linux-kernel - [PATCH 0/5] perf: Treat perf_event_paranoid and kptr

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Message-ID: <1566869956-7154-1-git-send-email-ilubashe@akamai.com>
Date:   Mon, 26 Aug 2019 21:39:11 -0400
From:   Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@...mai.com>
To:     Jiri Olsa <jolsa@...nel.org>,
        Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@...hat.com>,
        Mathieu Poirier <mathieu.poirier@...aro.org>
CC:     Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@...mai.com>,
        Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@...ux.intel.com>,
        Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@...ux.intel.com>,
        James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
        Namhyung Kim <namhyung@...nel.org>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Suzuki Poulouse <suzuki.poulose@....com>,
        <linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org>,
        Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 0/5] perf: Treat perf_event_paranoid and kptr_restrict like the kernel does it

This is a follow up series to the ensure perf treats perf_event_paranoid and
kptr_restrict in a way that is similar to the kernel's.  That includes use of
capabilities instead of euid==0, when possible, as well as adjusting the logic
and fixing bugs.

Prior discussion: https://lkml.kernel.org/lkml/cover.1565188228.git.ilubashe@akamai.com

===  Testing notes ===

I have tested on x86 with perf binary installed according to
Documentation/admin-guide/perf-security.rst (cap_sys_admin, cap_sys_ptrace,
cap_syslog assigned to the perf executable).

I tested each permutation of:

  * 7 commits:
      1. HEAD of perf/core
      2. patch 01 on top of perf/core
      3. patches 01-02 on top of perf/core
      4. patches 01-03 on top of perf/core
      5. patches 01-04 on top of perf/core
      6. patches 01-05 on top of perf/core
      7. HEAD of perf/cap (with known bug fixed by patch 01 of this series)

  * 2 build environments: with and without libcap-dev

  * 3 kernel.kptr_restrict values: 0, 1, 2

  * 4 kernel.perf_event_paranoid values: -1, 0, 1, 2

  * 2 users: root and non-root

Total: 336 permutations

Each permutation consisted of:
  perf test
  perf record -e instructions -- sleep 1

All test runs were expected.  Also, as expected, the following permutation (just
that permutation) resulted in segmentation failure:
 commit:                     perf/cap
 build:                      no libcap-dev
 kernel.kptr_restrict:       0
 kernel.perf_event_paranoid: 2
 user:                       non-root

The perf/cap commit was included in the test to ensure that we can reproduce the
crash and hence test that the patch series fixes the crash, while retaining the
desired behavior of perf/cap.

=== Series Contents ===

  01: perf event: Check ref_reloc_sym before using it
    Fix the pre-existing cause of the crash above: use of ref_reloc_sym without
    a check for NULL

  02: perf tools: Use CAP_SYS_ADMIN with perf_event_paranoid checks
    Replace the use of euid==0 with a check for CAP_SYS_ADMIN whenever
    perf_event_paranoid level is verified.
    * This patch has been reviewed previously and is unchanged.
    * I kept Acks and Sign-offs.

  03: perf util: kernel profiling is disallowed only when perf_event_paranoid>1
    Align perf logic regarding perf_event_paranoid to match kernel's.
    This has been reported by Arnaldo.

  04: perf symbols: Use CAP_SYSLOG with kptr_restrict checks
    Replace the use of uid and euid with a check for CAP_SYSLOG when
    kptr_restrict is verified (similar to kernel/kallsyms.c and lib/vsprintf.c).
    Consult perf_event_paranoid when kptr_restrict==0 (see kernel/kallsyms.c).
    * A previous version of this patch has been reviewed previously, but I
    * modified it in a non-trivial way, so I removed Acks.

  05: perf: warn perf_event_paranoid restrict kernel symbols
    Warn that /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid can also restrict kernel
    symbols.

Igor Lubashev (5):
  perf event: Check ref_reloc_sym before using it
  perf tools: Use CAP_SYS_ADMIN with perf_event_paranoid checks
  perf util: kernel profiling is disallowed only when perf_event_paranoid > 1
  perf symbols: Use CAP_SYSLOG with kptr_restrict checks
  perf: warn that perf_event_paranoid can restrict kernel symbols

 tools/perf/arch/arm/util/cs-etm.c    |  3 ++-
 tools/perf/arch/arm64/util/arm-spe.c |  3 ++-
 tools/perf/arch/x86/util/intel-bts.c |  3 ++-
 tools/perf/arch/x86/util/intel-pt.c  |  2 +-
 tools/perf/builtin-record.c          |  2 +-
 tools/perf/builtin-top.c             |  2 +-
 tools/perf/builtin-trace.c           |  2 +-
 tools/perf/util/event.c              |  7 ++++---
 tools/perf/util/evsel.c              |  2 +-
 tools/perf/util/symbol.c             | 15 ++++++++++++---
 10 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)

-- 
2.7.4