linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v12 00/11] Appended signatures support for IMA appraisal

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Date:   Mon, 26 Aug 2019 15:46:57 -0700
From:   Jordan Hand <jorhand@...ux.microsoft.com>
To:     Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@...ux.ibm.com>,
        linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, keyrings@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@...ts.ozlabs.org,
        linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>,
        Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com>,
        James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
        "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
        David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
        David Woodhouse <dwmw2@...radead.org>,
        Jessica Yu <jeyu@...nel.org>,
        Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
        "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
        Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
        "AKASHI, Takahiro" <takahiro.akashi@...aro.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v12 00/11] Appended signatures support for IMA appraisal

On 6/27/19 7:19 PM, Thiago Jung Bauermann wrote:
> On the OpenPOWER platform, secure boot and trusted boot are being
> implemented using IMA for taking measurements and verifying signatures.
> Since the kernel image on Power servers is an ELF binary, kernels are
> signed using the scripts/sign-file tool and thus use the same signature
> format as signed kernel modules.
> 
> This patch series adds support in IMA for verifying those signatures.
> It adds flexibility to OpenPOWER secure boot, because it allows it to boot
> kernels with the signature appended to them as well as kernels where the
> signature is stored in the IMA extended attribute.

I know this is pretty late, but I just wanted to let you know that I
tested this patch set on x86_64 with QEMU.

That is, I enrolled a key to _ima keyring, signed my kernel and modules
with appended signatures (with scripts/sign-file), set the IMA policy to
appraise and measure my kernel and modules. Also tested kexec appraisal.

You can add my tested-by if you'd like.

-Jordan