = "etc/passwd", .pass = true },
+ { .path = "abscheeky/abspasswd", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_IN_ROOT,
+ .out.path = "etc/passwd", .pass = true },
+ { .path = "cheeky/dotdotlink", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_IN_ROOT,
+ .out.path = "etc/passwd", .pass = true },
+ { .path = "abscheeky/dotdotlink", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_IN_ROOT,
+ .out.path = "etc/passwd", .pass = true },
+ { .path = "/../../../../abscheeky/dotdotlink", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_IN_ROOT,
+ .out.path = "etc/passwd", .pass = true },
+ { .path = "cheeky/garbagelink", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_IN_ROOT,
+ .out.path = "etc/passwd", .pass = true },
+ { .path = "abscheeky/garbagelink", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_IN_ROOT,
+ .out.path = "etc/passwd", .pass = true },
+ { .path = "/../../../../abscheeky/garbagelink", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_IN_ROOT,
+ .out.path = "etc/passwd", .pass = true },
+ /* O_CREAT should handle trailing symlinks correctly. */
+ { .path = "newfile1", .how.flags = O_CREAT,
+ .how.mode = 0700,
+ .how.resolve = RESOLVE_IN_ROOT,
+ .out.path = "newfile1", .pass = true },
+ { .path = "/newfile2", .how.flags = O_CREAT,
+ .how.mode = 0700,
+ .how.resolve = RESOLVE_IN_ROOT,
+ .out.path = "newfile2", .pass = true },
+ { .path = "/creatlink", .how.flags = O_CREAT,
+ .how.mode = 0700,
+ .how.resolve = RESOLVE_IN_ROOT,
+ .out.path = "newfile3", .pass = true },
+
+ /** RESOLVE_NO_XDEV **/
+ /* Crossing *down* into a mountpoint is disallowed. */
+ { .path = "mnt", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_NO_XDEV,
+ .out.err = -EXDEV, .pass = false },
+ { .path = "mnt/", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_NO_XDEV,
+ .out.err = -EXDEV, .pass = false },
+ { .path = "mnt/.", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_NO_XDEV,
+ .out.err = -EXDEV, .pass = false },
+ /* Crossing *up* out of a mountpoint is disallowed. */
+ { .dir = "mnt", .path = ".", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_NO_XDEV,
+ .out.path = "mnt", .pass = true },
+ { .dir = "mnt", .path = "..", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_NO_XDEV,
+ .out.err = -EXDEV, .pass = false },
+ { .dir = "mnt", .path = "../mnt", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_NO_XDEV,
+ .out.err = -EXDEV, .pass = false },
+ { .dir = "mnt", .path = "self", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_NO_XDEV,
+ .out.err = -EXDEV, .pass = false },
+ { .dir = "mnt", .path = "absself", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_NO_XDEV,
+ .out.err = -EXDEV, .pass = false },
+ /* Jumping to "/" is ok, but later components cannot cross. */
+ { .dir = "mnt", .path = "/", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_NO_XDEV,
+ .out.path = "/", .pass = true },
+ { .dir = "/", .path = "/", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_NO_XDEV,
+ .out.path = "/", .pass = true },
+ { .path = "/proc/1", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_NO_XDEV,
+ .out.err = -EXDEV, .pass = false },
+ { .path = "/tmp", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_NO_XDEV,
+ .out.err = -EXDEV, .pass = false },
+
+ /** RESOLVE_NO_MAGICLINKS **/
+ /* Regular symlinks should work. */
+ { .path = "relsym", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_NO_MAGICLINKS,
+ .out.path = "etc/passwd", .pass = true },
+ /* Magic-links should not work. */
+ { .path = "procexe", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_NO_MAGICLINKS,
+ .out.err = -ELOOP, .pass = false },
+ { .path = "/proc/self/exe", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_NO_MAGICLINKS,
+ .out.err = -ELOOP, .pass = false },
+ { .path = "procroot/etc", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_NO_MAGICLINKS,
+ .out.err = -ELOOP, .pass = false },
+ { .path = "/proc/self/root/etc", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_NO_MAGICLINKS,
+ .out.err = -ELOOP, .pass = false },
+ { .path = "/proc/self/root/etc", .how.flags = O_NOFOLLOW,
+ .how.resolve = RESOLVE_NO_MAGICLINKS,
+ .out.err = -ELOOP, .pass = false },
+ { .path = "/proc/self/exe", .how.flags = O_NOFOLLOW,
+ .how.resolve = RESOLVE_NO_MAGICLINKS,
+ .out.path = procselfexe, .pass = true },
+
+ /** RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS **/
+ /* Normal paths should work. */
+ { .path = ".", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS,
+ .out.path = NULL, .pass = true },
+ { .path = "root", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS,
+ .out.path = "root", .pass = true },
+ { .path = "etc", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS,
+ .out.path = "etc", .pass = true },
+ { .path = "etc/passwd", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS,
+ .out.path = "etc/passwd", .pass = true },
+ /* Regular symlinks are blocked. */
+ { .path = "relsym", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS,
+ .out.err = -ELOOP, .pass = false },
+ { .path = "abssym", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS,
+ .out.err = -ELOOP, .pass = false },
+ { .path = "cheeky/garbagelink", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS,
+ .out.err = -ELOOP, .pass = false },
+ { .path = "abscheeky/garbagelink", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS,
+ .out.err = -ELOOP, .pass = false },
+ { .path = "abscheeky/absself", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS,
+ .out.err = -ELOOP, .pass = false },
+ /* Trailing symlinks with NO_FOLLOW. */
+ { .path = "relsym", .how.flags = O_NOFOLLOW,
+ .how.resolve = RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS,
+ .out.path = "relsym", .pass = true },
+ { .path = "abssym", .how.flags = O_NOFOLLOW,
+ .how.resolve = RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS,
+ .out.path = "abssym", .pass = true },
+ { .path = "cheeky/garbagelink", .how.flags = O_NOFOLLOW,
+ .how.resolve = RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS,
+ .out.path = "cheeky/garbagelink", .pass = true },
+ { .path = "abscheeky/garbagelink", .how.flags = O_NOFOLLOW,
+ .how.resolve = RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS,
+ .out.err = -ELOOP, .pass = false },
+ { .path = "abscheeky/absself", .how.flags = O_NOFOLLOW,
+ .how.resolve = RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS,
+ .out.err = -ELOOP, .pass = false },
+ };
+
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_LEN(tests) != NUM_OPENAT2_OPATH_TESTS);
+
+ for (int i = 0; i < ARRAY_LEN(tests); i++) {
+ int dfd, fd;
+ bool failed;
+ void (*resultfn)(const char *msg, ...) = ksft_test_result_pass;
+ struct basic_test *test = &tests[i];
+ char *flagstr;
+
+ /* Auto-set O_PATH. */
+ if (!(test->how.flags & O_CREAT))
+ test->how.flags |= O_PATH;
+ flagstr = openat2_flags(&test->how);
+
+ if (test->dir)
+ dfd = openat(rootfd, test->dir, O_PATH | O_DIRECTORY);
+ else
+ dfd = dup(rootfd);
+ if (dfd < 0) {
+ resultfn = ksft_test_result_error;
+ goto next;
+ }
+
+ fd = sys_openat2(dfd, test->path, &test->how);
+ if (test->pass)
+ failed = (fd < 0 || !fdequal(fd, rootfd, test->out.path));
+ else
+ failed = (fd != test->out.err);
+ if (fd >= 0)
+ close(fd);
+ close(dfd);
+
+ if (failed)
+ resultfn = ksft_test_result_fail;
+
+next:
+ if (test->pass)
+ resultfn("openat2(root[%s], %s, %s) ==> %s\n",
+ test->dir ?: ".", test->path, flagstr,
+ test->out.path ?: ".");
+ else
+ resultfn("openat2(root[%s], %s, %s) ==> %d (%s)\n",
+ test->dir ?: ".", test->path, flagstr,
+ test->out.err, strerror(-test->out.err));
+ fflush(stdout);
+
+ free(flagstr);
+ }
+
+ free(procselfexe);
+ close(rootfd);
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+ ksft_print_header();
+ ksft_set_plan(NUM_OPENAT2_OPATH_TESTS);
+ test_openat2_supported();
+
+ /* NOTE: We should be checking for CAP_SYS_ADMIN here... */
+ if (geteuid() != 0)
+ ksft_exit_skip("openat2(2) tests require euid == 0\n");
+
+ test_openat2_opath_tests();
+
+ if (ksft_get_fail_cnt() + ksft_get_error_cnt() > 0)
+ ksft_exit_fail();
+ else
+ ksft_exit_pass();
+}
--
2.22.0
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